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Moral decisions are some of the most important decisions we make; often resulting in 
significant consequences for ourselves and others. In circumstances where there is little time 
for deliberation (Kahneman, 2003) or we are uncertain about the right course of action, we 
are likely to rely on other forms of emotional and bodily intuition to guide our decision-
making or behaviour (Damasio, 1996). There is a wealth of research supporting the relevance 
of somatic signals for guiding moral decision-making. In particular, in response to moral 
dilemmas concerning the harm of others, a negative arousal response pattern is associated 
with inclinations to reject harmful action (e.g. Cushman et al., 2012; Greene et al., 2001). 
Importantly, the extent to which we perceive and interpret internal sensations varies a great 
deal between individuals. Interoception is a multi-dimensional concept (Garfinkel & 
Critchley, 2013) which refers to our perceptual experiences of visceral sensations. There has 
been no prior empirical research specifically investigating individual differences in 
interoception in the relationship between emotional arousal and moral decision-making. This 
PhD thesis explored whether individual differences across a range of interoceptive 
dimensions influenced moral judgments and actions, and whether this was linked to 
concurrent visceral events and experiences such as physiological arousal, emotional state or 
hunger. Cardiac and gastrointestinal measures of interoception were used to understand 
whether interoceptive sensitivities across these systems were aligned or diverged in their 
relationship with moral judgment and arousal. Text-based and immersive virtual reality moral 
dilemmas were used to explore moral judgments and behaviour. We found individual 
differences in interoceptive sensibility indirectly predicted harm aversion responses to 
egocentric moral judgments. In contrast, subjective sensations of hunger predicted allocentric 
judgments of unprofitable harmful acts. Most significantly, we found an ability to 
consciously direct attention to heartbeats modulated the relationship between changes in 
physiological arousal and moral judgments and behaviour. Finally, we found that a tendency 
to worry about painful or unpleasant bodily sensations may predispose people to appraise the 
harm and suffering of others depicted in coronavirus media articles as more salient; 






When facing difficult situations which threaten our personal or moral values we are 
often advised to “Trust your gut” or “Listen to your heart”. These phrases carry an implicit 
assumption that subtle and often impalpable physiological sensations can provide value in 
guiding us towards the ‘right’ decision. Interoception is a perceptual capacity that refers to 
our experiences of such visceral sensations inside the body which are inherently associated 
with processes of homeostatic regulation and error-perception (Craig, 2015, Ullsperger et al., 
2010). Interoception is a multi-dimensional construct (Garfinkel & Critchley, 2013) and can 
be explored across a range of visceral domains including the cardiovascular system, 
respiratory system, gastric sensitivity, and pain (Craig, 2015). There is growing evidence that 
our subconscious and conscious perception of visceral sensations shares a common neural 
basis with emotion, motivation and overt behaviour (Feldman Barrett et al., 2004; Craig, 
2015; Damasio, 1996; Farb et al., 2015). Furthermore, there is increasing evidence for the 
central role of somatic markers in moral decision-making and moral action (Damasio, 1996; 
Greene et al., 2001; Teper et al., 2015; McDonald et al., 2017).  
Yet, there is a lack of research investigating whether distinct facets of interoception, 
such as our interpretation of internal sensations or accuracy in perceiving them, are related to 
decision-making and behaviour in moral dilemma scenarios. Virtual-reality (VR) technology 
provides exciting opportunities for the study of moral behaviour, moving beyond traditional 
text-based thought experiments into the realm of immersive moral dilemmas with increasing 
sensorimotor control (Francis et al., 2017; Pan & Slater, 2011). Moreover, studying moral 
behaviour in more ecologically valid environments could provide useful applications for 
understanding ‘real world’ behaviour (Pan & Slater, 2011) such as in occupational contexts 
like the NHS or police force, where moral decisions are frequently made and have profound 
consequences for the wellbeing of others (Francis et al., 2018). This PhD research explored 
the role of interoception in moral decision-making and moral behaviour across four studies 
implementing a range of physiological measures, including an immersive VR simulation of a 
moral dilemma.  
The following literature review begins with a focus on interoception; including its 
neural bases (Craig, 2015), theoretical models of interoceptive processing (Ainley et al., 
2016; Seth, 2013), measurement of interoceptive constructs (Garfinkel & Critchley, 2013) 
and overt behavioural responses associated with interoception. Empirical evidence and 
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theoretical accounts supporting a link between physiological and emotional arousal and moral 
decision-making are then discussed, followed by a review of more recent studies using virtual 
reality paradigms to explore harm-based moral behaviour. Following this, the research 
studies are presented within broader reflective commentary. Study 1 explored whether 
hunger, thirst, interoceptive sensibility and momentary emotional state influenced moral 
judgments of harm in an online cross-sectional design. Study 2 measured several parameters 
of physiological arousal and cardiac and gastric measures of interoception in an experimental 
lab study, to explore the link between arousal, interoception and moral judgments of harm. 
Study 3 investigated the relationship between physiological arousal, moral behaviour 
(harmful action) and interoception in immersive VR moral dilemma scenarios in a semi-
autonomous vehicle. Study 4 investigated the effects of harm-salience and frame-type of 
coronavirus media articles and interoceptive sensibility, on behavioural intentions during the 
pandemic and moral judgments about the treatment of coronavirus patients. 
Interoception 
Interoception is fundamentally linked with the homeostatic regulation of bodily 
functions and refers to our perceptual experiences of internal events produced by the states 
and processes of our physiological body and organs (Craig, 2015; Farb et al., 2015). 
Interoceptive signals (inside the body) are different from exteroceptive signals (outside the 
body) and proprioceptive signals (signals relating to body position and movement) (Craig, 
2015; Schulz, 2015). The integration of visceral signals with proprioceptive and 
exteroceptive signals gives rise to dynamic internal representations of the self and the 
external world (Farb et al., 2015; Seth, Suzuki & Critchley, 2012). Furthermore, increasing 
evidence suggests interoceptive signals are centrally important in generating subjective 
experiences of emotion and motivation (Craig, 2015; Feldman Barrett, 2017; Seth, 2013).  
Subjective feeling states are believed to result from interoceptive representations of affect-
laden motivations; specifically, activity in the autonomic nervous system is proposed to elicit 
behavioural responses we concurrently ‘feel’ or experience (Craig, 2015). Interoception has 
shown to be directly and indirectly related to a range of psychological processes including 
attention and perception, cognition, memory and overt behaviour (for a review, see Farb et 
al., 2015; Tsakiris & Critchley, 2016). Although there is some evidence for a more general 
interoceptive ability that is consistent across visceral channels, such as relationships between 
heartbeat detection accuracy, gastric sensitivity (Herbert et al., 2012) and pain sensitivity 
(Pollatos et al., 2012), interoception is generally regarded as a multidimensional phenomenon 
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consisting of sub-constructs that may sometimes be interrelated but are largely independent 
(Ferentzi, et al., 2018a, 2018b; Garfinkel et al., 2015; Werner, Duschek, et al., 2009). There 
are a range of sensory receptors in the body which give rise to sensory information (Craig, 
2015; Schulz, 2015):  
1) Exteroceptors: e.g. mechanoreceptors in the skin, which process external sensory 
information. Occasionally body-internal events like heartbeats could be partially 
processed via exteroceptive somatosensory receptors. 
2) Proprioceptors: e.g. the spindles of skeletal muscles. These receptors provide 
information related to body position, tension and muscle movement. 
3) Interoceptors: these include a range of mechano-, chemo-, thermo- and 
metaboreceptors within the visceral organs which altogether constitute ‘interoception’ 
(Craig, 2015; Schulz, 2015). 
 
Information from interoceptors is communicated to the central nervous system, with a 
large proportion transmitted via the brainstem or spinal cord below conscious perception 
(Craig, 2015). Interoceptive information is likely to reach consciousness if interoceptive 
information surpasses a fixed range of ‘normal functioning’ (Schulz, 2015). The nucleus 
tractus solutarius is the primary sensory brainstem for visceral-afferent information, with 
reflex circuits regulating homeostasis in physiological processes (Schulz, 2015). Brain areas 
implicated in the processing of interoceptive signals are the anterior cingulate cortex, anterior 
insula, somatosensory cortex and the prefrontal cortex, with the thalamus also responsible for 
the processing and perception of bodily signals (Schulz, 2015). The processing of 
interoceptive signals, like breathing or heartbeats can generate unique electrocortical 
potentials, such as heartbeat-evoked potentials (HEP’s), which can be observed in the 
aforementioned brain regions (Pollatos et al., 2005; Schultz, 2015). Interoceptor subtypes can 
be distinguished by their functionality, for example, receptors may be responsive to pressure 
or movement (mechanoreceptors) or to temperature change above or below certain thresholds 
(thermoreceptors) (Schulz, 2015). They can also be characterised by their adaptability (i.e. 
how quickly they adapt to stimulation), and their sensory threshold, for example different 
subgroups of baroreceptors in arterial blood vessels are sensitive to changes in blood pressure 
within different ranges (see Schulz, 2015 for a review).  
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Predictive coding models of interoception 
From a functional neuroanatomy perspective, Craig (2015) proposes the principle of 
optimal energy utilization is responsible for the evolution of humans’ perceptual capacity for 
subjective affect and emotions. Evidence strongly suggests feelings we experience in the 
body represent discrete sensations integrally coloured by strong positive or negative affect 
(Feldman Barrett, 2017). These affect-laden sensations are fundamentally linked to 
motivations driving behavioural responses necessary to sustain the health and functioning of 
the body (Craig, 2015; Seth & Friston, 2016). In this way, the brain uses interoceptive 
information like a form of currency for homeostatic valuation i.e. weighing up the costs and 
benefits of any current or potential behaviours for the overall functioning of the body. This 
valuation process enables the most energy-efficient behavioural response (Craig, 2015).  
The embodied nature of emotions proposed by Craig (2015) is a unifying premise of 
earlier neurophysiological theories of emotion. The James-Lange theory was the first to 
conceptualise emotional experience as fundamentally linked to the perception of changes in 
bodily state which are cognitively contextualised (Lang, 1994). Furthermore, Higgin’s self-
discrepancy theory (1987) hypothesised an adaptive basis of comparing sensed and expected 
sensations as a necessary process to bring our awareness toward unexpected changes in 
physiology which need to be attended to, as well as comparing current and predicted future 
states as a means to facilitate action. More recently, the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH; 
Damasio, 1996) developed from research into emotion-based learning, suggests a central role 
for the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in processing somatic markers in the body. The SMH 
explains how afferent signals from visceral organs that are indicative of outcomes associated 
with reward and punishment, have the potential to bias cognitive processes, judgments and 
behaviours (Damasio, 1996). More recent interpretations of the link between physiological 
arousal and emotion emphasise that patterns of physiology in the body do not automatically 
map onto feeling states, rather, it is the sensitivity to, or perception of, subtle somatosensory 
signals that contribute to subjective experiences of affect (Feldman Barrett et al., 2004; 
Feldman Barrett, 2017). For example, individuals more attuned to their internal processes 
report more intense emotional responses (Wiens et al., 2000).  
Functional accounts of the predictive power of interoceptive signals to influence 
decision-making and motivate behaviour can be assimilated with computational neuroscience 
models of the ‘Bayesian Brain’ (Friston, 2010). Bayesian perspectives describe neural 
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processes as inherently statistical, as the brain produces probability-driven hypotheses for 
stimuli encountered in the environment, which are then compared with incoming sensory 
information (Friston, 2010; Seth, 2013; Seth & Friston, 2016). This theory has been applied 
to interoceptive signalling, hypothesising how Bayesian probability distributions about states 
in the world give rise to internal sensations. ‘Hypotheses’ and ‘beliefs’ are proposed to 
represent neuronally encoded probabilities about the internal or external causes of sensory 
information. More precise probability distributions are likely to have more inferential power. 
Causes are ‘hidden’ as they can only be inferred from sensory consequences of hypothesised 
states in the world, and therefore can never be objectively perceived (Ainley et al., 2016; 
Feldman Barrett, 2017; Friston, 2010; Seth & Friston, 2016; Seth, 2013).  
The predictive coding model (PCM) of interoception (Seth, 2013) describes how 
‘simulation maps’ in memory represent the integration of sensory signals across the body 
which contribute to a holistic representation of the self that can interact with cognitive 
processes (Farb et al., 2015; Seth & Critchley, 2013). Predictive simulation maps provide a 
‘best guess’ estimation of the state of the body at a given moment which is based on prior 
states in memory (Seth, 2013; Farb et al., 2015). Therefore, these maps represent an 
interpreted signal which is achieved through the integration of the range of afferent sensory 
signals occurring at one point in time (Seth, 2013; Seth & Friston, 2016). Subjective emotion 
represents a quality of sensory representations that are accompanied by interoceptive 
predictions and interpreted alongside exteroceptive and proprioceptive signals (Feldman 
Barrett, 2017; Seth, 2013).  
Within these simulation maps, motivational salience is represented as the emotional 
valence we experience (Farb et al., 2015). Negatively valanced signals signify a deviation 
away from a pre-defined homeostatic threshold e.g. during hunger, which must be remedied 
through physiological or behavioural change - the process of ‘allostasis’ (Farb et al., 2015; 
Sterling, 2015). Allostasis involves a range of functions including autonomic, neuroendocrine 
and behavioural processes, with many regulatory physiological processes happening 
automatically and outside conscious awareness (Craig, 2015; Farb et al., 2015; Sterling, 
2015). For example, a cold glass in freezing temperatures will feel unpleasant, whereas it will 
be received gratefully in the summer when our bodies are trying to cool down. These feelings 
of pleasantness or unpleasantness represent the concurrent perception of our behavioural 
motivation to continue holding the cold glass or let it go (Craig, 2015; Critchley & Harrison, 
2013). 
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At lower levels, the simulation map consists of ‘raw’ sensory afferents with higher 
levels aggregating information from the lower levels of the map into representations that 
could be consciously available (Farb et al., 2015). What is consciously available in the 
simulation map is proposed to differ between people, depending on factors such as genetics, 
goals or cultural experiences (see Farb et al., 2015; Maister & Tsakiris, 2014; Ma-Kellums, 
2014). Regulatory motivation is believed to be influenced by the extent to which unexpected 
sensations that deviate from an expected body state (the prior) are perceived as acceptable or 
problematic (Farb et al., 2015; Seth & Friston, 2016). To resolve prediction error that results 
from the disagreement between expected and experienced sensations, the simulation map 
may update itself at that layer of the map (perceptual inference) or adjust the internal 
sensations (active inference) (Ainley et al., 2016; Friston, 2010; Seth & Friston, 2016). 
Larger prediction errors are more likely to reach conscious awareness and engage ‘higher-
order’ cognitive processing and overt behavioural responses (Craig, 2015; Critchley & 
Garfinkel, 2018; Farb et al, 2015). Farb et al (2015) suggest conscious deliberation may result 
in the evaluation of several potential regulatory strategies to minimize prediction error.  
Active versus perceptual inference 
According to PCM models of interoception (Seth, 2013), prediction error can lead to 
an active or perceptual form of inference (Ainley et al., 2016; Farb et al., 2015). In the case of 
active inference, resolving prediction error is achieved by altering our interoceptive state(s) to 
be congruent with the expected state (prior), thus initiating a regulatory response aimed at 
altering interoceptive processes to be more in line with the expected state. Seth and Friston 
(2016) propose sensory faculties may then be activated to re-examine sensory information 
and selectively sample this information as evidence to support the expected state. Active 
inference often happens outside our conscious awareness, triggering physiological or 
hormonal changes, not requiring overt behavioural regulation (Farb et al., 2015; Gu & 
FitzGerald, 2014). In contrast, perceptual inference involves altering the expected state 
(prior) to correspond with current interoceptive sensations (Seth & Friston, 2016; Ainley et 
al., 2016), thus, prioritising the accuracy of sensory information (Farb et al., 2015). In this 
instance, our simulation maps are updated to more precisely represent our current internal 
sensations (Seth, 2013). Farb et al (2015) proposes that perceptual inference may support the 
widening of sensory expectations which could reduce reactivity towards surprising 
interoceptive sensations. They further suggest that overt active inference could lead to 
dysregulation of interoceptive signals in the interests of a regulatory response aimed at 
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resolving prediction error. For example, for highly stressed individuals, prior expectations 
may be favoured over perceptual inference to readily identify negative sensations and initiate 
behaviours that reduce those sensations quickly (Farb et al., 2015).   
In contrast, Farb et al (2015) propose that perceptual inference may represent a more 
adaptive response to surprising interoceptive information, if interoceptive representations are 
allowed to occur and diminish, without necessarily committing to rigid appraisals of the 
sensations experienced; a process described as ‘decentering’. Contemplative training and 
traditions such as mindfulness promote practices of decentering which encourage acceptance 
of interoceptive experiences as a way to regulate interpretations of surprising interoceptive 
sensations (Mikulas, 2011), rather than engaging more active emotional regulation processes 
to manage these sensations (Gross, 2002; Farb et al., 2015). Interestingly, increased cortical 
thickness of brain regions associated with interoceptive processing has been found in long-
term meditators with extensive insight meditation experience compared with matched 
controls (Lazar et al., 2005). However, there is little evidence to suggest the ‘benefits’ of 
contemplative practice can lead to enhanced interoceptive accuracy (Ferentzi et al., 2018b). 
No difference in interoceptive accuracy in a heartbeat detection task was found between 
Buddhist meditators and non-meditators (Khalsa et al., 2008), and many contemplative 
practice interventions have been unsuccessful at improving interoceptive abilities such as 
heartbeat detection accuracy (see Ferentzi et al., 2018b for a review). 
 Measures of interoception 
Garfinkel & Critchley’s (2013) hierarchical model of interoception is currently regarded 
as the most plausible and well-conceptualised account of the distinct dimensions of 
interoception. The model distinguishes between: Interoceptive accuracy/sensitivity: objective 
performance on tests of interoceptive monitoring e.g. heartbeat detection and counting 
(Schandry, 1981); Interoceptive sensibility: A dispositional tendency to focus internally 
which is assessed via self-report questionnaires and; Interoceptive awareness: a meta-
cognitive awareness of interoceptive accuracy, that is, whether our confidence in our 
accuracy reflects actual performance (Garfinkel & Critchley, 2013). Research has 
consistently demonstrated the independence of these dimensions (see Garfinkel & Critchley, 
2013; Ferentzi et al., 2018b; Whitehead et al., 1977). However, relationships between these 
facets of interoception and their respective influences on behaviour are less clear, as studies 
have often limited their measures of interoception to one or two dimensions. 
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Interoceptive sensibility and awareness 
Self-report measures of interoceptive sensibility and awareness are independent from 
measures of interoceptive accuracy which refer to individuals’ objective performance on 
interoceptive tasks (Garfinkel et al., 2015; Garfinkel & Critchley, 2013). Interoceptive 
sensibility refers to a self-evaluated trait which can be measured by questionnaires, assessing 
an individuals’ level of engagement with interoceptive sensations or belief in their 
interoceptive ability (Garfinkel et al., 2015). Questionnaires measuring interoceptive 
sensibility include the Autonomic Perception Questionnaire (Mandler et al., 1958), Body 
Perception Questionnaire (Porges, 1993) and the Body Consciousness Scale (Miller, Murphy, 
& Buss, 1981). These measures are useful to understand individual differences in subjective 
experiences of interoceptive sensations and attentional styles associated with bodily 
sensations. ‘Body awareness’ is a term often used to refer to self-reported sensitivity to 
bodily states which may be considered equivalent to interoceptive sensibility. Interoceptive 
sensibility does demonstrate good test-retest reliability but appears somewhat susceptible to 
external factors influencing bodily activity (e.g. Rani & Rao, 1994; see Ferentzi et al., 
2018b). For example, contemplative training (Bornemann et al., 2015), mindfulness training 
(Fissler et al., 2016) and mind-body experience (Mehling et al., 2013) have been shown to 
influence interoceptive sensibility. Ferentzi et al (2018b) suggest that mind-body 
interventions emphasising the importance of listening to bodily sensations may promote self-
reported awareness of such sensations.  
Subjective accounts of interoceptive ability are likely to provide a biased estimation 
of interoceptive ability and are not necessarily predictive of objective measures of 
interoception (Garfinkel et al., 2015). A measure combining both interoceptive sensibility and 
interoceptive accuracy involves a subjective confidence score for performance on 
interoceptive tasks, such as heartbeat detection tasks, which can be compared with 
performance accuracy on that task (Ehlers et al., 1995; Garfinkel et al., 2015; Khalsa et al., 
2008). This measure represents individuals’ metacognitive awareness of interoception and is 
the most well-conceptualised definition of interoceptive awareness (Garfinkel et al., 2015; 
Garfinkel & Critchley, 2013). A more recently validated measure- The Interoceptive 
Accuracy Scale- developed by Murphy and colleagues (2018), captures self-perceived 
accuracy of interoception across a range of visceral systems not limited to accuracy on 
heartbeat detection tasks. Despite these important differences very few studies have 
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distinguished between heartbeat detection accuracy and individuals’ awareness or confidence 
in their interoceptive ability.  
Interoceptive accuracy   
Cardiac system 
Cardiac interoception can be measured using heartbeat perception tasks to understand 
the link between heartbeats and cognition and have generally been the principal method for 
evaluating interoceptive accuracy (Critchley & Garfinkel, 2018). Baroreceptors in arterial 
blood vessels are responsible for transmitting information concerning cardiovascular arousal 
to the brain (Craig, 2015; Critchley & Garfinkel, 2018). Heartbeat counting tasks (HBC) and 
heartbeat detection or discrimination (HBD) tasks represent the two methods for assessing 
cardiac interoceptive accuracy (Garfinkel et al., 2015; Ring & Brener, 2018). For heartbeat 
counting tasks participants are required to count their heartbeats for indicated time intervals 
and accuracy is determined by calculating the difference between reported and actual 
heartbeats (Schandry, 1981). Heartbeat counting accuracy can be calculated using two 
slightly different formulae: Schandry’s (1981) calculation (scores range between 0-1) and 
Hart et al’s (2013) calculation (scores range between -1 and 1) which accounts for 
overestimations as well as underestimations of heart beats. Some researchers have compared 
heartbeat perception across conditions of sitting, standing and supine positions, and post-
exercise (see Ring & Brener, 2018 for a review) while others instruct participants to maintain 
a seated position (e.g. Herbert et al., 2012).   
The validity of the heartbeat counting method has been challenged by evidence 
showing heartbeat counting is more dependent on beliefs about (resting) heart rate than 
heartbeat sensations themselves (Ring et al., 2015; Ring & Brener, 2018). In addition, 
research has shown individuals are capable of estimating their heart rate without experiencing 
their heart rate and are therefore able to perform accurately on the task (e.g. Kleckner et al., 
2015). However, predictive coding model perspectives of interoception (Ainley et al., 2016; 
Farb et al., 2015; Seth & Friston, 2016) suggest heart rate beliefs are likely to be informed by 
a lifetime experience of heart rate sensations and thus prior expectations about heart rate are 
likely to be generated as a result of both explicit and tacit knowledge about heart rates, which 
may be associated with performance on heartbeat counting tasks.   
 xvi 
Heartbeat discrimination tasks (HBD) are believed to be the most valid measure of 
cardioceptive accuracy (Brener et al., 1993; Schneider, Ring, & Katkin, 1998). Performance 
on these tasks is not influenced by prior beliefs or knowledge about heart rate and appears to 
rely completely on perception of heartbeat sensations in the moment (Brener & Ring, 2016; 
Ring & Brener, 2018).  HBD tasks require participants to make judgments about whether 
their heartbeats coincide with exteroceptive stimuli (e.g. acoustic tone) which are presented at 
time points that coincide and do not coincide with participants’ real heartbeats (Whitehead et 
al., 1977). Participants are attached to an electrocardiogram (ECG), which monitors cardiac 
activity. Stimuli delays are presented following the R wave of the ECG cycle (Whitehead et 
al, 1977). Evidence suggests that around 200ms and 500ms represent the optimum R-wave 
delay for distinguishing between coincident (200ms) and non-coincident tones (500ms) (see 
Kleckner et al, 2015). Precision is recorded across a large number of trials which can be 
interpreted as heartbeat detection accuracy (Ring & Brener, 2018). Kleckner et al (2015) 
recently found that fewer than forty trials will not yield sufficient power or reliability on this 
task, suggesting potentially high experimental load for participants.  
There is some evidence showing correlations between performance on the HBC and 
HBD tasks (e.g. Hart et al., 2013; Knoll & Hodapp, 1992). However, a recent comparison 
found no relationship between these tasks (Ring & Brener, 2018). Ring and Brener (2018) 
concluded these tasks measure different abilities and advise against using the HBC task - 
despite performance on heartbeat counting tasks predicting a range of psychological 
phenomena (Ainley et al., 2016; Tsakiris & Critchley, 2016). In contrast, others have 
suggested that the HBD task may not be suitable for understanding individual differences in 
interoceptive sensitivity because of the difficulty of the task (Kleckner et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, Forkmann et al (2016) proposed that the HBD and HBC tasks require different 
psychological processes. Whereas the tracking task requires attention to be focused 
completely on visceral sensations, the HBD task asks people to pay attention to both external 
and visceral sensations at the same time, which (unlike the HBC task) demands effective 
multi-sensory integration of this information to perform well.  
There is considerable evidence to suggest that interoceptive accuracy and 
interoceptive sensibility are not related (e.g. Ainley & Tsakiris, 2013; Critchley et al., 2004;  
et al., 2017; see Ferentzi et al., 2018b for a review). A recent longitudinal non-intervention 
study also found no predictive relationship between body awareness and interoceptive 
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accuracy (Ferentzi et al., 2018b). However, Duschek et al (2015) found participants with 
higher cardiac interoceptive accuracy reported greater interoceptive sensibility using the 
Body Consciousness Questionnaire (Miller, Murphy, & Buss, 1981). The authors argue that 
failure to find an association between cardiac interoceptive accuracy and private body 
consciousness could be explained by the relatively ‘low’ interoceptive ability of previous 
samples based on proposed interoceptive criterion (Schandry, 1981). However, many studies 
use slightly different methods of heartbeat counting and discrimination tasks, and those that 
operationalise heartbeat counting accuracy as a dichotomous variable may use different cut-
off points to distinguish between ‘high’ and ‘low’ interoceptive accuracy, depending on the 
level of interoceptive accuracy within the sample.   
Gastrointestinal system 
Historically, interoception research has largely focused investigations on the cardiac 
system which has resulted in a limited understanding of the relationships between 
interoceptive constructs across visceral systems. Another interoceptive system which can be 
measured using standardized interoceptive tasks is the gastrointestinal (GI) system (Herbert 
et al., 2012). Previous work investigating interoceptive GI processes have traditionally used 
invasive measurement techniques (e.g. manipulating distention of stomach) which can affect 
GI processes themselves. A more invasive method for measuring perceptions of stomach 
contractions involves a perfused catheter that delivers water into participants’ stomach via a 
tube through their nose. Stomach contractions are measured, and participants indicate 
whether a stomach contraction co-occurs with a light (Whitehead & Drescher, 1980). 
Invasive tasks like this have been criticised for increasing the likelihood of learning effects, 
whereby participants awareness of sensations associated with gastric functioning are 
enhanced during the task. Moreover, tolerance of this unusual procedure is likely to be 
restricted to certain individuals which is likely to compromise the representativeness of 
sample (Herbert et al., 2012).  
A less invasive method for assessing perception of gastric sensations is a standardized 
water load test (WLT) which activates gastric distension and post-ingestion gastric 
neuromuscular activity (see Herbert et al., 2012). Water loads have shown to stimulate 
normal slow-wave frequency of the stomach (e.g. Koch et al., 2000), and using water avoids 
the hormonal consequences associated with eating food (see Herbert et al., 2012). The WLT 
has shown to be a valid measure of subjectively felt fullness and has been consistently 
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replicated in healthy participants and patients with gastrointestinal disorders (e.g. Jones et al., 
2003; Koch et al., 2000; Van Dyck et al., 2016; Herbert et al., 2012). Water load tasks also 
demonstrate good correlation with previous invasive methods (e.g. Boeckxstaens et al., 
1990).  
Two studies that have explored perception of visceral sensations from both the cardiac 
(using heartbeat counting method) and GI systems, have found correlations between 
interoceptive sensitivity of these systems (e.g. Whitehead & Drescher, 1980; Herbert et al., 
2012). However, a recent study did not find correlations across different sensory modalities 
of interoception, including gastric perception, pain, balance, proprioception, and balance and 
concluded that interoceptive sensitivity cannot be generalised across visceral systems 
(Ferentzi et al., 2018a). Importantly, they used a water drinking task which was 
fundamentally different to the prior studies (Herbert et al., 2012; Whitehead & Drescher, 
1980), whereby participants drank a height-corrected amount of water per minute for five 
minutes and reported sensations of fullness and unpleasantness. In contrast, the WLT used by 
Herbert et al (2012) involved drinking water freely for 5 minutes until reaching a point of 
maximum fullness, along with reporting other sensations such as nausea and satiety. More 
recently, Van Dyck et al (2016) developed a two-stage water load task, whereby participants 
drink water until the point of satiation (1st threshold) and to the point of maximum fullness 
(2nd threshold). This allows the calculation of a percentage amount of water required to 
achieve maximum fullness from the point of satiety, resulting in a measure of gastric 
interoception that is not determined by stomach capacity (Van Dyck et al., 2016).  
Interoceptive processing 
Neuroimaging techniques allow the comparison of interoceptive predictions with 
subjective experiences during the recording of brain activity. The anterior insula (AI) cortex 
is implicated in interoceptive processing and has shown to be activated when people are 
paying attention to their internal bodily state (Terasawa et al., 2012). The AI is also believed 
to be central in facilitating predictive representations of emotion and uncertainty, and also 
empathy, which can influence decision-making (Singer et al., 2009).  The middle insula 
appears to be involved in the integration of interoceptive information with exteroceptive 
context (Seth & Friston, 2016). Interoceptive processing can also be observed as event-
related potentials, such as heartbeat-evoked potentials (HEP’s) using electroencephalograms 
(EEG; Schulz, 2015). HEP’s correspond with the perception of cardiac signals but do not 
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necessarily represent conscious perception of heartbeats (Schulz, 2015). HEP’s can be 
measured alongside heartbeat detection tasks (e.g. Leopold & Schandry, 2001) and have 
shown to predict heartbeat detection performance, attentional focus on heartbeats and 
motivation to perform in heartbeat detection tasks (see Schulz, 2015 for a review). 
Respiratory-related evoked potentials (RREP’s) are a less well-studied measure, but 
respiratory occlusion methods have shown to induce respiratory-related evoked potentials 
captured using EEG (e.g. von Leupoldt et al., 2010). Finally, the effects of interoceptive 
processing on the preconscious processing of external information can be measured as the 
cardiac modulation of startle response (Schulz et al., 2016), as startle responses are lower 
during the earlier phases of the cardiac cycle (Schulz, 2015). This is the only method that is 
able to capture the influence of afferent interoceptive signals communicated via the brainstem 
(Schulz, 2015). 
Temporal stability of interoception 
There is some evidence that interoceptive abilities may be susceptible to change. For 
example, contemplative practices such as mindfulness can improve self-reported 
interoceptive sensibility (Bornemann et al., 2015) and age has been associated with reduced 
heartbeat detection ability (Khalsa et al., 2009). However, other evidence suggests 
interoceptive-accuracy measured by heartbeat detection tasks is a relatively stable construct. 
Parkin et al (2014) found heartbeat counting accuracy remained relatively consistent after a 
1-week and 8-week mindfulness intervention. Furthermore, in a longitudinal non-intervention 
study Ferentzi et al (2018b) found interoceptive accuracy (on a heartbeat counting task) 
demonstrated good test-retest reliability over time. Providing feedback to participants on their 
performance in heartbeat detection and counting tasks has been used to improve interoceptive 
accuracy (e.g. Meyerholz et al., 2019). However, Ferentzi et al (2018b) suggest it is unclear 
whether performance enhancement is the result of updating heart rate beliefs or genuine 
improvement in accuracy (Ring et al., 2015). Other intervention studies using chemical 
manipulations (isoproterenol) to increase the heart rate found changes in participants reported 
cardiac sensations according to the dose (Khalsa et al., 2009). The impact of stress has also 
been shown to influence heartbeat detection for females, with accuracy declining during a 
challenging cognitive task (Fairclough & Goodwin, 2007). 
Other evidence suggests interoceptive accuracy may be improved when combined 
with exteroceptive cues. For example, Ainley et al (2013) found heartbeat detection ability 
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was significantly enhanced when participants were able to look at their own face in a mirror. 
In addition, Suzuki et al (2013) used a ‘cardiac rubber hand illusion’ which integrated 
interoceptive information about heart rate into a computer-generated augmented reality. They 
found virtual hand ownership was increased when cardio-visual feedback was synchronous 
with the participants’ heartbeat and this correlated with interoceptive sensitivity. These 
studies highlight the importance of congruence between interoceptive and exteroceptive 
information in the representation of internal states, which may influence momentary 
interoceptive abilities. 
Interoception and behaviour 
In line with the predictive coding model of interoception (Seth, 2013; Seth & Friston, 
2016), comparing incoming sensory information with prior expectations results in prediction 
error which motivates modifications to either the bodily signals or the simulation map 
through autonomic and behavioural regulation. Although these self-regulatory mechanisms 
are often not subject to conscious awareness, interoceptive signals can be powerful enough to 
produce overt behavioural responses (Craig, 2015; Farb et al., 2015). There is evidence to 
support the notion that our behaviour may be driven by our allostatic drives; for example, 
holding a hot cup of coffee has shown to increase feelings of interpersonal warmth beyond a 
change in mood (Williams & Bargh, 2008), and holding a cold object has shown to decrease 
interpersonal trust (Kang et al., 2011). Importantly, not all behaviour is an attempt to achieve 
balance in our bodies and Farb et al (2015) suggest that rather than regulatory motivation 
being driven by allostasis, it may be more usefully conceptualised as how our sensations 
correspond with predicted or desired states. 
Enhanced interoceptive accuracy in particular has shown to facilitate more adaptive 
self-regulation and behavioural responses (e.g. Ainley et al., 2016; Dunn et al., 2010; Füstös 
et al., 2013). Ullsperger et al (2010) propose interoceptive awareness is essential for 
conscious error perception and subsequent behavioural adjustments due to the involvement of 
the anterior insular cortex. Interestingly, attentional resources are influenced by cardiac 
signals, for example afferent signals sent during the heart contraction phase (systole) decrease 
distraction towards background stimuli and enhance performance on visual search tasks 
(Pramme et al., 2016). In addition, systole has been shown to selectively enhance the 
detection of fear faces in an emotional attentional blink paradigm (Garfinkel & Critchley, 
2016). Furthermore, those with better interoceptive accuracy on a heartbeat detection task 
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show better implicit memory (Werner et al., 2010) and decision-making ability on intuitive 
reasoning tasks (Dunn et al., 2010). Herbert et al (2007) also found better heartbeat 
perceivers showed enhanced self-regulation of physical load and cardiovascular effort during 
exercise. Moreover, Weiss et al (2014) found greater interoceptive accuracy during a 
heartbeat counting task was associated with more effective self-regulation and pain tolerance 
- although a relationship between pain tolerance and interoceptive accuracy was not found by 
Werner and colleagues (2009). Using EEG, Füstös et al (2013) found interoceptive accuracy 
supported downregulation of emotional arousal during an emotional reappraisal procedure. 
Relatedly, Kever et al (2015) found heartbeat detection ability was associated with both 
reappraisal and suppression focused emotional regulation strategies. These findings suggest 
that a superior ability to detect cardiac sensations, may support more effective and dynamic 
use of emotional regulation strategies in the moment (Kever et al., 2015), which could have 
benefits for wellbeing and behavioural responses to emotional stimuli. 
There is some evidence to suggest that interoceptive accuracy may not always support 
optimal behavioural responses. For example, Dunn et al (2010) found that changes in 
participants’ heart rate distinguished between ‘profitable’ and ‘unprofitable’ decks during a 
computerised gambling task. When these somatic markers were indicative of advantageous 
choices, higher interoceptive accuracy corresponded with more successful intuitive decision-
making. However, interoceptive accuracy was problematic for intuitive learning of profitable 
versus unprofitable decks when bodily signals were more suggestive of disadvantageous 
decisions. More recently, Marshall et al (2018) proposed the integration of interoceptive 
signals into motor representations could lead to more impulsive behaviour in certain contexts. 
In support of this, Ainley et al (2014) found that good heartbeat perceivers found it more 
difficult to inhibit the tendency to imitate the actions of others, which they suggested may be 
associated with enhanced empathy among these people. Marshall et al (2018) suggested 
greater interoceptive accuracy could engender stronger internal representations of actions, 
which leads to increased motor reactivity to observed actions.  
At a more fundamental level, interoceptive signals appear to be important in shaping 
our perception of time (Di Lernia et al., 2018), and there is increasing evidence to suggest an 
association between the physiological regulation of the body and conscious awareness of our 
embodied self (e.g. Moseley et al., 2008; Seth, Suzuki & Critchley, 2012; Seth & Friston, 
2016; Farb et al., 2015). For example, brushing an embodied rubber hand (using the Rubber 
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Hand Illusion paradigm) has been shown to decrease the temperature of participants’ real 
hands (Moseley et al., 2008). Interoception is also proposed to be fundamentally linked with 
experiences of agency (Nahab et al., 2011; Seth, Suzuki & Critchley, 2012) and interoceptive 
processes have been implicated in experiences of empathy (e.g. Fukushima, Terasawa, & 
UmedaIf, 2011). These findings highlight how low-level visceral processes may interact with 
higher-level social processes such as our sense of self, which could influence more complex 
social behaviour. Importantly, there are cultural variations in conceptualisations of 
interoception, interoceptive awareness and cultural practices that encourage an awareness of 
somatic states and bodily sensations (Ma-Kellams, 2014). So far, these differences have 
typically been examined in comparisons of Eastern and Western cultures, but further cross-
cultural research is needed to illuminate the nuances in how we understand interoception such 
as the language we use, differences in interoceptive ability and cultural activities and 
traditions that shape our relationship to interoceptive sensations (Ma-Kellams, 2014; Tsakiris, 
2020). 
Somatic markers, moral judgments and behaviour 
Moral norms can vary greatly across cultures, religions and political groups but norms 
surrounding principles of harm and fairness appear to be recognised more consistently than 
others such as those relating to purity or authority (Haidt & Graham, 2007). Our sensitivity to 
harm including observations of aggression and cruelty, originated from an evolutionary 
response to the suffering in others, and is upheld in moral virtues of compassion and kindness 
(Haidt & Graham, 2007). Historically, moral psychology and moral philosophy focused more 
heavily on the cognitive and contextual factors influencing our evaluation of ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’ in hypothetical text-based moral dilemmas (see Teper et al., 2015 for review). Over 
time, there has been increasing impetus to understand how emotional and physiological 
factors may interact with cognitive processes to influence moral judgments and behaviour 
particularly in relation to harm-based moral norms (Blair, 1995; Buon et al., 2016; Cushman 
et al., 2012; Damasio et al., 1990; Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2009; Haidt, 2001; Parton & 
McGinley, 2019; Reynolds & Conway, 2018).  
In a situation of moral conflict, a negative emotional response could signal the 
anticipation of taking a moral action that is inconsistent with our principles (e.g. Cushman et 
al; 2012; Greene et al., 2001). Feelings of frustration, pain and anxiety are often reported by 
people who have to make difficult decisions that are incongruent with their ethical principles 
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(Corley, 2002). Evolutionary perspectives suggest that the emotional aversion we experience 
when carrying out or anticipate carrying out moral transgressions formed due to our need for 
human cooperation to survive (Rand & Nowak, 2013; Teper et al., 2015). Negative affective 
experiences have been proposed to represent outcome-based aversion mechanisms which are 
adaptive because they facilitate moral decisions that have beneficial consequences for 
ourselves and societal functioning in the long term, such as mutual cooperation and respect 
(Rand & Nowak, 2013). However, when making moral decisions in complex social 
environments, we may not always have the time nor all the necessary information to weigh 
up the consequences for our future selves in a rational and deliberative manner (Damasio, 
1996; Kahneman, 2003). The Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH; Damasio, 1996) proposes 
that decisions, including moral decisions, are influenced by automatic ‘intuitive’ inclinations 
about the ‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’ of a given decision which is informed by somatic signals 
generated in the body.  
The SMH has received considerable empirical support in moral judgment studies 
(Koenigs et al., 2007; Moretto et al., 2010; Young et al., 2010). Damage to brain areas 
involved in the processing of physiological experiences have been associated with anti-social 
behaviour over time (Damasio et al., 1990). Measures of anti-social behaviour have been 
shown to predict reduced heartbeat detection accuracy (Nentjes et al., 2013). The authors 
suggest that a reduced sensitivity to interoceptive sensations could influence a likelihood to 
carry out anti-social behaviour, but they acknowledge cause and effect are difficult to 
establish (Nentjes et al., 2013). It is possible that poorer interoceptive accuracy could indicate 
a reduced ability to self-regulate which may predispose people towards acting anti-socially, 
rather than interoceptive accuracy representing an inability to weigh up the moral 
implications of behaving anti-socially. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the 
simulation of harmful actions is experienced as emotionally aversive before we contemplate 
the consequences of that action (e.g. Blair, 1995; Cushman et al., 2012) and these negative 
emotions are what prevent us from carrying out transgressions (Miller et al., 2014). Cushman 
et al (2012) found that individual differences in anticipatory physiological arousal influenced 
readiness to carry out simulated harmful actions (e.g. hitting a plastic baby doll) compared to 
when participants observed someone else carry out those actions. This suggests we 
physiologically respond to the anticipation of carrying out a harmful behaviour despite 
knowing that there are no harmful consequences of the action. Differences in interoceptive 
capacities can be conceptualised as individual difference measures of our ability to perceive, 
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or notice somatic signals (Garfinkel et al., 2013) but it is currently unclear how individual 
differences in interoception could influence the relationship between emotional arousal and 
harm-based moral decision-making.  
There is some evidence to suggest that a belief that we are physiologically aroused 
can influence moral decision-making. In a series of laboratory experiments, Gu et al (2013) 
explored the influence of digitally altered cardiac feedback on moral behaviour. They 
provided false heartbeat feedback (‘fast’ versus ‘normal’) to participants while they 
contemplated a moral action: either volunteering time for a charity or deceiving a 
confederate. They found ‘fast’ versus normal heartbeat feedback increased volunteering rates 
and reduced deception. Differences in moral behaviour was accounted for by stress and 
coping theory (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) which proposes perceived stress (i.e. negative 
physiological arousal) during moral conflict activates coping mechanisms aimed at regulating 
negative emotions and/or removing the stressor. This could result in either conforming to 
moral norms (in this case volunteering for charity) or implementing moral disengagement 
strategies (Bandura, 2002; Gu et al., 2013). In addition, perceived heartbeat impacted moral 
action less when individuals were mindful and when approaching the situation deliberatively. 
Gu et al (2013) concluded that trait mindfulness and deliberative processing buffered 
participants’ responses to cardiovascular stress signals. Conversely, Gu et al (2013) 
speculated that individuals low in interoceptive sensitivity may be less influenced by a 
perceived ‘fast’ heartbeat as they have less knowledge of their cardiac sensations in stressful 
situations. However, as interoception and physiological arousal was not measured, it is 
unknown whether the effects they found were the result of real physiological changes.  
Moral dilemmas 
Moral dilemma thought experiments are useful for studying our aversion to moral 
transgressions because the type and means of carrying out immoral acts can be systematically 
varied. A moral dilemma typically offers the choice between two ‘wrong’ courses of action, 
in that both choices involve the violation of one or more moral principles - hence the 
dilemma. Two fundamental philosophies proposing conflicting maxims for determining 
whether actions are morally right are John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism (Mill, 1998) and 
Immanuel Kant’s duty-based (deontological) ethics (Kant, 2018). Mill’s Utilitarianism (Mill, 
1998) proposes moral actions that maximise the wellbeing of the greatest number of people 
are good actions. Whereas Kant’s deontological ethics assesses the moral ‘goodness’ of an 
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action based on the act itself and how it relates to moral rules pertaining to the rights and 
duties of those involved in the situation. 
The well-known and widely used thought experiments in moral psychology that tap 
into our aversion to harm are the Trolley (Thomson, 1985) and Footbridge dilemmas (Foot, 
1967); which put deontological and utilitarian principles in competition with one another. 
The Trolley dilemma requires participants to judge whether it is morally right to switch a 
driverless trolley travelling towards five people (who would certainly be killed) to an 
alternate track with one person on it - saving five people but killing one. Whereas the 
Footbridge dilemma asks participants whether it is morally right for them to push a large man 
standing near them off the footbridge to stop the trolley from killing five people on the track 
but killing the man in the process. These dilemmas distinguish between ‘personal’ and 
‘impersonal’ harmful actions (Greene et al., 2001). The Footbridge dilemma requires either 
anticipated or actual physical force and death is necessary to achieve a utilitarian outcome. 
Whereas harm caused in the Trolley dilemma is done impersonally and death is a side-effect 
of switching the trolley. The outcome of each action is the same, but people tend to endorse a 
utilitarian response in the Trolley dilemma, but not in the Footbridge dilemma (e.g. Cushman 
et al., 2006; Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2009; Moretto et al., 2010; Patil, 2015),  showing how 
the mental representation of harmful acts and not just their consequences, can influence 
people’s moral judgments (Mikhail, 2007).  
Importantly, research has also uncovered an omission bias in moral dilemmas; 
whereby omissions of actions that lead to harmful consequences are judged as less morally 
wrong than moral actions that result in the equivalent amount of harm (e.g. Cushman et al., 
2006; Navarrete et al., 2012). Relatedly, research suggests that a motivation be consistent in 
our moral responses (Lombrozo, 2009) can be overridden, when a less emotionally arousing 
situation is presented before more arousing situation as it has less influence on the more 
arousing situation (Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2012). Essentially, if it is possible to revise our 
initial response with explicit reasoning, we may be less likely to be consistent in our moral 
judgments (Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2012). 
Physiological responses to harmful action 
 The physical proximity between the agent doing the harm, and the subsequent ‘harm’ 
carried out characterises the key difference between the Trolley and Footbridge dilemmas. 
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The terms ‘Personal’ and ‘Impersonal’ are also used to describe the difference between these 
dilemmas. However, Greene et al (2009) proposed ‘personal force’ offered a more precise 
experimental variable, which describes the extent an agent’s muscles and body are 
(hypothetically or not) involved in inflicting harm to another person (see Christensen & 
Gomila, 2012 for a review). Dual process models of moral behaviour describe how 
systematic and deliberative processes can interact with automatic and emotional processes 
when responding to hypothetical dilemmas of harmful moral action (e.g. Greene et al., 2001; 
Greene et al., 2004; Greene, 2007). The Trolley Dilemma is believed to allow a more 
cognitive and ‘cooler’ decision making process which leads to greater utilitarian judgments 
(Greene et al., 2001; Greene et al., 2004). Whereas the Footbridge dilemma requires us to 
imagine intentionally harming another person with our own body which facilitates a stronger 
aversive emotional response to the harmful action (Cushman, 2013; Cushman et al., 2006; 
Greene et al., 2001). This theory was primarily supported by a series of fMRI experiments, 
whereby Greene et al (2001) found personal moral dilemmas (e.g. the Footbridge dilemma) 
evoked a negative emotional response not present in impersonal moral dilemmas (e.g. the 
Trolley problem).  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, physiological arousal is also greater during moral dilemmas 
where personal harm is required to attain a utilitarian outcome (McDonald et al., 2017; 
Moretto et al., 2010; Navarette et al., 2012). Greene et al’s (2001) dual process account 
suggests that condoning harm in personal dilemmas is only possible when the emotional 
processing system deterring us from causing harm is overridden by deliberative processing 
mechanisms which assess the costs and benefits of the action (Greene et al., 2009). In 
support, individual differences in arithmetic reflection, which potentially promotes the 
weighing up of ‘outcomes’ of harm in moral dilemmas (Baron et al., 2015) and cognitive 
reasoning (Patil et al., 2020) have been associated with utilitarian judgment. People are also 
more likely to reject harm when given less time to make a moral judgment, which the authors 
concluded was evidence that ‘cognitive control’ can be facilitated when more time for 
deliberation is allowed (Suter & Hertwig, 2011).  
Conversely, Patil and Silani (2014) found trait alexithymia (a characteristic associated 
with an inability to identify emotions and deficits in empathy) predicted increased utilitarian 
responses to emotionally aversive personal moral dilemmas. The authors concluded that this 
finding reflected a reduced empathic response for the victim in alexithymic participants, 
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which supported enhanced cognitive processing and cost-benefit analysis. Combined, these 
findings suggest that an absence of an emotional response or an increase in cognitive 
deliberation, could both predict stronger utilitarian preferences. Greene et al (2004) found 
that compared with deontological judgments, utilitarian judgments are associated with greater 
activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex - a region known to be important for cognitive 
control. Greene et al (2008) also found cognitive load selectively increased response time for 
utilitarian decisions but not for deontological decisions in personal moral dilemmas. 
However, Moore et al (2008) found that although people with greater working memory 
capacity were more likely to condone personal harm when harm was inevitable, their results 
suggested this was more due to enhanced deliberative reasoning as opposed to executive 
functioning ‘overriding’ or constraining emotional responses.  
A reputational adaptation account of moral behaviour suggests automatic negative 
responses to inflicting harm with personal force may be an adaptive neurobiological response 
to deter us from actions where we are more likely to be judged as culpable (e.g. DeScioli et 
al., 2011). However, Greene (2009) suggested that there could be a variety of reasons why 
personal moral dilemmas generate an aversive emotional response, which may include: the 
personal or direct quality of the act (Greene et al., 2001; Royzman & Baron, 2002); the 
intentional nature of the action or the physical contact required (Cushman et al., 2006); the 
intervention required on the victim (Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007); or the culpability 
associated with personal harm (DeScioli et al., 2011). More recently, researchers have found 
stable individual differences in the emotional responses people have to carrying out harmful 
acts, and the consequences of harmful acts. The concept of ‘Action aversion’ describes 
individual differences in the negative emotional response to carrying out ‘harmful’ actions 
e.g. hitting someone with a rubber hammer (Cushman et al., 2012; Miller et al., 2014). 
‘Outcome aversion’ represents another individual-differences measure associated with a 
negative reaction to witnessing harm, regardless of its cause (Miller et al., 2014). Action 
versus outcome aversion are proposed to represent distinct ‘self’ versus ‘other’ oriented 
motives respectively, which could influence moral judgments of harm (Miller et al., 2014).  
Action-based harm aversion has been linked to physiological threat responses 
(Cushman et al., 2012), evidenced by increases in systemic vascular resistance (SVR; 
Mendes et al., 2007) and pre-ejection period (Parton & McGinley, 2019). Individuals with 
greater cardiovascular ‘threat reactivity’ (increases in SVR relative to cardiac output) towards 
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action-based harm have demonstrated a tendency to reject harm in moral dilemmas (Cushman 
et al, 2012). However, a link between moral judgments and physiological aversion to carrying 
out simulated harmful acts, was not found in a recent study that used an alternative measure 
of sympathetic cardiovascular arousal; pre-ejection period, which represents the force of heart 
contractility (Parton & McGinley, 2019). In contrast, utilitarian tendencies but not 
deontological tendencies, have been associated with lower resting heart-rate variability - a 
proxy measure for vagal tone, which is believed to support neurovisceral integration during 
moral decision-making (Park et al., 2016). The authors suggested that a reduced ability to 
integrate cardiac signals into the decision-making processes promoted stronger utilitarian 
preferences, but this finding was also not replicated in a later study using a small set of moral 
dilemmas (Parton & McGinley, 2019). 
Measures of physiological arousal 
The autonomic nervous system (ANS) regulates and maintains bodily functions and 
states, including our response to stressors (Montano et al., 2012). The sympathetic (SNS) and 
parasympathetic nervous system (PNS) represent two distinct branches of the ANS. The SNS 
(when activated) prepares the body for stress e.g. by increasing heart rate and blood-flow to 
the muscles (‘fight or flight’). Typically, the PNS has an opposing role to reduce 
physiological stress-responses, e.g. by decreasing heart rate and increasing digestive 
processes (‘rest and digest’). Motivational states of ‘challenge’ and ‘threat’ are associated 
with specific physiological patterns, including cardiovascular and hormonal changes 
(Blascovich & Mendes, 2000). ‘Challenge’ states arise when we evaluate personal resources 
as exceeding environmental demands, whereas ‘threat’ states arise when we evaluate 
demands as exceeding resources. 
As discussed, an aversion to action-based harm has been associated with a 
physiological threat state and activation of the sympathetic nervous system, indicated by a 
shortening of pre-ejection period (PEP; Parton & McGinley, 2019) or increases in systemic 
vascular resistance (SVR) (Cushman et al., 2012). SVR is the amount of resistance in the 
circulatory system that must be overcome for blood to flow through. In states of ‘threat’ our 
bodies release norepinephrine which tightens blood vessels and increases the amount of 
resistance in the circulatory system (Mendes et al., 2007). Blood-pressure is related to SVR, 
however, SVR actually determines arterial blood pressure physiologically (Klabunde, 2011). 
Blood pressure can increase as a result of increased SVR (related to the tightening of blood 
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vessels i.e. vasoconstriction), but also as a result of overall cardiac output, volume or 
viscosity of blood etc. Cardiac-output (volume of blood ejected from the heart per-beat) 
increases in ‘challenge’ and ‘threat’ states (Mendes et al., 2007), therefore measures of blood-
pressure alone could be a misleading indicator of underlying ‘challenge’ and ‘threat’ states.  
Another measure of physiological arousal related to activation of the sympathetic 
nervous system is galvanic skin-response (GSR). GSR is a measure of electrodermal activity 
and may also indicate an aversion to harmful actions in moral dilemmas (McDonald et al., 
2017; Moretto et al., 2010). GSR activation appears unrelated to systemic vascular resistance 
(Furedy & Gagnon, 1969) suggesting different neural processes (Prout, 1967). GSR is also 
sensitive to viewing violent media (Carnagey et al., 2007), and highly demanding cognitive 
processing (Botvinick & Rosen, 2009). Therefore, it is possible that increases in GSR during 
harm-based moral dilemma tasks may provide a more generalised indication of sympathetic 
arousal associated with violence or task-demands.  
Moral dilemmas: harm aversion versus outcome maximisation 
Trolley (Thomson, 1985) and Footbridge (Foot, 1967) type dilemmas used in moral 
psychology research have historically conceptualised utilitarian and deontological judgments 
as opposite ends of a scale. However, these responses are not considered to be inversely 
proportional as someone could condone the harm of one person (making the ‘utilitarian’ 
choice) because they are motivated to maximise outcomes for the most people or because 
they have a reduced sense of harm aversion (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). Conway and 
Gawronski (2013) developed a battery of moral dilemmas using a process dissociation (PD) 
technique (Jacoby, 1991) which allows the calculation of harm-rejection and outcome-
maximisation tendencies separately and offers a more accurate understanding of the socio-
emotional processes driving moral judgments (e.g. Reynolds & Conway, 2018). Responses to 
both conventional ‘incongruent’ moral dilemmas (i.e. causing harm whilst maximising 
outcomes), and ‘congruent’ dilemmas (i.e. causing harm but not maximising outcomes) are 
assessed to calculate the two parameters (Conway & Gawronski, 2013).  
This procedure is increasingly favoured by researchers in this field (e.g. Park et al., 
2016) and can further our understanding of the discrete processes and reactions that underlie 
judgments in moral dilemmas. For example, Reynolds and Conway (2018) recently clarified 
the role of emotional processes associated with action-aversion and outcome aversion in 
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moral judgments of harm. Interestingly, those scoring highly on action-aversion, 
demonstrated reduced dispositions to maximise outcomes (scored lower on the utilitarian 
parameter), as well as increased inclinations to reject causing harm (scored higher on the 
deontological parameter). To the contrary, those reporting higher outcome-aversion 
demonstrated a stronger inclination to maximise overall outcomes, while also showing 
greater inclinations to reject harm. Therefore, harmful actions can be experienced as 
emotionally aversive independent of their outcomes, but negative affect can also be 
experienced when contemplating witnessing harm befalling others, independent of the nature 
of the actions that cause harm (Reynolds & Conway, 2018). These findings suggest that there 
may be an emotional component to both harm-aversion and outcome-maximisation decisions 
which can be influenced by our aversions to harmful actions and outcomes, which has not 
previously been recognised due to the limitations of traditional moral dilemma paradigms 
(Reynolds & Conway, 2018).  
Exploring moral behaviour in virtual reality 
Research using immersive virtual reality (VR) has consistently demonstrated that 
people typically respond to events, situations and other people as if they were real (Pan & 
Slater, 2011; Riva et al., 2016; Slater & Sanchez-Vives, 2016). Immersive VR therefore 
represents a promising methodology for studying moral psychology (e.g. Francis et al., 2016; 
Pan & Slater, 2011), which his historically relied upon abstract representations of moral 
scenarios using text-based paradigms, yielding low ecological validity. The most significant 
finding of VR moral dilemma research so far is that moral judgments made in response to 
text-based paradigms often contradict moral behaviours carried out in more immersive VR 
environments (e.g. Francis et al., 2016; Francis et al., 2017; Patil et al., 2014). Therefore, 
behavioural measures of morality used in VR dilemmas are valuable for understanding 
discrepancies between text-based moral judgments and more realistic moral actions (Teper et 
al., 2011; 2015). Often people will be morally hypocritical and endorse hypothetical moral 
behaviours for social desirability reasons or based on what they believe to be the right course 
of action, whereas in reality moral actions can be personally costly (Batson et al., 1999). It is 
also more difficult to focus on emotions during hypothetical decision-making situations 
(Wilson & Gilbert, 2003), and changes in physiology triggered by a moral conflict such as 
increases in heart rate or breathing, are also likely to be less pronounced, which may lead to 
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divergent responses between moral judgments and more realistic moral behaviour (Patil et al., 
2014; Teper et al., 2015).  
Increased contextual saliency has proven to be an important factor in processing the 
value of a moral action (Patil et al., 2014). Patil et al (2014) found that differences in the 
contextual saliency (i.e. immersive VR versus not) of moral dilemmas corresponded to 
differences in autonomic arousal and utilitarian responses. The authors explain their findings 
as differences between value-representation targets (Cushman, 2013). The contextual 
saliency of the VR presentation influenced participants to be more sensitive to the 
consequences of their action (i.e. witnessing the deaths of virtual people), and therefore their 
aversive emotional state motivated them to minimise their own distress by choosing the 
option where fewer deaths occur (utilitarian). Whereas the authors suggest text-based 
presentation results in a value representation of the actions (deontological) i.e. pushing 
someone off a bridge accrues a negative value, subsequently resulting in fewer utilitarian 
responses. Patil et al (2014) suggest that the outcome-based value representation for not 
saving more people from harm is greater than the negative value associated with harming one 
person. Interestingly, post-hoc analyses indicated that the foregrounding of the virtual people 
was more important than watching their unpleasant deaths when making a utilitarian decision 
(Patil et al., 2014). In contrast, Navarette et al (2012) found no difference between text-based 
moral judgments and moral behaviour in contextually salient VR simulations of the trolley 
dilemma, however behavioural responses in VR were compared to text-based judgments from 
previous studies which could explain their results (see Patil et al., 2014). 
A more recent study investigating personal force in a VR ‘footbridge’ simulation 
aimed to increase contextual saliency to a more extreme degree. Francis et al (2017) used a 
robotic manipulandum and interactive sculpture providing realistic haptic feedback to provide 
sensorimotor aspects relating to embodiment and touch. Francis et al (2017) used two 
experiments to compare differences in moral judgment and moral action. In experiment one, 
participants did not see the consequences of their actions in VR but received haptic feedback 
when carrying out a pushing action on a robotic manipulandum. Here, contextual saliency 
was absent as there was no visual element. In experiment 2, participants received haptic 
feedback when pushing a realistic sculpture, while also experiencing the moral dilemma in an 
immersive, contextually salient VR environment. The frequency of utilitarian moral actions 
was compared to the frequency of utilitarian moral judgments using the traditional text-based 
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paradigm. They found participants provided more utilitarian action responses in experiment 1 
and 2, compared to moral judgments of text-based moral dilemmas. As contextual saliency 
was absent from experiment 1, the authors propose both a contextual salience and frame of 
reference explanation may account for the judgment-action discrepancy observed. For 
experiment 1, the authors suggest utilitarian choices were facilitated by an egocentric 
perspective generated by personal action choices (pushing the manipulandum device), as 
participants assessed the potential self-relevant consequences of condoning harmful action. In 
contrast, they proposed that moral judgments that asked about the moral acceptability of 
harmful acts, were more allocentric in nature and did not facilitate this perspective (see Tassy 
et al., 2013). Whereas, in experiment 2, the contextual saliency of the VR dilemma may have 
encouraged people to place more negative emphasis on the outcome of seeing the victims die 
(compared to non-contextually salient dilemmas) rather than the harmful act, as suggested by 
Patil et al (2014).  
Despite these advances in VR methodologies in moral psychology, research has so far 
been limited to the traditional moral dilemma scenarios. Therefore, the process dissociation 
technique developed by Conway and Gawronski (2013) that allows independent assessment 
of harm aversion and outcome aversion tendencies has yet to be applied to an immersive 
virtual environment. A replica of the 20-dilemma battery developed by Conway and 
Gawronski (2013) is unlikely to be feasible in terms of both the resources required and the 
experimental-load participants would need to endure. However, a scaled version of this 
approach could be piloted in VR, whereby participants experience several matched 
‘incongruent’ and ‘congruent’ moral dilemmas (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). This would 
allow some evaluation of their tendency to cause harm to others, in the absence of 
maximising outcomes.  
Moral behaviour research in applied contexts 
A critical caveat of traditional Trolley and Footbridge dilemmas, in addition to those 
already discussed, is that many people are now familiar with these problems, which could 
influence participants to respond in biased and unnatural ways (Pan & Slater, 2011). In 
addition, these problems bear little resemblance to real-life moral dilemmas we might 
typically face in real life. Highly controlled moral dilemma experiments that provide very 
clear and discrete moral choices typically using forced-choice paradigms, are beneficial for 
understanding how contextual, emotional or individual differences factors can influence 
 xxxiii 
moral judgment and behaviour under experimental conditions (e.g. Patil et al., 2014). 
However, many have criticised these thought experiments as being too removed from real life 
to be useful to understanding real-world morality (Nyholm & Smids, 2016). For example, the 
uncertainty about the consequences of our actions is typically absent in moral dilemmas 
where we are provided with unrealistic levels of certainty about the outcomes of certain 
moral choices (Hansson, 2009; Pan & Slater, 2011). 
Although some studies are attempting to make the sensorimotor experiences of 
traditional moral dilemmas more physically accurate (e.g. Francis et al., 2017), thought 
experiments such as the trolley and footbridge problems were conceived as “stylized thought 
experiments we use for certain circumscribed purely theoretical and abstract purposes” 
(pg.1285, Nyholm & Smids, 2016). These thought experiments are not necessarily meant to 
be applied to real-world moral behaviour. A much greater number of contextual variables and 
motivational drives are at play in real-life moral dilemmas, which if included in moral 
dilemma studies would decrease experimental control. However, some researchers (Pan & 
Slater, 2011; Faulhaber et al., 2018) are beginning to test ‘applied’ versions of moral 
dilemma scenarios in VR simulations to increase understanding of the factors influencing 
behaviour in more complex and realistic ethical dilemmas.  
Pan and Slater (2011) tested an applied version of the trolley problem (n=36) in an 
immersive VR moral dilemma simulation to provide a novel and more plausible problem. In 
the scenario, an attacker is firing a gun at five visitors in an art gallery. The participant is in a 
virtual lift and they have the choice to bring the lift down to the ground floor, which would 
save five people on the top floor but put the person on the ground floor in danger. They found 
that participants’ utilitarian responses in VR were consistent with moral judgment data 
collected prior to the study (n=80). Interestingly, in the VR simulation participants tended to 
panic and make mistakes in their immediate action (Pan & Slater, 2011). The authors 
suggested this may be because the choices for action were unclear, or because this is what 
people often do in real-world dilemmas; they freeze, make mistakes, and are conflicted about 
what to do. Faulhaber et al (2017) used a simulated moral dilemma VR driving scenario (n = 
189). As participants were driving along a virtual road, a range of obstacles was placed in 
their path and they had to decide between two options to collide with. ‘Obstacles’ included a 
range of human avatars of different sizes and ages. Overall, they found participants 
responded in a utilitarian way - this was also the case in situations where participants had to 
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sacrifice their own avatar to save others. Interestingly, they found participants consistently 
saved younger avatars. However, it was not necessarily clear that hitting avatars would lead 
to death and there is a possibility that utilitarian actions in the first dilemma may have led to 
consistency in later dilemmas.  
VR is gaining popularity as a method to explore driving behaviour in moral dilemma 
scenarios, due to the development of automated vehicles and the debate over the ‘morality’ 
algorithms these vehicles may eventually be controlled by. However, moral philosophers 
highlight important distinctions between the moral dilemmas like the Trolley problem and 
accident-algorithms of driverless cars (Nyholm & Smids, 2016). Accident algorithms are 
decisions made by multiple stakeholders prospectively, with an unlimited number of 
considerations and situational features, relying on risk estimation and decision-making under 
uncertainty, and must fundamentally account for moral and legal responsibility - issues which 
are still heavily debated. Whereas, in Trolley-type dilemmas; decisions are made in the 
present, only a small number of situational or human factors are considered, legal 
responsibility is removed, and facts and consequences are certain (Nyholm & Smids, 2016). 
Nevertheless, realistic VR driving simulations could be useful to understand what human 
factors (e.g. arousal, interoception) are important for moral behaviour in more contextualised 
and ecologically valid scenarios.  
Rationale for proposed thesis research 
Visceral sensations associated with changes in physiological arousal provide an 
adaptive function for motivating behaviour to support homeostatic regulation and efficient 
utilisation of energy (Craig, 2015; Seth & Friston, 2016). Our perception of somatic markers 
associated with changes in physiological arousal appear to be centrally important for shaping 
our emotional experiences, decision-making and behaviour (e.g. Craig, 2015; Damasio, 1996; 
Dunn et al., 2010; Farb et al., 2015). Negative affective arousal appears to provide a special 
regulatory function for guiding decision-making in harm-based moral dilemmas (Greene et 
al, 2001; 2004; 2009; Moretto et al., 2010; Reynolds & Conway, 2018). For example, 
physiological aversion to action-based harm has been shown to occur before conscious 
consideration of the consequences of harmful action (Cushman et al., 2012; Parton & 
McGinley, 2019). Little is currently known about how individual differences in interoceptive 
capacities correspond with the anticipatory physiological responses prior to moral decision-
making/action, and the moral decision/action itself. Evidence thus far suggests both our 
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interpretations of internal signals and our ability to objectively perceive them are central to 
understanding how interoceptive information could influence our behaviour (Feldman Barrett 
et al, 2004; Garfinkel et al., 2015; Gu et al., 2013; Farb et al., 2015; Kever et al., 2015; 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). 
Contextually salient immersive virtual reality (VR) simulations that can simulate 
sensorimotor processes associated with harmful action during a moral dilemma scenario, may 
offer a more ecologically valid setting to explore our emotional aversion to harm compared to 
traditional text-based paradigms (Francis et al., 2017; Pan & Slater, 2011). VR simulations of 
moral dilemmas are also more likely to generate stronger physiological and emotional 
reactions (Patil et al., 2014; Slater & Sanchez-Vives, 2016; Teper et al., 2015), as well as 
facilitate an egocentric perspective that is more likely to increase the saliency of self-relevant 
consequences of moral behaviour (Francis et al., 2017).  
Understanding how subtle interoceptive processes are associated with physiological 
and emotional reactions to moral dilemmas, could have important implications for real-world 
moral behaviour and professional training programs (Francis et al., 2017; Grinberg & 
Hristova, 2013). For example, understanding the behavioural and physiological responses of 
drivers in anticipated collisions could inform the design of driver-control algorithms in 
automated vehicles that incorporate driver-data. Moreover, within professions such as the 
army or nursing, trained professionals are frequently confronted with moral dilemmas which 
have implications for the wellbeing of others (Corley, 2002). Interestingly, emergency 
services staff have shown reduced physiological arousal during moral dilemma tasks (Francis 
et al., 2017), which suggests that physiological reactivity in response to moral dilemma 
situations may need to be adapted in particular occupational contexts. 
This PhD thesis investigates the role of interoception in moral decision-making and 
moral behaviour across four studies. Study 1 investigates whether interoceptive states of 
hunger, thirst, emotional state and interoceptive sensibility influences moral judgments of 
harm in an online cross-sectional design. Study 2 implements a range of physiological and 
interoception measures in an experimental lab study, to explore the link between 
physiological arousal, interoception and moral judgments of harm. Study 3 investigates the 
relationship between physiological arousal, moral behaviour and interoception in immersive 
VR moral dilemma scenarios in an autonomous vehicle. Finally, in light of the current 
pandemic, Study 4 explores the effects of harm-salience in news articles about coronavirus 
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and interoceptive sensibility, on real-world behavioural intentions during the pandemic and 





















Study 1 Preface 
 
Paper:  
Brown, H., Proulx, M. J., & Fraser, D. S. (2020). Hunger Bias or Gut Instinct ? Responses to 
Judgments of Harm Depending on Visceral State Versus Intuitive Decision-Making. 




Brown, H., Fraser, D. S., and Proulx, M. J. (2019). Does felt hunger and interoceptive 
sensibility influence moral judgments of harm? Open Science Framework. osf.io/37vsh 
 
 
Study 1 aimed to explore the influence of the everyday interoceptive states hunger 
and thirst on moral judgments of harm in people’s naturalistic eating settings in a large online 
sample that could be recruited relatively quickly. This research was initially motivated by the 
protocol of some lab-based tasks that measure interoceptive accuracy and sensitivity 
including heartbeat counting tasks (Schandry, 1981), and water-drinking tasks (Van Dyck et 
al., 2016) used in Study 2 and 3. These tasks typically require people to abstain from eating 
and drinking for several hours to control for differences in for example caffeine or sugar 
consumption that may confound these tasks by altering people’s momentary ability to detect 
internal states. However, short-term fasting manipulations have been shown to influence 
moral judgments of ethical violations (e.g. Vicario et al., 2018), changes in blood glucose 
have been associated with reduced levels of self-control and prosocial intentions (Gailliot et 
al., 2007), and fasting has been shown to increase people’s awareness of changes in 
cardiovascular arousal (Herbert et al., 2012).  
Interoceptive states of hunger and thirst indicate energy and fluid intake is deviating 
away from an expected range required to maintain homeostasis (Craig, 2015) which may be 
associated with individual differences in cognitive and emotional states (MacCormack, 2016; 
Stevenson et al., 2015). As negative emotional responses and increases in sympathetic 
physiological arousal are associated with harm-rejection judgments in hypothetical moral 
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dilemmas (e.g. Cushman et al., 2012; Greene et al., 2001; Moretto et al., 2010; Reynolds & 
Conway, 2018), we were interested in how hunger and thirst, a habitual tendency to focus on 
or notice bodily sensations (interoceptive sensibility; IS; Garfinkel & Critchley, 2013), and 
self-reported emotion and anxiety may interact to influence moral judgments of harm. 
Careful consideration of eligibility requirements ensured no important baseline differences in 
people’s tendency to perceive internal sensations of hunger and thirst e.g. thyroid problems, 
gastrointestinal/heart conditions.  
There were numerous novel elements in this study that contributed to the existing 
literature. No prior studies investigating the link between hunger and moral decision-making 
included measures of interoceptive sensibility (IS). However, Schnall et al (2008) found that 
IS was important in the link between disgust sensations and judgments of ethical violations, 
showing how individual differences in how we typically attend to our bodies can shape 
embodied moral judgment. In addition, we were specifically looking at the relationship 
between hunger, thirst, interoceptive sensibility and egocentric and allocentric moral 
judgments of harm, whereas prior studies have focused more on allocentric judgments of 
harmful acts (e.g. Vicario et al., 2018) and none have included measures of thirst, despite the 
close relationship with hunger (Mckiernan et al., 2008).  
Furthermore, the moral dilemma stimuli used makes it possible to calculate 
independent parameters of harm-aversion and outcome-maximisation tendencies and is now 
considered a superior method to understanding the socio-emotional motivations behind these 
harm-based judgments, compared to earlier traditional dilemmas (Conway & Gawronski, 
2013) such as the Trolley (Thomson, 1985) and Footbridge (Foot, 2003) problems. Conway 
and Gawronski (2013) drew attention to the importance of not conflating overt moral 
judgments with moral inclinations driving these judgments, which led them to develop a 
measure that could capture the relative strength of an inclination to avoid harm or maximise 
outcomes, which are not inversely related. In a series of studies exploring individual 
differences associated with these two motivations, Conway and Gawronski (2013) found that 
differences in harm-aversion tendencies were associated with empathy and perspective 
taking, whereas differences in outcome-maximisation tendencies were predicted by need for 
cognition. Therefore, these parameters show consistency with Greene’s dual process model 
(Greene et al., 2001, 2004), supporting the notion that ‘deontological’ judgments are 
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associated with emotional reactions to the prospect of harm, and ‘utilitarian’ judgments are 
associated with more cost-benefit deliberations concerning the outcome of harmful actions.  
The ‘Utilitarian’ (outcome-maximisation) and ‘Deontological’ (harm-aversion) 
parameters are calculated with the following formulae (Conway & Gawronski, 2013), where 
‘action’ refers to condoning harmful action and ‘inaction’ refers to rejecting harmful action: 
 
Percentage (%) inaction incongruent trials = 1 - % action on incongruent trials 
Percentage (%) inaction congruent trials = 1 - % action on congruent trials 
Utilitarian parameter = % inaction congruent trials – % inaction on incongruent trials 
Deontological parameter = % inaction congruent trials/ (1-Utilitarian parameter) 
 
We discriminated between egocentric and allocentric moral judgments (Tassy et al., 
2013) as egocentric judgments have been shown to engage emotional processes in the brain 
that allocentric judgments do not (Berthoz et al., 2006). We expected egocentric moral 
judgment would be more likely to be associated with interoceptive processes, as both involve 
a level of self-referential processing. In addition, we included a measure of intuitive decision-
making, the Cognitive Reflection Task (Frederick, 2005) to explore whether people’s 
tendency to focus or notice internal sensations predicted people’s ability to disregard ‘gut’ 
responses to counter-intuitive problems, to explore whether this was a potential mechanism 
through which interoceptive sensibility may influence moral decision-making. Finally, we 
discussed correlations with possible confounding factors such as age, sex and anxiety to 
explicate potential interrelationships among the independent and dependent variables to 
contribute to the wider individual differences and moral judgment literature.  
 
Note: Power analysis 
As there are currently no studies showing the effect size for interoception on moral 
judgments, the power analysis was based on a conservative estimate of a small to medium 
effect size (f2= 0.10) of interoception in regression analyses. The degrees of freedom (df=8) 
were chosen to account for the potential of conducting moderation, or moderated mediation 
analyses with several predictors e.g. between interoception, emotion, hunger, thirst etc.- 
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Empirical investigation into the emotional and physiological processes that shape 
moral decision-making is vast and growing. Yet, relatively less attention has been paid to 
measures of interoception in morality research despite its centrality in both emotional and 
physiological processes. Hunger and thirst represent two everyday interoceptive states, and 
hunger, in particular, has been shown to be influential for moral decision-making in 
numerous studies. It is possible that a tendency to focus on internal sensations (interoceptive 
sensibility), as well as the emotional and physiological states associated with visceral states, 
could be important in the relationships between hunger, thirst, and moral judgments. This 
cross-sectional online research (n=154) explored whether interoceptive sensibility, hunger, 
thirst and emotional state influenced appropriateness and acceptability judgments of harm. 
The moral dilemma stimuli used allowed the independent calculation of 1) people’s tendency 
to avoid harmful action at all costs and 2) people’s tendency to maximise outcomes that 
benefit the greater good. The Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT) was implemented to 
determine whether an ability to override intuitive responses to counterintuitive problems 
predicted harm-based moral judgments, as found previously. Hunger-bias, independent of 
interoceptive sensibility and emotional state was influential for non-profitable acceptability 
judgments of harmful actions. Contrary to dual-process perspectives, a novel finding was that 
more intuitive responses on the CRT predicted a reduced aversion to harmful actions which 
was indirectly associated with interoceptive sensibility. We suggest that interoceptive 
sensibility may indicate people’s vulnerability to cognitive miserliness on the CRT task and 
reduced deliberation of moral dilemma stimuli. The framing of moral dilemmatic questions to 
encourage allocentric (acceptability questions) versus egocentric perspectives 
(appropriateness questions), could explain the divergence between hunger-bias and intuitive 
decision-making for predicting these judgments respectively. The findings are discussed in 
relation to dual-process accounts of harm-based moral judgments and evidence linking 
visceral experiences to harm-aversion and moral decision-making. 





Our current homeostatic needs provide a context for decision-making (Craig 2015; 
Gailliot, 2013; Yam et al., 2014). Important decisions sometimes with serious consequences 
such as prescribing anti-biotics (Linder et al., 2014), judicial rulings (Danziger et al., 2011) 
and voting behaviour (Gomez et al., 2007) can be influenced by regularly occurring 
trivialities such as the time of day (Linder et al., 2014; Danziger et al., 2011), bad weather 
(Gomez et al., 2007), carbon-dioxide levels (Satish et al., 2012) and how hungry we are 
(Gailliot, 2013). The connection between how we feel right now and the decisions we make 
is no coincidence. Interoception refers to our perception and interpretation of visceral 
sensations associated with homeostatic regulation inside the body, such as those originating 
in the cardiovascular, respiratory, and gastro-intestinal systems (Craig, 2015; Garfinkel & 
Critchley, 2013). Brain areas responsible for the perception of visceral states (e.g. feeling hot, 
cold, full) are also implicated in the integration of this information to initiate drive states (e.g. 
hunger, thirst, sex-drive) that in turn affect how we feel (Craig, 2015). The vagus nerve 
communicates the majority of information from visceral centres to the brain stem (Hellström 
& Näslund, 2001) coordinating adaptive fight/flight responses on one hand and emotional 
expression and social engagement processes on the other depending on the physiological state 
of the body (Porges, 2007). There is considerable crossover in brain areas responsible for 
interoception, emotion and social cognition (Adolfi et al., 2017) and empirical advances in 
the field of embodied cognition continue to illuminate how cognitive products of the mind 
can be rooted within the body (Häfner, 2013). Furthermore, individual differences in how we 
perceive internal sensations have been shown to be important in the link between visceral 
processes and decision-making (Dunn et al., 2010; Häfner, 2013). 
Visceral states like hunger can influence ethical decisions in the lab (e.g. Yam et al., 
2014) and the real-world (e.g. Gailliot, 2013). Hunger is the subjective experience of food 
deprivation comprising visceral sensations in the stomach area, an emotional desire or 
wanting to eat, and cognitive states associated with eating, food, and hunger (Stevenson et al., 
2015). Thirst is a comparatively understudied but related drive, largely regulated by food 
intake (Mckiernan et al., 2008) and comprises a desire or wanting to obtain and drink water, 
often accompanied by sensations such as dryness of mouth (Ramsay & Booth, 2012). 
Incidental emotional states can influence moral decision-making (Valdesolo & Desteno, 
2006), sensitivity to moral norms (Gawronski et al., 2018) and emotional-regulation 
difficulties predict a bias towards immoral judgments (Zhang et al., 2017). Differences in 
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blood glucose levels have also shown to predict prosocial intentions (Gailliot et al., 2007). 
Danziger and colleagues found the probability of court judges to provide less favourable 
rulings was increasingly likely before the provision of a food/rest break compared to 
afterwards (Danziger et al., 2011). However, other researchers (Weinshall-Margel & 
Shapard, 2011) have contested this, suggesting that the order of cases seen by judges was 
partly responsible for this observation.  
Lab-based research has been more effective at substantiating a link between hunger 
and moral judgments as hunger can be objectively manipulated. Vicario et al (2018) found 
hunger reduced moral disapproval ratings for ethical violations, suggesting hunger-bias may 
reduce the harshness of moral judgments. A dispositional sensitivity towards feelings of 
disgust was also found to increase the severity of moral disapproval ratings of ethical 
violations. Vicario and colleagues suggested hormonal reactions and interoceptive signals 
triggered by eating may evoke feelings of nausea interpreted as disgust (Tracy et al., 2019) 
which subsequently inform moral judgments. This is consistent with other work (Horberg et 
al., 2009; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005), including Schnall et al (2008) who found disgust 
manipulations encourage harsher judgments of ethical violations and is strongest for those 
with a greater tendency to pay attention to interoceptive sensations. Despite large variations 
in interoceptive sensitivities between people and daily fluctuations in interoceptive states, 
individual differences in interoception is an underexplored area in the link between moral 
decision-making and visceral states like hunger (Dunn et al., 2006).  
Damasio’s (1996) somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) was among the first theoretical 
frameworks to reveal the neuropsychological foundations that connect fundamental visceral 
processes with higher-level moral cognitions. The SMH (Damasio, 1996) describes how 
changes in bodily states have the potential to alter our emotional state and bias our thinking 
processes to support adaptive behavioural responses to the environment (Craig 2015; Barrett, 
2016). The ventromedial prefrontal cortex is believed to be responsible for the representation 
of homeostatic information (including emotional state) when evaluating ethical violations 
(Damasio, 1994; Moretto et al., 2010). Damage to this area is associated with emotional 
deficits in guilt and empathy (Anderson et al., 2013), reduced physiological responses to 
moral decisions and greater acceptance of moral violations (Moretto et al., 2010). The insula 
is a key centre for interoceptive integration (Adolfi et al., 2017) and is implicated in 
processing negative emotional states, particularly disgust sensitivity (Calder et al., 2007) 
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which can bias moral decision-making (Greene et al., 2004). It is possible people with 
superior ability to perceive interoceptive processes, could be more influenced by this 
information when forming moral judgments. For example, in research using the Iowa 
Gambling Task (a card-choosing task measuring decision-making under uncertainty), people 
with a superior ability to detect internal sensations were more influenced by concurrent 
somatic signals even when those signals unhelpfully guided them towards high-risk card-
decks (Dunn et al., 2010). 
Historically, research exploring emotional influences in moral decision-making have 
focused on harm-based moral dilemmas like the Trolley (Thomson, 1985) and Footbridge 
(Foot, 2003) problems, as particularly emotive moral-conflicts to consider (Greene et al., 
2001). In these dilemmas’ participants judge whether it is acceptable to cause fatal harm to 
one person either directly (Footbridge) or indirectly (Trolley), as a necessary means to saving 
the lives of more (>1) people. Judgments can be influenced by an emotional reaction to the 
harmful action towards the one person intentionally harmed (‘deontology’), or to the 
outcomes of the action for the many people who would be harmed otherwise (‘utilitarianism’) 
(Cushman, 2013; Miller et al., 2014). This traditional moral dilemma paradigm places 
utilitarianism and deontology on opposite ends of a bi-polar scale, preventing us from 
determining whether someone chooses to harm the 1 person because they have a weakened 
aversion to harming others or because they are more motivated to save the lives of the most 
people (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). A more recent process-dissociation approach (Conway 
& Gawronski, 2013) uses moral dilemma stimuli that allow the measurement of people’s 
outcome-maximisation (utilitarian) and harm-aversion (deontological) motivations 
independently. This method works by calculating the probability that someone chooses to 
condone harming others when harm results in a ‘greater good’ overall, and when it does not. 
Although people’s tendencies to avoid harm or maximise outcomes do not necessarily 
represent people’s abstract views about deontological and utilitarian philosophies (Kahane et 
al., 2018), these terms are used for clarity.  
Deontological moral judgments associated with the rejection of harmful action, have 
been associated with more visceral and intuitive decision-making processes than utilitarian 
decisions (Greene et al., 2001; Park et al., 2016). Greene’s (2001) dual-process account of 
morality proposes deontological judgments are driven by automatic and emotional responses 
associated with activation of emotional centres in the brain, whereas, utilitarian judgments are 
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driven by more reflective, cognitive processes and are associated with activation of brain 
areas implicated in cognitive control (Greene et al., 2004). In support of a dual process 
conceptualisation, emotional arousal predicts deontological preferences (Szekely & Miu, 
2015) and performing or witnessing harmful actions correlates with measures of cardiac 
arousal (Cushman et al., 2012; Parton & McGinley, 2019). More calculative reasoning styles 
have been associated with utilitarian response tendencies (Patil et al., 2020) and successful 
performance on the Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT; Frederick, 2005) is associated with 
increased utilitarian judgments, potentially due to its’ association with cognitive deliberation 
(Baron et al., 2015). The CRT task includes questions that have both correct and ‘intuitive’ 
answers and can be scored according to correct versus intuitive responses (Erceg & Bubić, 
2017). Successful performance on this task requires some reflection to avoid the intuitive 
lures and determine the correct solutions. As such, this task is believed to provide an 
indication of a person’s ability to ‘override’ their gut response to counter-intuitive problems 
(Frederick, 2005). Byrd and Conway (2019) suggest that arithmetic-reflection ability 
(captured by the CRT) is responsible for the association with utilitarian preferences, possibly 
because it indicates a greater numerical focus (i.e. saving more lives) when weighing up 
moral decisions. Whereas, Park and colleagues (2016) suggest strong utilitarian preferences 
may reflect poorer integration of visceral signals into the decision-making process, leading 
participants to place more weight on the outcomes of harmful action.  
The physiological, emotional and cognitive processes implicated in moral decision-
making are relevant to consider in the context of hunger and thirst, as changes in our 
psychophysiological states have the potential to bias decision-making processes (Critchley & 
Garfinkel, 2018). Food deprivation is often associated with increased physiological arousal 
(e.g. Chan et al., 2007; Ribeiro et al., 2009). Ghrelin (the ‘hunger’ hormone) appears to play a 
role in regulating our responses to stressors potentially by increasing anxiety (see Korbonits 
et al., 2004) and relationship with the stress hormone cortisol (Sarker et al., 2013). Although 
there has been less empirical interest in thirst, available evidence suggests hydration levels do 
not affect cardiovascular reactivity (Schwabe et al., 2007) but can affect blood-reactivity to 
stress (Rochette & Patterson, 2005). Cardiovascular arousal is of particular interest, as 
arousal represents a core component of emotional experience (Barrett & Russell, 1999) which 
can intensify the processing of emotionally salient information (McGaugh, 2015) and could 
influence moral decision-making (Greene et al., 2001). Heartbeat signals alone can directly 
influence cognition and facilitate the detection of fearful and threatening stimuli (Garfinkel & 
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Critchley, 2016). In addition, the sound of ‘quickening’ heartbeat feedback has shown to 
predict moral decision-making (Gu et al., 2013), demonstrating how even a belief that we are 
physiologically aroused can influence our moral choices. Hunger sensations or sensations 
associated with hunger-induced physiological arousal may manifest as different 
psychological states (MacCormack, 2016; Barrett et al., 2004) depending on individual 
differences in perception (Dunn et al., 2010; Herbert et al., 2012) and interpretation 
(Domschke et al., 2010) of these interoceptive processes. For example, brain regions 
associated with the conscious awareness of interoceptive states are also implicated in 
subjective emotional experience (Zaki et al., 2012) and individuals who are better at detecting 
heartbeat sensations experience more arousal-focused emotional experiences (Barrett et al., 
2004). Furthermore, preliminary evidence suggests hunger could actually provide a context 
for more accurate perception of visceral sensations due to changes in the autonomic nervous 
system that alter cardiac activity (Herbert et al., 2012). Therefore, although subjective hunger 
and thirst states may be influential for moral decision-making due to the physiological 
experiences typically accompanying them, it is likely that individual differences in 
interoceptive sensitivities will shape how these visceral states translate into psychological and 
emotional states.  
Interoceptive sensibility (IS) is one construct that could influence the psychological 
manifestation of visceral states and is a measure of a person’s tendency to focus on internal 
sensations, independent from their ability to objectively detect internal sensations (Garfinkel 
& Critchley, 2013). Although some evidence suggests heartbeat detection accuracy 
corresponds with increased sensitivity to bodily information (Duschek et al., 2015) other 
research indicates interoceptive accuracy and sensibility are unrelated (Ainley & Tsakiris, 
2013; Ferentzi et al., 2018). Individual differences in IS has shown to be important in the link 
between our visceral experiences and subjective appraisals of these experiences (Häfner, 
2013) and could potentially shape the interpretation of visceral sensations present during 
moral decision-making. Individuals high in body awareness typically direct more attention 
towards visceral sensations, increasing the likelihood they will observe and misinterpret 
physiological changes as meaningful which can influence emotional state (Palomba & 
Stegagno, 1995) and increase anxiety (Clark et al., 1997; Domschke et al., 2010). Paulus and 
Stein (2010) suggest that visceral sensations detected by people with high levels of anxiety 
can be intensified and associated with bad or aversive outcomes and is consistent with the 
finding that IS can increase risk-averse behaviour when bodily information is present 
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(Salvato et al., 2019). Overall the link between anxiety and moral judgments of harm presents 
a mixed picture. Anxiety facilitates increased vigilance to threats and has been associated 
with unethical behaviour (Kouchaki & Desai, 2015). There is some evidence to suggest that 
self-oriented anxiety associated with empathy, can increase people’s tendency to reject harm 
in traditional moral dilemmas (Sarlo et al., 2014). Trait anxiety has shown to specifically 
predict moral goodness ratings of utilitarian action in the Footbridge dilemma, whereas mild 
anxiety-inducing manipulations appear to have less of an impact on moral judgments (Zhao 
et al., 2016). It is plausible that a greater attentional focus on bodily sensations could heighten 
sensitivity to arousal-based physiological sensations accompanying hunger or thirst which, if 
interpreted as meaningful and anxiety-evoking (Paulus & Stein, 2010) could influence moral 
decision-making (Sarlo et al., 2014; Zhao et al., 2016).  
Importantly, prior studies exploring the relationship between hunger and moral 
judgments have measured judgments of ethical violations, which require people to make 
allocentric judgments about the acceptability of other people’s morally dubious actions (e.g. 
Vicario et al., 2018). However, moral dilemmas used to explore people’s aversion to harm 
typically ask questions that facilitate an egocentric perspective e.g. ‘Would you, carry out X 
action…in order to?’ (e.g. Foot, 2003; Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Thomson, 1985). 
Several studies have found discrepancies between whether people judge another person’s 
actions to be morally acceptable, versus whether people agree that they would perform 
‘immoral’ actions themselves (Pletti et al., 2017; Tassy et al., 2013). An egocentric 
perspective, that is putting ourselves in the shoes of the agent committing an immoral act, 
encourages us to consider the self-relevant consequences of our actions (Sood & Forehand, 
2005). Egocentric moral judgments, but not allocentric judgments have been associated with 
activation of the amygdala, suggesting these judgments rely on emotional processes that 
allocentric judgments do not (Berthoz et al., 2006). Therefore, it is possible that imagining 
ourselves personally performing harmful acts could influence how likely we are to refer to 
bodily and emotional cues when forming moral judgments. Extending previous work, we 
explored whether the role of hunger, interoceptive process and emotional state, were 
associated with moral appropriateness (egocentric) and moral acceptability (allocentric) 
judgments of harm in the same way. Furthermore, comparing people’s tendency to judge 
harmful acts as morally acceptable from an allocentric perspective when harm results in a 
greater good, and when it does not, has not previously been explored.  
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We do not yet have a clear understanding of how incidental visceral and emotional 
states may interact and exert influence over moral judgments in the moment, as the 
relationships between these variables are complex and multi-directional. Food deprivation 
can affect physiological arousal (e.g. Chan et al., 2007; Korbonits et al., 2004) and emotional 
processes (MacCormack, 2016) which are known to influence moral judgments regarding the 
harm of others (Damasio et al., 1990; Greene et al., 2001; Cushman et al., 2012; Parton & 
McGinley, 2019). Hunger also influences interoceptive processes and may even heighten our 
awareness of changes in cardiac arousal (Herbert et al., 2012). A heightened awareness of 
internal sensations associated with hunger/thirst may increase the availability of bodily cues 
(Domschke et al., 2010). Hunger states could therefore influence moral decision-making e.g. 
by reducing the harshness of moral acceptability judgments (e.g. Vicario et al., 2018), but the 
direction of this effect has not previously been investigated with harm-based moral 
judgments. Emotional state is fundamentally linked with interoceptive processes, and hunger 
(Barrett, 2016; MacCormack, 2016; Macht & Simons, 2000) and can affect moral judgments 
(e.g. Valdesolo & Desteno, 2006; Zhang, Kong, & Li, 2017). People’s current emotional 
experiences could therefore modulate the relationship between hunger/thirst and moral 
decision-making. We also explored the influence of sex, age and individual differences in 
anxiety for predicting moral judgments. Women and older people are more likely to reject 
harmful action in hypothetical moral dilemmas (McNair et al., 2019; Armstrong et al., 2019). 
Anxiety is associated with heightened cardiac arousal which can affect how we process 
threatening information (Garfinkel & Critchley, 2016) and is a psychological correlate of 
both hunger (Herman et al., 1987) and interoceptive sensibility (Domschke et al., 2010). The 
role of anxiety in moral decision-making appears mixed. Anxiety has shown to increase 
unethical behaviour in some circumstances (Kouchaki & Desai, 2015), with trait anxiety and 
self-focused emotional distress demonstrating varying influences on moral judgments (Sarlo 






The current study aimed to assess the interdependent relationships between 
interoceptive sensibility, hunger and moral judgments of harm with the following research 
questions. The protocol was registered on the Open Science Framework (OSF) (Brown et al., 
2019).  
R1.  Does felt hunger or thirst bias responses to a moral judgment task? 
R2.  Does interoceptive sensibility moderate the relationship between hunger/thirst and 
moral judgments of harm? 
R3.  Does emotional state moderate the relationship between hunger and moral judgments 
of harm?  
R4.  Does sex, age and/or anxiety predict moral judgments of harm?  
 
Materials and Methods 
Design 
This was a within-subjects cross-sectional study (n=154) testing pre-registered research 
questions and exploratory hypotheses in a series of regression analyses. Moral 
appropriateness and moral acceptability judgments were the dependent variables. Hunger, 
thirst, interoceptive sensibility, incidental emotional state, and performance on the Cognitive 
Reflection Task (Frederick, 2005) were the independent variables. The influence of age, sex 
and anxiety for predicting moral judgments was also explored.  
Measures 
Demographics 
Participants completed a brief demographic form indicating their sex, age, nationality 
and ethnicity. Collecting sex data was preferred over gender, as physiological sex differences 
were more relevant due to known sex-differences in interoceptive abilities. Experience in 
mindfulness/mediation practice was collected as a control variable due to its associations with 
body awareness (Bornemann et al., 2015) which could inform interpretation of the results. 
The item read: ‘Are you an experienced meditator or regularly practice mindfulness?’  with 
response options: No/Practice mindfulness or mediate occasionally/Yes, coded for analysis.  
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Health questionnaire  
A brief health questionnaire was used to assess participants’ general health on the day 
prior to, and day of the experiment in the interest of managing any outliers that could 
influence the dependent and independent variables e.g. feelings of nausea, sickness. Only one 
of the questions regarding ‘current state of health’ was coded for analysis as it was deemed 
more relevant to the participants current emotional state. The item read: ‘How is your overall 
health at this moment?’, and response options included: Very Bad/Unwell, Slightly Unwell, 
No Complaints, Fine, Very Good. These were numerically coded 1 to 5 pre-analysis to create 
a measure of ‘current health’.  
Anxiety  
State and trait anxiety were measured using the State and Trait Anxiety Scale (STAI, 
Spielberger & Gorsuch, 1983). This consists of two identical 20-item scales that ask 
participants to rate how they feel right now (State anxiety) and how they feel in general (Trait 
anxiety). Participants were asked to indicate their agreement (Not at 
all/Somewhat/Moderately so/Very much so), with twenty different statements e.g. ‘I feel 
calm’, ‘I feel tense’, ‘I feel at ease’. The scales include positive and negatively coded items to 
calculate two cumulative scores representing State and Trait anxiety.  
Interoceptive sensibility  
Interoceptive sensibility (IS) concerns individuals’ beliefs about their sensitivity to 
normal bodily processes (Ferentzi et al., 2018; Garfinkel & Critchley, 2013) and was 
measured using the ‘Private Body consciousness’ subscale of The Body Consciousness 
Questionnaire (Miller et al., 1981). This subscale offers a parsimonious measure of 
interoceptive sensibility, focusing specifically on bodily sensations and is commonly used in 
interoception research (e.g. (Ainley & Tsakiris, 2013; Sze et al., 2010; Werner et al., 2009). 
The entire Body Consciousness Questionnaire (Miller et al., 1981) was used in the interest of 
maintaining scale-validity. Only scores for the Private Body Consciousness subscale (PBCQ) 
were calculated for analysis which includes 5 questions measuring how often people typically 
notice or pay attention to interoceptive sensations. Subscale items include: ‘I know 
immediately when my mouth or throat gets dry’, ‘I am sensitive to internal bodily tensions’ 
and ‘I am quick to sense the hunger contractions in my stomach’. Participants indicated how 
characteristic each statement was of themselves on a scale (extremely 
uncharacteristic/uncharacteristic/ neutral/characteristic/extremely characteristic). Items were 
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numerically coded 1-5 resulting in a maximum possible score of 25. Mean scores were 
calculated for all participants before analysis. 
State emotion 
State emotion was measured using the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; 
(Watson et al.,1988). Positive (PA) and negative (NA) affect represent two independent 
subscales of subjective emotional experience. Each subscale consists of 10 items and 
demonstrate high internal reliability (PA: Cronbach α= .89; NA Cronbach α = .85; Crawford 
& Henry 2004).  
Moral judgment stimuli 
Conway and Gawronski’s (2013) moral dilemma stimuli were used to assess 
independent response-tendencies of harm-aversion and outcome-maximisation separately. 
Harm-aversion represents the tendency to reject the moral appropriateness of carrying out 
harmful actions regardless of the consequences of harm. Whereas outcome-maximisation 
represents the tendency to condone the moral appropriateness of harmful action, if harm 
results in a greater good overall (e.g. saving more lives). Participants respond with a yes or no 
response (see Table 1). Their text-based procedure includes 20 moral dilemmas made up of 
10 story-pairs, which are matched in story-content but the amount of ‘greater good’ resulting 
from a harmful action is manipulated. This makes it possible to measure harm-aversion 
tendencies while controlling for people’s tendency to maximise outcomes. A harm-aversion 
and outcome-maximisation score is calculated for each person, based on the probability that 
they accepted/rejected harm when harm resulted in a ‘greater good’, and when it did not (for 








Table 1.  
Matched pair of moral dilemma stimuli from Conway and Gawronski’s (2013) moral dilemma task 
 
Moral acceptability ratings 
Moral acceptability ratings of allocentric ethical violations (Schnall et al., 2008) or 
moral goodness ratings of harmful actions (Sarlo et al., 2014) provide a useful scale measure 
of the strength of people’s judgments of harmful actions. Here we implemented a moral 
acceptability measure, to capture the strength of people’s allocentric moral judgments when 
harmful action results in a greater good and when it does not. Following each of the moral 
dilemmas, we asked participants to judge the moral acceptability of the harmful actions 
proposed in the previous moral dilemma (see Table 1). The item read: ‘How morally 
acceptable or morally unacceptable do you find the proposed action to be?’ Response 
options included: 1 = Completely unacceptable, 2 = Moderately unacceptable, 3 = Slightly 
Causing harm maximises outcomes Causing harm does NOT maximise 
outcomes: 
You are a soldier guarding a border 
checkpoint between your nation and one 
troubled by insurgent violence. You 
notice a young man in a cheap car 
approaching the checkpoint with a 
determined look on his face. You suspect 
he means to bomb the checkpoint, killing 
all the soldiers inside. He is rapidly 
approaching your station. 
 
Question: Is it appropriate for you to 
shoot and kill the approaching man? 
Yes/No 
You are a soldier guarding a border 
checkpoint between your nation and one 
troubled by insurgent violence. You 
notice a young man in a cheap car 
approaching the checkpoint with a 
determined look on his face. You suspect 
he means to cross the border in order to 
work illegally inside your country. He is 
rapidly approaching your station. 
 
Question: Is it appropriate for you to 
shoot and kill the approaching man? 
Yes/No 
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unacceptable, 4 = neither acceptable nor unacceptable, 5= Slightly acceptable, 6= Moderately 
acceptable, 7= Completely acceptable (adapted from Schnall et al., 2008). 
Hunger and thirst 
Two separate, single-item visual analogue scales were used to assess self-reported 
sensations of Hunger and Thirst on a scale of 1 to 9: ‘How Hungry/Thirsty do you feel at this 
moment?’ (1=not at all, 9=extremely hungry/thirsty). Hunger and Thirst were assessed last to 
avoid any priming-effects before the moral judgment task.  
Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT) 
The original CRT (Frederick, 2005) assesses participant’s ability to override intuitive 
or ‘gut’ responses to counter-intuitive problems. The task involves three questions that have 
both an intuitive and correct answer e.g. ‘A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs 
$1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?’. Participants manually typed their 
answers and response-time was not capped. Successful performance on this task requires 
further deliberation of the questions to determine the correct solutions and therefore, better 
performance is associated with a greater ability to override the ‘intuitive’ or more obvious 
answer. This measure aimed to capture participant’s intuitive versus analytic decision-making 
tendencies when faced with counterintuitive problems. There are many possible scoring 
methods for the CRT. As such, both the ‘Regular’ scoring method (totaling only correct 
answers) and the ‘Intuitive’ scoring method (totaling only intuitive answers and disregarding 
incorrect answers) were used (Erceg & Bubić, 2017), to inspect correlations between these 
alternative calculations.  
Procedure 
Following approval from University of Bath Psychology Ethics Committee, 154 
participants were recruited online via advertisements displayed on University of Bath 
research participation portal and social networking sites. The experiment was developed in 
Qualtrics and accessible via an anonymous web-link. All partially completed questionnaires 
were excluded from analysis. We exceeded our target sample size of 120 participants, which 
was based on a-priori power calculations using G*Power for multiple linear regression 
models, assuming α = .95, β = .8 and f² = 0.10 (df=8). Inclusion criteria for participation was 
guided by a literature review of physiological and psychological confounds known to 
influence the primary independent variables, namely hunger, thirst and interoception. 
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Participants were required to be aged 18+; with no current mental health issues; no history of 
disordered eating, diabetes, thyroid conditions, gastrointestinal or heart conditions or 
previous surgery to those areas; and no current health conditions or medication that affected 
diet, weight or exercise. Eligibility criteria were emphasised on the research advertisements 
and participant information sheet.  
Potential participants accessing the experiment in Qualtrics were first presented with a 
study information sheet. They were then asked to confirm they met eligibility requirements 
and encouraged to contact the experimenter with any questions or concerns about taking part. 
Participants then completed an online consent form and were made aware they could enter 
their names into a prize draw at the end of the experiment in exchange for their participation. 
Participants worked through a series of questionnaires in the order outlined below with 
instructions provided before each questionnaire. The experiment took roughly thirty minutes 
to complete and could be mostly carried out at the pace of the respondent. The moral 
dilemma task was the only timed element of the experiment, whereby the text for each moral 
dilemma story would time-out after 45 seconds and was followed by the moral judgment 
questions. Participants could advance to the questions after 20 seconds with a button click. 
This ensured reading time for each moral dilemma was roughly standardised and was clearly 
signposted in the instructions before starting the task. Upon completion of the study 
participants were thanked for their time and provided with some further information about the 
study and experimenter contact details. They were then asked if they would like to enter the 
prize draw to win 1 of 4 £25 Amazon vouchers, by entering their details via an anonymous 
link to a Raffle survey in Qualtrics. 
Results 
Data reduction and descriptive analysis 
The sample was 31.8% male and the age of participants ranged between 18-70 years 
(Median=31, SD=12.21). Statistical analysis was carried out with SPSS v.24. A Pearson’s 
bivariate correlation analysis including all of the variables was conducted first, followed by a 
series of ordinary least squares regression analyses to address preregistered and exploratory 
hypotheses. The SPSS scripts for moderation, mediation and conditional process analyses 
(PROCESS) were adopted from Hayes (2018). For all moderation analyses carried out in 
PROCESS, interactions are probed at the 16th, 50th and 84th percentiles by default. As females 
were considerably overrepresented in this sample, a bootstrapping method was adopted for all 
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regression analyses (5000 x bootstrapping samples, 95% confidence interval) to generate 
standard error estimates that do not rely on parametric assumptions (Hayes, 2018).  
Dependent variables: moral judgments and moral acceptability ratings 
The four moral judgment dependent variables included 1) harm-aversion and 2) 
outcome maximisation tendencies and moral acceptability ratings for 3) congruent and 4) 
incongruent trials. Raw harm-aversion and outcome-maximisation scores were standardised 
into z-scores as suggested (see supplementary material; Conway and Gawronski 2013). As 
expected, harm-aversion and outcome-maximisation scores only showed weak negative 
correlation (r = -.092, p=.259); confirming the independence of these response tendencies. To 
explore whether people judged harmful actions (from an allocentric perspective) as more 
morally acceptable for trials where harm maximised outcomes and when it did not, moral 
acceptability ratings for the harmful actions proposed in each moral dilemma were averaged 
for trials where harm did not maximise outcomes (congruent), and trials where harm 
maximised outcomes (incongruent) (see Table 1). This resulted in two average moral 
acceptability scores for each participant: 1) acceptability_incongruent and 2) 
acceptability_congruent. Each acceptability score represented 10 moral acceptability ratings. 
Moral acceptability scores for congruent and incongruent trials were strongly positively 
correlated (r=.640, p<.001). This indicates people were relatively consistent in how morally 
acceptable they judged harmful actions to be from an allocentric perspective across all trials, 
when harm maximised outcomes and when it did not.  
The distribution of studentised residuals of the dependent variables were inspected. 
Outcome-maximisation scores and acceptability_incongruent scores were fairly normally 
distributed. Harm-aversion scores sat slightly higher than the mean on average, however only 
mild skewness was identified. A log10 transformation was carried out on 
acceptability_congruent scores to adjust for a strong positive skew. For all regression 
analyses, a casewise diagnostic was performed on studentised residuals to identify outliers 
affecting the values of the estimated regression coefficients. Only three outliers ±3 standard 
deviations were identified overall and removed from the associated regression analysis. A 
Cook’s distance and Levene’s test confirmed no leverage values or unusual data points in 




The state emotion and trait and state anxiety measures showed high internal 
reliability. Coefficient a was .87 for positive affect, .89 for negative affect (.82 for the entire 
PANAS measure), .94 for state anxiety and .95 for trait anxiety. Adequate internal 
consistency was found for the private body consciousness subscale (5 items) of the Body 
Consciousness Questionnaire (a=.65) and is comparable to prior research (Christensen et al., 
1996). Scores for the Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT) were coded for the presence of 
correct answers (Regular scoring) and intuitive answers (Intuitive scoring) and demonstrated 
very high negative correlation (r=-.910, p<.001). Correlations for the independent variables 
can be found below in Table 2. 
Hunger and thirst 
The mean hunger rating was 3.24 (SD=2.09) and 4.07 for thirst (SD=1.96), and the 
mode being 1 for hunger and 3 for thirst. As expected, hunger and thirst were positively 
correlated (r=0.294) and both scores positively predicted how many hours it had been since 
participants reported eating. Hunger and thirst scores were relatively normally distributed 
although participants typically reported less felt hunger than the median response option. 
Thirst was positively correlated with interoception (r=.247, p<.001) suggesting that people 
who were more likely to focus on internal sensations were also more likely to report 
subjective experiences of thirst.  
Anxiety, emotion and interoceptive sensibility 
Both state and trait anxiety strongly positively correlated with negative affect and 
were negatively correlated with positive affect (Table 2), which is expected as subjective 
arousal comprises a core component of affective experience (Barrett & Russell, 1999). More 
anxious people were more likely to report feeling unwell and although the direction of the 
relationship is unclear, correlation between anxiety and health related concerns is consistent 
with other work in this field (Domschke et al., 2010; Paulus & Stein, 2010). A noteworthy 
observation was that self-reported frequency of mindfulness practice (see ‘Demographics’) 
was positively correlated with interoceptive sensibility (r=.274, p=.001) suggesting people 
with a tendency to focus on bodily sensations engaged in mindfulness more often. Therefore, 
people exhibiting a greater tendency to notice bodily sensations in this study, may have 
demonstrated a healthier, more adaptive attentional style towards bodily sensations as 
opposed to a more anxious preoccupation with bodily sensations. 
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Table 2.  
Pearson’s coefficients for all independent variables  








Intero. CRT Age Sex Health 
Hunger .289** -.30 -.089 -.031 -.071 .152 -.069 .000 .041 .050 
Thirst  .165 .136 -.117 .140 .247** .012 -.061 .064 -.154 
State Anx.   .726** -.197* .454** .038 -.045 -.318** .119 -.430** 
Trait Anx.    -.284** .454** .121 -.008 -.294** .227** -.325** 
Pos. Affect     -.072 -.125 .057 .143 -.156 .204* 
Neg. Affect      .083 -.023 -.205* .230** -.148 
Intero.       -.216** -.004 .093 -.072 
CRT        .047 -.121 -.029 
Age         -.253** .155 
Sex          -.040 
 
Note. Variables in vertical order: Hunger, Thirst, State Anxiety, Trait anxiety, Positive Affect, Negative Affect, Interoceptive 
sensibility, Cognitive Reflection Task score (regular), Age, Sex (Male=1, Female=2), Current Health (* p<.05; **p<.01). 
 
Analyses 
R1. Hunger, thirst, and moral judgments of harm 
R1 tested whether felt hunger or thirst biased moral judgments of harm. Hunger and 
thirst ratings were entered as predictor variables in four multiple linear regression models. 
Outcome-maximisation, harm-aversion and moral acceptability for congruent 
(acceptability_congruent) and incongruent trials (acceptability_incongruent) were the 
dependent variables. Contrary to our hypothesis, neither hunger (b=.072, p=.402) nor thirst 
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(b=.036, p=.675) predicted participant’s harm aversion scores (R² chng=.010, F (2, 149) = 
0.597, p=.552). Moreover, hunger (b=0.043) and thirst (b= -0.043) did not predict participant 
outcome-maximisation scores (R² chng=.003, F (2, 149) = 0.195, p=.823). Therefore, 
participants who were more hungry or thirsty were not more or less likely to accept/reject 
harm or maximise outcomes on the moral dilemma task than those who were less hungry or 
thirsty. Hunger (b=0.118, p=.170) and Thirst (b=-0.052, p=.544) also did not predict 
acceptability_incongruent scores (where harm results in a ‘greater good’) (R² chng=.013, F 
(2, 148) = 0.973, p=.380). Hunger did negatively predict acceptability _congruent scores 
(b=0.226, p=.008) in the model (R² chng=.049, F (2, 148) = 3.841, p=.024) but thirst did not 
(b=-0.116, p=.167). Therefore, hungrier participants were more likely to judge the moral 
acceptability of harmful actions as less ‘wrong’, but only for trials where harmful actions 
resulted in no greater-good overall. Finally, as hunger and thirst are related sensations often 
physiologically interlinked, a post hoc mediation analysis was conducted to assess whether 
hunger (a) influenced acceptability_congruent scores through experiences of thirst (b). A 
bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect (ab=-0.0421) included zero (-0.0059 to 
0.0005) indicating that hunger did not influence moral acceptability ratings on congruent 
trials through related experiences of thirst. Despite the positive correlation between hunger 
and thirst ratings, how thirsty participants felt did not appear influential for moral 
acceptability ratings across all trials. 
R2. Moderating role of affective state 
In R2, we explored the moderating role of affective state in the relationship between 
hunger and moral judgments of harm. Against our predictions, no significant correlations 
were found between hunger, thirst and positive or negative emotional state, or between 
emotional state and moral judgments (see Table 2). Non-significant relationships between 
hunger/thirst and moral judgments were not probed for moderation effects of emotional state. 
A moderating role of positive affect (R² chng=.0118, F (1, 147) = 1.82, p=.1793) and 
negative affect (R² chng=.012, F (1, 147) = 1.853, p=.1755) was not found in the relationship 
found between hunger and acceptability_congruent ratings found in R1. A further mediation 
analysis was carried out to rule out the possibility of hunger influencing 
acceptability_congruent ratings through changes in emotional state. Bootstrap confidence 
intervals of the indirect effect of hunger through positive affect (-.0012 to .0012) and negative 
affect (-.0013 to .0008) on acceptability_congruent ratings were entirely below zero, ruling 
out any mediation effects. Together this indicates, the influence of hunger on moral 
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acceptability ratings of unprofitable harmful acts cannot be explained by hunger-associated 
changes in emotional state. A two-step hierarchical regression controlling for the effects of 
positive affect, negative affect and state anxiety also confirmed hunger significantly 
influenced acceptability_congruent ratings (b=.197, p=.016). Therefore, the influence of 
hunger on non-profitable judgments of harm was independent of affective experience. 
R3. Moderating role of interoceptive sensibility 
In R3 we proposed that greater interoceptive sensibility (tendency to focus on bodily 
sensations) could increase the availability of visceral sensations associated with hunger or 
thirst which could moderate the relationship between hunger/thirst and moral judgments.  
Contrary to R3, a moderation analysis yielded no interaction effect between hunger and 
interoception for outcome-maximisation tendencies (R² chng=<.001, F (1, 147) = 0.054, 
p=.817), harm-aversion tendencies (R² chng=.0179, F (1, 147) = 2.719; p=.101), 
acceptability_incongruent scores (R² chng=.0064, F (1, 147) = 0.964, p=.328) or 
acceptability_congruent scores (R² chng=.003, F (1, 147) = 0.455, p=.501). Similarly, no 
moderation effect of interoception was found between thirst and outcome-maximisation (R² 
chng=.000, F (1, 147) = 0.064, p=.799), harm-aversion tendencies (R² chng=.0026, F (1, 147) 
= 0.395, p=.531), acceptability_incongruent scores (R² chng=<.001, F (1, 147) = 0.002, 
p=.961), or acceptability_congruent scores (R² chng=<.001, F (1, 147) = 0.005, p=.979). 
Therefore, the influence of sensations of hunger or thirst on participant’s moral acceptability 
and moral appropriateness judgments did not vary as a function of their tendency to focus on 
bodily sensations. 
R4. Influence of sex, age, and anxiety on moral judgments 
Age and sex were inputted as predictors in multiple linear regression models of all of 
the dependent variables (harm-aversion, outcome-maximisation tendencies, 
acceptability_congruent and acceptability_incongruent ratings).  We found participants age 
(b=0.216, p=.009) and sex (b=0.220, p=.008) significantly predicted harm-aversion 
tendencies, with females and older participants showing greater harm-aversion tendencies 
irrespective of the consequences of harm (R²=.071, F (2, 148) = 5.656, p=.004). Neither age 
nor sex predicted outcome-maximisation tendencies i.e. acceptance of harm in the interests of 
the ‘greater good’ (R²=.003, F (2, 148) = 0.215, p=.807). Age and sex also did not predict 
acceptability_congruent (R²=.022, F (2, 148) = 1.626, p=.200) or acceptability_incongruent 
ratings (R²=.026, F (2, 148) = 1.959, p=.145). Therefore, age and sex did not influence how 
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morally acceptable people judged harmful actions to be, despite the differences in harm-
aversion tendencies overall. In partial support of the role of anxiety in moral judgments, state 
anxiety negatively correlated with harm-aversion (r=-.177, p=.03), indicating people who 
were more anxious at the time of the experiment were less likely to reject causing harm in the 
moral dilemmas. However, a hierarchical regression model confirmed that state anxiety did 
not significantly predict harm-aversion scores when controlling for the effects of sex and age, 
(R² chng=.091, F (3, 147) = 4.911, b=-.150, p=.078). State anxiety was significantly 
negatively correlated with age (r=.318, p<.01), with younger people more likely to report 
both state and trait anxiety. Therefore, age appears to account for much of the variation in 
state anxiety that predicted harm rejection judgments towards the moral dilemmas.  
Exploratory analyses 
We tested the hypothesis that more accurate performance on the CRT task would 
positively predict more utilitarian response tendencies in line with prior research (Baron et 
al., 2015; Byrd & Conway, 2019).  
EH1. CRT performance and moral judgments 
Contrary to EH1, CRT performance showed significant positive correlation with 
harm-aversion (r=.235, p=.004) but not outcome-maximisation tendencies (r=.048, p=.562). 
As gender differences have been found for CRT performance (Ring et al., 2016) a multiple 
linear regression controlling for the effects of age and sex confirmed that CRT scores 
significantly predicted harm-aversion tendencies (R² chng=.135, F (3, 147) = 7.655, b=.255, 
p=.001). This finding was sustained when inputting alternative CRT scores representing the 
presence of ‘intuitive’ answers as opposed to correct answers. Therefore, participants who 
were more likely to provide ‘intuitive’ answers on the CRT were more likely to accept 
causing harm in moral dilemmas, irrespective of the outcomes.  
Following EH1, we explored the predictive relationship between interoceptive 
sensibility and the performance on the CRT task. We further investigated the possibility of a 
mediation-effect of interoceptive sensibility through intuitive decision-making processes 




EH2. CRT performance, interoceptive sensibility and harm-aversion 
Following identification of moderate correlation between CRT scores and 
interoceptive sensibility (r=-.216, p=.008), a linear regression model confirmed that higher 
interoceptive sensibility predicted more incorrect and intuitive responses on the CRT (R² 
chng=.046, F (1, 149) = 7.264, p=.008). A mediation analysis explored the presence of an 
indirect effect of interoceptive sensibility (a) on harm-aversion scores, through more 
‘intuitive’ decision-making processes on the CRT (b). The direct effect of interoception on 
harm-aversion scores was not significant (t=-0.272, p=.786). However, a bootstrap 
confidence interval of the indirect effect (ab=-.0802) was entirely below zero (-0.1718 to -
.0110) suggesting that people with a greater tendency to focus on internal sensations provided 
more intuitive responses on the CRT and were more likely to condone harmful actions. 
Therefore, interoceptive sensibility explains a significant amount of variance in ‘intuitive’ 
CRT responses which subsequently predicts participants acceptance of harmful actions. 
Discussion 
An unexpected and novel discovery in this study was that hunger-bias appeared 
uniquely influential for acceptability judgments of non-profitable harmful actions, whereas 
‘intuitive’ decision-making tendencies exclusively predicted appropriateness judgments of 
harm. These independent effects suggest that a metaphorical ‘gut instinct’ and gut-related 
visceral experiences of hunger have distinct influences on harm-based moral cognition. We 
do have the capacity to be morally hypocritical; although we may judge an action to be 
morally appropriate, we can equally judge that act to be morally unacceptable (Tassy et al., 
2013). Framing questions as ‘is it appropriate to…?’ versus ‘how morally acceptable do you 
find…?’ assumes different perspectives of the judge and inconsistencies have been found 
between these types of judgments previously (Pletti et al., 2017; Tassy et al., 2013). Choice 
judgments such as “Would you do…in order to…?” involves forming a judgment from an 
egocentric perspective and makes self-relevant consequences more salient (Sood & Forehand, 
2005; Tassy et al., 2013). Choice judgments are akin to the moral appropriateness judgments 
in this study which encouraged people to adopt the perspective of the person carrying out the 
harmful action in the story (see Table 1). Whereas moral acceptability judgments provide a 
more abstract or allocentric perspective to evaluate a harmful act and create distance from the 
self and refer to the moral acceptability judgments in this study (Frith & De Vignemont, 
2005). These two types of judgments may rely on distinct neural bases associated with 
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differing degrees of agency. For example, egocentric moral judgments, but not allocentric, 
have been associated with activation of the amygdala suggesting these judgments activate 
emotional processes associated with weighing up the consequences of our own actions for 
ourselves (Berthoz et al., 2006). Moreover, experiencing oneself as the cause of action has 
shown to activate areas of the anterior insula (Adolfi et al., 2017) whereas experiencing 
someone else as the cause of action is associated with activation of the inferior parietal cortex 
(Farrer & Frith, 2002). The importance of ‘where we are’ in relation to harm, has also come 
to light in virtual-reality studies that find discrepancies between hypothetical moral 
judgments people make and the harmful behaviours they perform when confronted with more 
realistic moral dilemmas (e.g. Francis et al., 2016).  
In R1, we found less hungry people rated harm as more wrong in instances where 
harm did not result in any ‘greater good’ overall, although this predictive relationship was 
relatively weak. This suggests hunger may be uniquely influential for allocentric judgments 
about unprofitable harmful acts. In line with prior research, the physiological changes 
associated with hunger states could bias how severely we judge the acceptability of moral 
violations from an allocentric perspective (Vicario et al., 2018), but the exclusivity of this 
effect for non-profitable harmful actions is a novel finding for harm-based moral dilemmas. 
Arguably, acceptability judgments for the trials where harm did not result in a ‘greater good’ 
provides a judgment of the ‘wrongness’ of excessive harm, as there is no moral justification 
to judge harm that is without benefit as morally acceptable. However, clearly people did 
judge certain types of harm to be more acceptable than other types and appears to have been 
influenced by their level of hunger. This is discussed further below. Moral appropriateness 
judgments, however, may reflect more stable aversions people have to characteristically 
harmful actions (action-aversion) and witnessing the pain of others (outcome-aversion) 
(Miller et al., 2014), that are more impervious to temporary hunger states. Alternatively, the 
binary yes/no option, may simply prevent us from understanding the true strength of 
appropriateness judgments. Surprisingly, in R3 we found emotional state did not moderate 
the relationship between hunger and moral judgments. Interoceptive sensibility also did not 
moderate any relationships between hunger, thirst and moral judgments, contrary (R2). Null 
findings for R2 and R3 suggest that hunger ‘acted alone’ to influence non-profitable moral 
acceptability judgments of harm and cannot be explained by differences in people’s tendency 
to focus on visceral sensations like hunger, or incidental emotional state (e.g. Valdesolo & 
Desteno, 2006) 
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Perhaps most surprising was that CRT performance (directly) and interoceptive 
sensibility (indirectly) predicted people’s harm-aversion tendencies. This may suggest a 
discrete influence of intuitive decision-making processes and interoceptive sensibility for 
judgments of harm when adopting an egocentric viewpoint of the actor causing harm. This 
finding contradicts exploratory hypothesis EH1 and prior research showing a positive 
relationship between CRT performance and outcome-maximisation or ‘utilitarian’ tendencies 
(Baron et al., 2015; Byrd & Conway, 2019). Although a logical reflection measure has 
correlated with harm-aversion tendencies before, arithmetic reflection (assessed by the CRT) 
has not (Byrd & Conway, 2019). The fact that more arithmetically correct answers on the 
CRT predicted the rejection of harmful action when harm resulted in a ‘greater good’ and 
when it did not, challenges the view that a more arithmetic focus is responsible for moral 
judgments that prioritise the number of lives saved (Byrd & Conway, 2019; Patil et al., 
2020). An association between CRT performance and harm-aversion is also counter-intuitive 
to dual-process perspectives (Greene et al., 2001) that propose the rejection of harmful 
actions is associated with a faster, more emotional decision-making pathway that we might 
expect to negatively correlate with intuitive responses on the CRT (e.g. Kahneman and 
Frederick, 2002).  People with higher interoceptive sensibility were more likely to provide 
‘intuitive’ answers on the CRT task, suggesting greater bodily awareness impeded successful 
performance on this task. Furthermore, in EH2 we found interoceptive sensibility indirectly 
predicted harm-aversion tendencies through its influence on CRT performance. Whereby, 
heightened interoceptive sensibility appeared to reduce people’s ability to resolve counter-
intuitive problems on the CRT, which subsequently increased the likelihood they would 
condone harmful actions on the moral dilemma task.  There is some support for the notion 
that an awareness of somatic states could actually enhance our representations of ourselves in 
relation to our moral responsibilities (Immordino-Yang, 2011), but the findings here suggest 
a heightened focus on visceral sensations may somehow contribute to a weakening of our 
aversion to harmful actions. 
In R4, we found age and sex were the strongest predictors of harm-aversion but not 
outcome-maximisation tendencies. As founds previously, older participants and female 
participants were most likely to reject causing harm (Armstrong et al., 2019; McNair et al., 
2019), but these age and sex differences did not extend to moral acceptability ratings- a 
distinction that has not been clarified before. There was partial support for a role of state 
anxiety in predicting harm-aversion tendencies, with more anxious people more likely to 
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accept causing harm regardless of the outcomes. This is somewhat consistent with a previous 
finding (Kouchaki & Desai, 2015) and is potentially due to how anxiety influences how we 
process threatening information (see Garfinkel & Critchley 2016). However, the predictive 
value of state anxiety appeared to be mostly explained by variation in age, with younger 
people significantly more likely to report higher levels of state anxiety.  
Hunger and moral acceptability ratings 
We did find hungrier people were more likely to judge non-profitable harmful actions 
as more morally acceptable, although the magnitude of effect was relatively weak and should 
be interpreted with caution. An absence of a relationship between hunger and state anxiety 
suggests these appraisals were not based on hunger-induced arousal (e.g. Chan et al., 2007; 
Korbonits et al., 2004). Indeed, hunger may not always induce physiological arousal in a 
negative sense (e.g. Michalsen, 2010) and hunger and state anxiety were in fact slightly 
negatively correlated in this study. Psychophysiological arousal has shown to predict an 
aversion to harmful actions (Cushman et al., 2012). Therefore, if arousal cues were reduced 
in hungrier individuals it is possible this lessened the severity of their acceptability judgments 
and is consistent with the finding that hunger can actually reduce threat-tolerance and 
promote riskier decision-making in animals (Ghosh et al., 2016). As the majority of people 
reported lower levels of hunger, it is possible that our sample did not include enough ‘very-
hungry’ participants to generate the hormonal and physiological responses associated with 
hunger-induced arousal. This subsequently reduces the probability of observing individual 
differences in state anxiety or negative affect associated with hunger that may have been 
influential.  
As people who were less hungry reported to have eaten more recently, a ‘fullness’-
based explanation is perhaps more likely and is consistent with some prior research (Vicario 
et al., 2018). Nausea symptoms often correlate with post-eating gastric emptying (Halawi et 
al., 2017) and can be interpreted emotionally as disgust (Tracy et al., 2019) which can 
influence moral judgments (see Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin 1994). However, this is a novel 
finding for harm-based moral judgments (Horberg et al., 2009). Nevertheless, this 
explanation is consistent with research finding positive correlations between hunger and 
acceptance of moral violations (Vicario et al., 2018), and between disgust sensitivity and 
disapproval of moral violations (Horberg et al., 2009; Vicario & Rafal, 2017). Unfortunately, 
as we did not measure disgust or fullness these hypotheses remain speculative, although only 
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3% of the sample reported any nausea or gastrointestinal distress in a pre-study health 
questionnaire. Importantly, nausea associated with gastric dysrhythmias is not unique to 
visceral signaling processes associated with eating and can occur during hunger states and 
stomach emptiness (see Levine, 2005 for a review). However, why exactly hunger was only 
influential for moral acceptability judgments of harm that did not result in any ‘greater good’ 
overall is unclear and requires further investigation. 
Interoceptive sensibility  
Interoceptive sensibility (IS) did not moderate the relationship between hunger and 
acceptability judgments of non-profitable harm (R2). As people’s tendency to focus on 
visceral sensations did not change the relationship between hunger and moral judgments, this 
implies that the psychophysiological processes proposed to underlie this relationship (e.g. 
Vicario et al., 2018) do not strengthen with higher levels of attention directed towards 
internal sensations. However, it is conceivable that people with higher levels of IS had lower 
thresholds for detecting sensations of hunger and thirst (Stevenson et al., 2015) and were 
more likely to overestimate ‘true’ homeostatic states of hunger/thirst. This was evident for 
thirst at least, as a moderate correlation between thirst and IS (r=.247, p<.01), indicated 
people with a greater sensitivity to bodily sensations were more aware of thirst-type visceral 
sensations. Similarly, hunger was positively correlated with IS (r=.152) but was non-
significant. It could be argued, that the hunger and thirst ratings scales provided a measure of 
IS themselves, as they asked people to consciously assess and report subjective visceral states 
which will of course depend on the availability of this information. Although problematic 
levels of multicollinearity between hunger/thirst and IS were not identified in the regression 
analyses; if changes in IS were met with corresponding changes in hunger/thirst ratings this 
would reduce the likelihood of observing any moderation effects of IS in the relationship 
between hunger and moral judgments. Future work using a larger sample could generate 
more statistical power to uncover any small effect sizes of IS in the link between hunger and 
moral acceptability judgments not found here.   
Role of emotional states and anxiety 
Interestingly, neither anxiety nor emotional state correlated with hunger or thirst 
providing no support for any association between these constructs found previously (see 
MacCormack, 2016). Agreeing on the archetypical symptoms and psychophysiological 
experiences of hunger and thirst is challenging, due to variations in eating contexts (Ribeiro 
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et al., 2009) and the variation of visceral and emotional expressions of hunger and thirst 
people report (e.g. Michalsen, 2010). For example, a large proportion of people do not 
experience abdominal emptiness when hungry (Harris & Wardle, 1987) and some even report 
positive psychological experiences from food deprivation (Watkins & Serpell, 2016) which 
could partially explain why we did not find the anticipated relationships between hunger, 
thirst and emotional states in this study.  Alternatively, the null finding for R3 is perhaps due 
to the low variation in hunger and thirst ratings in this sample.  
State anxiety negatively predicted harm-aversion tendencies on the moral judgment 
task but fell from significance when controlling for age and sex. Trait anxiety did not 
correlate with harm-aversion tendencies which contradicts an earlier finding (Zhao et al., 
2016), and is surprising considering that measures of dispositional threat-reactivity have 
predicted people’s aversion to harmful actions (Cushman et al., 2012) with momentary 
anxiety inductions having less of an effect on moral judgments (Zhao et al., 2016). Anxiety 
can facilitate the processing of threatening information (Mathews, 1990) and increase 
anticipation of aversive outcomes (Paulus & Stein, 2010) and may explain the negative 
association found between state anxiety and harm-acceptance tendencies found here. More 
anxious people may have perceived the hypothetical recipients of harm to be more 
threatening or considered the option of not carrying out harm (i.e. doing nothing) to be the 
riskier option compared to less anxious people, but the link between anxiety, physiological 
arousal and moral judgments is likely much more complex. Moreover, as emotion and 
anxiety were measured before participants completed the moral dilemmas, we can only 
speculate that any incidental feelings of anxiety or emotion were experienced as unrelated to 
the task as opposed to a reaction to the potential consequences of their choices on the task 
(see Baumeister et al., 2012).  
CRT, interoceptive sensibility and harm-aversion 
While interoceptive accuracy (on a heartbeat detection task) has shown to influence 
CRT performance under certain conditions (Lugo et al., 2017), a relationship between 
interoceptive sensibility (IS) and CRT performance is novel. Empirical work surrounding IS 
and cognition is limited. There is some evidence to suggest IS can influence risk-taking 
behaviour (Salvato et al., 2019) but this does not appear related to impulsivity in decision-
making (Herman, Critchley, & Duka, 2018). IS also indirectly predicted harm-aversion 
tendencies through its influence on CRT performance. Both IS (Paulus & Stein, 2010) and 
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egocentric moral judgments are associated with forms of self-referential processing (Sood & 
Forehand, 2005) which is one speculative explanation of the indirect association between IS 
and harm-aversion in this study. People scoring higher on IS may engage in self-referential 
processing to a greater extent, which possibly reduces their inclination to engage in 
computationally demanding decision-processes when faced with counterintuitive problems 
like the CRT. Therefore, these people may be more likely to rely on intuitive heuristics to 
form their answer (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) which may also have consequences for 
moral decision-making. Consistent with this hypothesis, perhaps the most parsimonious 
account for why the CRT was a predictor of harm-aversion bias here is because it taps into 
our general tendency towards being ‘cognitive misers’ – preferring the processing option that 
requires least energy expenditure (Toplak et al., 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). More 
intuitive responses on the CRT task could suggest reduced engagement or deliberation of 
items across the whole experiment, including the moral dilemmas where harmful actions do 
not result in a greater good overall. For these ‘congruent’ dilemmas, weighing up the 
consequences of harmful action arguably requires slightly more scrutiny of the story content 
at times. If participants did not fully consider the specific content of the stories, they could 
have mistakenly condoned harmful actions due to misreading or overlooking story 
information, which would provide a negatively skewed measure of harm-aversion for these 
people. Therefore, rather than poorer performance on the CRT task representing stable 
differences in intuitive thinking styles, it is possibly more a reflection of intuitive ‘preference’ 
(Pennycook et al., 2016) based on the computational resource available or utilized at that 
moment (Toplak et al., 2011).  
Sex and age effects 
In line with prior research using traditional moral dilemma paradigms, older 
participants demonstrated greater harm-aversion preferences which has been linked to a 
greater propensity to experience negative emotions (McNair et al., 2019) and/or a reduced 
ability to overcome affective cues when making judgments (Hess et al., 2000). Older 
participants in this study reported lower negative affect and state/trait anxiety than younger 
participants, and no age-related differences were found for interoceptive sensibility. 
Therefore, incidental negative affect (unrelated to the task) or greater attentional focus 
towards affective cues in the body does not appear to underlie the finding here, but a more 
negative emotional response to the moral dilemma stimuli from older participants cannot be 
ruled out. Similarly, although some research has shown men demonstrate stronger utilitarian 
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preferences (Tinghög et al., 2016), the finding that females scored similarly to men on 
utilitarian preferences but higher on harm-aversion tendencies is in line with cumulative 
research findings in this field (Armstrong et al., 2019). Explanations for gender differences 
typically centre around differences in socialisation practices (Wood & Eagly, 2012) as well as 
evolutionary pressures and physiological differences (see Armstrong, Friesdorf, & Conway 
2019 for a review) which may engender greater social and emotional responses to the 
prospect of harming others in women.  
Limitations 
Online research into hunger and thirst has the advantage of gathering data from 
people in their natural eating environments but does not guarantee variation in visceral 
experiences or the presence of real physiological changes associated with hunger and thirst. It 
is possible that low variability of hunger (3.24 ± 2.09) and thirst ratings (4.07 ± 1.96) 
prevented us from uncovering individual differences in the impact of visceral and emotional 
states on moral decision-making. In addition, relying on self-report measures cannot provide 
an objective understanding of the physiological conditions accompanying these subjective 
states, and some research has found intra-individual inconsistencies using visual analogue 
scales of appetite (e.g. Flint et al., 2000). One indication of reliability of our measure is that 
hunger significantly predicted hours since eating, providing the expected relationship 
between hunger states and reported ingestive behaviour. Although we can never know what 
hungry or thirsty ‘feels’ like to different people or guarantee a consistent impact of food-
deprivation manipulations on visceral experiences (Michalsen, 2010; Stevenson et al., 2015), 
using fasting manipulations (Vicario et al., 2018) or measures of blood-glucose (Gailliot et 
al., 2007) would allow the objective investigation of the impact of homeostatic depletion on 
moral decision-making.  
A second limitation was the measure of interoceptive sensibility used (PBCQ: (Miller, 
Murphy & Buss., 1981). Although popular in interoception research (e.g. Duschek et al., 
2015; Ainley & Tsakiris, 2013; Garfinkel et al., 2015) the PBCQ provides a one-dimensional 
trait measure of perceptual awareness of bodily symptoms. An important distinction between 
body awareness attention styles (Mehling et al., 2018) is not captured by this measure and 
limits our understanding of interoceptive sensibility in this context. A more negative 
attentional style is associated with anxiety and somatization (Domschke et al., 2010; 
Ginzburg et al., 2014) whereas a more adaptive attentional focus on the body can enhance 
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self-regulatory processes associated with bodily sensations and is prevalent in mindfulness-
style practices like body-scanning (Bornemann et al., 2014). As participants self-reported 
mindfulness practice positively correlated with interoceptive sensibility, it is possible that 
participants on the higher end of the interoceptive sensibility scale exhibited a ‘healthier’ 
attentional focus on bodily sensations which could explain the absence of any relationship 
between interoceptive sensibility and anxiety. Future work using a Multidimensional 
Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (Mehling et al., 2018) would provide a more nuanced 
understanding of the attentional and emotional regulation styles of people with higher levels 
of interoceptive sensibility.  
The CRT (Frederick, 2005) is a popular but controversial measure, inherently 
confounded with numeracy ability. It is possible the CRT provides an indication of people’s 
tendency to think in less effortful ways as opposed to reflecting stable individual differences 
in thinking styles (Toplak et al., 2011). A recent study found CRT scores did not reflect 
thinking styles or intuitive ability that was distinct from a general intelligence measure 
(Blacksmith et al., 2019) whereas other research suggests the CRT is valid for measuring 
reflective but not intuitive thinking styles (Pennycook et al., 2016). Ambiguity about whether 
the CRT taps into stable psychological constructs or more temporary psychological 
processes, can make the interpretation of results difficult. Future replications could clarify 
whether the CRT’s power in predicting harm-aversion judgments was due stable individual 
differences in intuitive or rational thinking styles using measures such as the Rational-
Experiential Inventory (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Finally, our sample was a moderate size and 
well-represented in terms of age but contained a disproportionate number of women. 
Considering small effect-sizes and several null findings in this study, a more substantial and 
representative sample would increase the power to uncover effects of visceral states and 
interoceptive processes on moral judgments if they do exist. 
Conclusion  
When making difficult moral decisions we may refer to a metaphorical ‘gut instinct’ 
to explain our choices; a feeling we locate in our stomach area that steers us one way or 
another. Hunger is one such sensation fundamentally linked with our gastrointestinal system 
that appears to play a role in allocentric judgments of harmful acts and other moral 
transgressions, potentially due to its link with disgust (Schnall et al., 2008; Vicario et al., 
2018). We also associate ‘gut feelings’ with a felt sense of intuition. Intuition is easily linked 
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with interoceptive processes, when we cannot consciously access the homeostatic valuations 
happening between the brain and body that can bias our decision-making processes (Craig 
2015; Damasio, Everitt, & Bishop, 1996). Here, we found intuitive thinking preferences on 
the CRT was associated with a tendency to pay attention to interoceptive sensations and a 
reduced aversion to harmful actions. Together, these findings suggest hunger-bias and 
intuitive thinking preferences may represent independent processes shaping different types of 
moral judgments. It is possible that the presence of ‘intuitive’ responses on the CRT, may 
instead represent an absence of deliberative thinking processes (e.g. Toplak, West, & 
Stanovich, 2011), and we speculated that increased monitoring of bodily sensations 
associated with body awareness, could interfere with more effortful thinking processes due to 
the demand on attentional resources. Further work using validated measures of intuitive 
thinking (e.g. Pacini & Epstein, 1999) could clarify this supposition. Interestingly, incidental 
emotion and anxiety states did not moderate any relationship between hunger, interoception, 
CRT performance and moral judgments. This suggests that emotional state at the time of 
making harm-based moral judgments did not provide any significant contribution to these 
effects, contrary to our hypotheses (Valdesolo & Desteno, 2006). Future work measuring 
people’s emotional state before and after the task could clarify whether a change in emotional 
state is more predictive of moral judgments than incidental emotional state. The findings of 
this study have gone some way in clarifying the influence of incidental visceral states, 
emotion and interoceptive sensibility on moral judgments of harm. Interoception is 
significantly understudied in morality research which provides many more research 
opportunities to explore the complex relationships between interoceptive processes, emotion 
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Supplementary material 
Data processing and quality 
Assumption checks of the data are presented in the results section. All data was appropriately 
distributed, except where mentioned and was corrected for one of the dependent variables. 
We observed expected relationships between trait/state anxiety and positive/negative effect 
suggesting the reliability of these measures. We also observed comparable internal 
consistency scores for the questionnaire measures as found in previous studies. Hunger and 
thirst measures were corroborated by hours since eating and drinking, suggesting this data 
was reliable. An attention check was not used in this study, and therefore, we cannot rule out 
the possibility of poor attention influencing performance on the moral dilemma task.  
 
 
Moral Dilemma Items 
 
Incongruent Time Machine  
 You find a time machine and travel back to the year 1920. While checking into a hotel, you 
meet a young Austrian artist and veteran of the First World War. You realize this is Adolf 
Hitler before his rise to power in Nazi Germany.  
 
He is staying in the hotel room next to yours and the doors are not locked. It would be easy to 
simply smother him with a pillow in his sleep and disappear, stopping the Second World War 
and the Nazi party before they even start. However, he has not committed any crimes yet and 
it seems wrong to hurt an innocent person.  
 




Congruent Time Machine  
You find a time machine and travel back to the year 1920. While checking into a hotel, you 
meet a young petty criminal. You realize this is George Brackman, a man who later on 
abducted a child and held her for a week until her family paid him some ransom money.  
 
He is staying in the hotel room next to yours and the doors are not locked. It would be easy to 
simply smother him with a pillow in his sleep and disappear, stopping the abduction and 
ransom demands before they even start. However, he has not committed any crimes yet and it 
seems wrong to hurt an innocent person.  
 





Incongruent Car Accident  
You are driving through a busy city street when all of a sudden a young mother carrying a 
child trips and falls into the path of your vehicle. You are going too fast to brake in time; your 
only hope is to swerve out of the way.  
 
Unfortunately, the only place you can swerve is currently occupied by a little old lady. If you 
swerve to avoid the young mother and baby, you will seriously injure or kill the old lady.  
 
Is it appropriate to swerve and hit the old lady in order to avoid the young mother and child?  
 
Congruent Car Accident  
You are driving through a busy city street when all of a sudden a young mother carrying a 
child trips and falls into the path of your vehicle. You are going too fast to brake in time; your 
only hope is to swerve out of the way.  
 
Unfortunately, the only place you can swerve is currently occupied by a group of children on 
their way to elementary school. If you swerve to avoid the young mother and baby, you will 
seriously injure or kill several of them.  
 
Is it appropriate to swerve and hit the schoolchildren in order to avoid the young mother and 
child? 
 
Incongruent Hard Times  
 You are the head of a poor household in a developing country.  Your crops have failed for 
the second year in a row, and it appears that you have no way to feed your family.  Your 
sons, ages eight and ten, are too young to go off to the city where there are jobs, but your 
daughter could fare better. 
 
You know a man from your village who lives in the city and who makes sexually explicit 
films featuring girls such as your daughter.  In front of your daughter, he tells you that in one 
year of working in his studio your daughter could earn enough money to keep your family fed 
for several growing seasons.  
 
Is it appropriate for you to employ your daughter in the pornography industry in order to feed 
your family?   
 
Congruent Hard Times  
 You are the head of a poor household in a developing country.  Your sons, ages eight and 
ten, work on the family farm everyday in order to teach them the value of hard work and 
providing for others. Your daughter, however, cannot work on the farm due to the heavy 
lifting required. You worry that she will not learn the value of money if she does not work.  
 
You know a man from your village who lives in the city and who makes sexually explicit 
films featuring girls such as your daughter.  In front of your daughter, he tells you that in one 
year of working in his studio your daughter could earn enough money to keep your family fed 
for several growing seasons.  
 
Is it appropriate for you to employ your daughter in the pornography industry in order to 
teach her the value of money?   
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Incongruent Crying Baby 
It is war time. Enemy soldiers have taken over your village.  They have orders to kill all 
remaining civilians.  You and some of your townspeople have sought refuge in the cellar of a 
large house.  Outside you hear the voices of soldiers who have come to search the house for 
valuables.   
 
A baby with no parents begins to cry loudly.  You cover her mouth to block the sound.  If you 
remove your hand from the baby’s mouth her crying will summon the attention of the 
soldiers who will kill you and the others hiding out in the cellar. To save yourself and the 
others you must smother the child to death.  
 
Is it appropriate for you to smother the child in order to save yourself and the other 
townspeople from being killed?    
 
 
Congruent Crying Baby  
It is war time. Enemy soldiers have taken over your village.  They have orders to capture all 
remaining civilians to make them work quarrying stone in a mine. You and some of your 
townspeople have sought refuge in the cellar of a large house.  Outside you hear the voices of 
soldiers who have come to search the house for valuables.   
 
A baby with no parents begins to cry loudly.  You cover her mouth to block the sound.  If you 
remove your hand from her mouth the crying will summon the attention of the soldiers who 
will capture you and the others hiding out in the cellar. To save yourself and the others from 
laboring in the mine you must smother the child to death.  
 
Is it appropriate for you to smother the child in order to save yourself and the other 
townspeople from being captured?  
 
Incongruent Relationship  
You are divorced now and your former spouse lives far away. You don’t expect to see your 
former spouse for a very long time. However, you have recently started dating a new person 
that is positively wonderful. Your new partner is head over heels in love for the first time and 
you feel equally strong about your partner. You want to do everything in your power to keep 
the relationship progressing smoothly to what you believe will be a second marriage.  
 
Unfortunately, your new partner has told you many times that dating someone who is 
divorced is totally unacceptable. It is expressly forbidden in your partner’s religion. Your 
partner doesn’t know about your ex-spouse. You consider simply pretending that you have 
never been divorced so that your current relationship can continue.  
 
Is it appropriate for you to leave your new partner in the dark about your previous 
relationship in order to keep her/him happy and the relationship alive?  
 
Congruent Relationship  
You are divorced now and your former spouse lives far away. You don’t expect to see your 
former spouse for a very long time. However, you have recently started dating a new person 
that is positively wonderful. Your new partner is head over heels in love for the first time and 
you feel equally strong about your partner. You want to do everything in your power to keep 
the relationship progressing smoothly to what you believe will be a second marriage.  
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Unfortunately, your ex-spouse gave you a very serious and incurable Sexually Transmitted 
Disease (STD). Your partner does not know about it. You consider simply pretending that 
you don’t know about the STD so that your current relationship can continue.  
 
Is it appropriate for you to leave your new partner in the dark about your STD in order to 
keep her/him happy and the relationship alive?  
 
Incongruent Abortion 
You are a surgeon. A young woman you know becomes pregnant, but her body reacts in an 
unusual fashion. She develops a severe case of preeclampsia, a dangerous syndrome that 
leads to rapid increases in blood pressure. The only treatment is to deliver the baby.  
 
Unless the baby is delivered soon, the mother will die. However, the baby is too young to 
survive on its own. If it is delivered, it will die. So, although it is very difficult for her, the 
mother asks you to abort the baby.  
 
Is it appropriate for you to perform an abortion in order to save the mother’s life?  
 
Congruent Abortion  
You are a surgeon. A young woman you know becomes pregnant, but she is not yet ready for 
children. She has not finished high school, has no income, and was abandoned by the father.  
 
If she has the baby now, she will be stuck as a single mother on welfare for the rest of her 
life. This will make things very hard on her and the baby. She thinks that it would be smarter 
to wait and have children later. So, although it is very difficult for her, she asks you to abort 
the baby.  
 
Is it appropriate for you to perform an abortion in order to let the mother live a better life?   
 
Incongruent Torture  
You are a police officer, and have recently caught a criminal you have been hunting for some 
time. He is allegedly responsible for rigging a series of explosive devices: some that have 
already gone off and some that have yet to detonate.  
 
He places explosives outside city cafes and sets them to go off at a time when people are 
drinking coffee on the patios. In this manner, he has injured many people and might injure 
many more.  
 
Now that the criminal is in custody, you want to know where the unexploded bombs are so 
you can defuse them. He refuses to talk, so you decide to use “aggressive interrogation 
techniques” like holding his head under water and beating him.  
 
Is it appropriate for you to use “aggressive interrogation techniques” in order to find and 
defuse the unexploded bombs?  
 
Congruent Torture  
You are a police officer, and have recently caught a criminal you have been hunting for some 
time. He is allegedly responsible for rigging a series of explosive devices: some that have 
already gone off and some that have yet to detonate.  
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He places explosives outside city cafes and sets them to go off at a time when no one is 
around. His explosives are inside paint cans so that they spray nearby objects with paint. In 
this manner, he has sprayed many cafes with paint and might spray many more.  
 
Now that the criminal is in custody, you want to know where the unexploded bombs are so 
you can defuse them. He refuses to talk, so you decide to use “aggressive interrogation 
techniques” like holding his head under water and beating him.  
 
Is it appropriate for you to use “aggressive interrogation techniques” in order to find and 
defuse the unexploded bombs?  
 
 
Incongruent Vaccine Policy 
You are a doctor in a health clinic overrun by patients with a serious disease. You just 
received a shipment of drugs that can cure the disease but the drugs have their own severe 
side-effects.  
 
If you administer the drugs to your patients, a small number will die from the side effects, but 
most will live. If you do not, most will die from the disease.  
 
Is it appropriate for you to administer the drug to your patients?  
 
Congruent Vaccine Policy  
You are a doctor in a health clinic overrun by patients with the latest flu virus. You just 
received a shipment of drugs that can cure the flu but the drugs have their own severe side-
effects.  
 
If you administer the drugs to your patients, a small number will die from the side effects, but 
most will live. If you do not, most will continue to suffer from the effects of the flu virus for 
some time.  
 
Is it appropriate for you to administer the drug to your patients?  
 
Incongruent Animal Research  
You have been hired by a pharmaceutical company to conduct research on their products. 
Since products must be fit for human use, they are first tried out on animals. Your job is to 
find out the effects various chemicals have on rats, pigeons, rabbits, and monkeys. Most 
chemicals have only minor effects on the animals, but some cause them discomfort or even 
permanent damage.  
 
The chemicals you are researching are slated to form part of a new AIDS drug cocktail that 
will give new hope to millions of AIDS victims around the world. You anticipate saving 
many lives with the chemicals.  
 
Is it appropriate to test these chemicals on animals?  
 
 Congruent Animal Research  
You have been hired by a pharmaceutical company to conduct research on their products. 
Since products must be fit for human use, they are first tried out on animals. Your job is to 
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find out the effects various chemicals have on rats, pigeons, rabbits, and monkeys. Most 
chemicals have only minor effects on the animals, but some cause them discomfort or even 
permanent damage.  
 
The chemicals you are researching are slated to form part of a new acne facial cleanser that 
will give new hope to people with pimples and greasy skin. You anticipate making many 
people feel better about their appearance with the chemicals.  
 




Incongruent Border Crossing 
You are a soldier guarding a border checkpoint between your nation and one troubled by 
insurgent violence. You notice a young man in a cheap car approaching the checkpoint with a 
determined look on his face.  
 
You suspect he means to bomb the checkpoint, killing all the soldiers inside. He is rapidly 
approaching your station.  
 
Is it appropriate for you to shoot and kill the approaching man?  
 
Congruent Border Crossing 
You are a soldier guarding a border checkpoint between your nation and one troubled by 
insurgent violence. You notice a young man in a cheap car approaching the checkpoint with a 
determined look on his face.  
 
You suspect he means to cross the border in order to work illegally inside your country. He is 
rapidly approaching your station.  
 

















Brown, H., Proulx, M. J., & Fraser, D. S. (2020). Hunger Bias or Gut Instinct ? Responses to 
Judgments of Harm Depending on Visceral State Versus Intuitive Decision-Making. 




The key finding from this paper was the different associations between hunger, 
interoceptive sensibility and egocentric and allocentric judgments of harm. A lack of hunger 
enhanced the disapproval of allocentric judgments of unprofitable harmful acts but did not 
influence egocentric choice judgments. Whereas, interoceptive sensibility (indirectly) and a 
tendency towards intuitive decision-making (directly) predicted egocentric harm-aversive 
moral judgments. These findings were useful to reflect on in the context of Study 2 and 3, as 
they suggested the relationship between interoception, and moral judgment may be more 
evident for egocentric than allocentric judgments.  Furthermore, the findings suggest that 
momentary hunger induced by pre-task protocols of e.g. not drinking/eating for several hours 
for interoceptive tasks may be less of a confounding factor for egocentric moral judgments. 
Although, we have since considered that measures of hunger and thirst may relate to 
constructs of IS as it requires people to consciously report interoceptive sensations which 
may have confounded our ability to find an interaction between hunger and IS. Surprisingly, 
thirst had no effect on any of the dependent variables, despite its relationship to hunger which 
suggests that interoceptive sensations of thirst did not as easily translate to emotional states in 
the way that gastric sensations associated with satiety/hunger do for disgust sensations and 
moral judgments (Tracy et al., 2019).  
A key limitation of this study was that most of the sample reported being relatively 
less hungry/thirsty, which is unsurprising as people are probably less likely to participate in 
an online study when their homeostatic needs are significantly depleted. A lab-based 
between-subjects design using short-term fasting manipulations and potentially other 
measures of interoception would greatly improve our understanding of hunger, thirst, and 
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moral judgments of harm, although could potentially give way to demand characteristics. 
Nevertheless, this study revealed that even small differences in both the presence of 
interoceptive sensations and our habitual patterns of attending to bodily sensations can shape 
momentary moral judgments relating to harmful acts. However, overall, it appeared that 
hunger, thirst and interoceptive sensations only showed small effects on moral decision-
making during harm-based moral dilemmas. Therefore, individual differences in momentary 
interoceptive state and hunger and thirst sensations may not be that influential for harm-based 
moral decision-making on moral dilemma tasks. This work provided useful ‘food for 


























Study 2 Preface 
 
Paper:  
Brown, H., Proulx, M. J., & Fraser, D. S. (2020). Do individual differences in interoception 
influence the relationship between physiological arousal and moral judgments of harm? 
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Study 2 aimed to assess whether individual differences in interoception influenced 
moral judgments of harm, but specifically whether interoception moderated the relationship 
between physiological arousal and moral judgments of harm. Damasio’s (1996) Somatic 
Marker Hypothesis has been extremely influential in neuropsychological and 
psychophysiological studies of decision-making (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Dunn et al., 
2010; Suzuki et al., 2003; Verdejo-García & Bechara, 2009) and moral decision making 
(Koenigs et al., 2007; Moretto et al., 2010; Young et al., 2010). However, individual 
differences in interoceptive capacities have not previously been explored in the context of 
physiological arousal and moral decision making.  
Again, moral judgments of harm were the focus of this study, due to the established 
emotional and physiological processes shown to influence harm-rejection judgments in 
sacrificial dilemmas (e.g. Carmona-Perera et al., 2013; Cushman et al., 2012; Greene et al., 
2001; Moretto et al., 2010). Arousal is a critical aspect of emotional experience (Russell & 
Barrett, 1999), and people’s sensitivity towards changes in arousal states in their bodies (e.g. 
Katkin, 1985) is likely to influence subjective experiences of emotion (e.g. Feldman Barrett 
et al., 2004; Wiens et al., 2000). Heartbeat detection ability in particular, has been shown to 
influence cardiovascular reactivity to aversive stimuli (Eichler & Katkin, 1994; Pollatos et 
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al., 2007b), facilitate adaptive regulation of emotion (Kever et al., 2015; Pinna & Edwards, 
2020) and psychophysiological arousal (Füstös et al., 2013).  
We measured interoceptive sensibility, accuracy, meta-cognitive awareness 
(Garfinkel & Critchley, 2013), and gastric interoception (Van Dyck et al., 2016) to 
understand whether these capacities were related to moral judgments in different ways. 
Physiological responses during a moral dilemma task were measured, to test whether 
interoceptive accuracy moderated the relationship between anticipatory physiological arousal 
prior to making moral judgments and the moral judgments themselves. Heartbeat detection 
ability was assessed using a heartbeat counting task (HBC; Schandry, 1981), as a relatively 
simple method of assessing people’s awareness of discrete autonomic events. This task 
appeared to be more suitable to individual differences experiments (e.g. Dunn et al., 2010), 
than heartbeat discrimination tasks that require people to discern whether their heartbeats 
coincide with a tone (HBD; Whitehead & Drescher, 1980), largely due to the difficulty of the 
task (Kleckner et al., 2015). There is also a much greater task-load for participants, with 
evidence suggesting that a minimum of forty trials is required to achieve adequate reliability 
and statistical power (Kleckner et al., 2015). Furthermore, the HBD task is likely to capture 
people’s ability to integrate internal and external sensory information whereas the HBC task 
requires attention to be completely focused on visceral sensations (Forkmann et al., 2016). 
This HBC method was considered more appropriate to study 2 as we were interested in how 
someone’s habitual capacity to notice changes in physiological arousal may modulate the 
influence of arousal on decision-making.  
Gastric interoception was measured using a two-step water load task (Van Dyck et al., 
2016). Sensitivity to gastric processes and sensations of disgust have been shown to influence 
moral judgments (Schnall et al., 2008; Vicario et al., 2018), but this method has not 
previously been used in this context. Gastric sensitivity measures are also scarcely used in 
interoception research, and so this provided an opportunity to explore correlations previously 
found between cardiac and gastric forms of interoception (e.g. Herbert et al., 2012). The 
water-load test (WLT) was first used by Boeckxstaens et al (1990) as a non-invasive 
alternative to barostat measures of gastric sensitivity.  The original test either asked 
participants to drink freely for a period of five minutes to maximum fullness or demanded 
water be ingested at a rate of 100ml per minute (De Schepper et al., 2004). Other water-load 
test methods have used a three-litre maximum water volume provided to participants across 
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two five-minute drinking intervals (Van Dyck et al, 2016). Earlier experiments have provided 
3.5 litres of water during a ~30-minute water loading procedure (Schoen, 1957). To mitigate 
the small risk that participants suffer from hyponatremia (loss of sodium in the blood), older 
participants (60 +) were excluded (O’Neill, 1996), a small amount of electrolyte solution was 
added to the water, and the maximum amount of water provided to participants was only 1.3 
litres for a period of five minutes as used in Zeng et al (2007). The two sensory thresholds we 
used were 1) noticing the first signs of stomach distention (Zeng et al, 2007) and 2) 
maximum fullness. Prior studies using the WLT in the context of eating-disorders have used 
‘satiety’ as the first sensory threshold (Van Dyck et al., 2016). However, we were interested 
in people’s sensitivity to the onset of visceral sensations of stomach filling up to maximum 
fullness, rather than experiences of satiety, to provide an indication of how early in the 
stomach filling process people notice signals associated with the stomach expanding. 
As in Study 1, the moral dilemma stimuli allowed the calculation of harm-aversion 
and outcome-maximisation tendencies separately (Conway & Gawronski, 2013) which has 
not been possible for earlier psychophysiological studies using traditional moral dilemmas 
(e.g. Greene et al., 2001; Patil et al., 2014; Moretto et al., 2010). Furthermore, these stimuli 
provided a useful control condition for comparing the change of physiological arousal when 
contemplating moral ‘dilemmas’ that involved no conflict between harm-aversion and 
outcome-maximisation motivations i.e. in congruent conditions only harm-aversion drives the 
response, and dilemmas that did provide a conflict (incongruent dilemmas). Therefore, we 
could calculate the difference in physiological arousal associated specifically with this moral 
conflict element of the dilemmas, rather than for example, comparing the difference in 
physiological arousal in ‘moral’ dilemmas to ‘non-moral’ dilemmas (e.g. Greene et al., 
2001). Furthermore, by using ‘congruent’ versus ‘incongruent’ dilemmas, we could 
specifically explore differences in physiological arousal associated with motivations of 
outcome-maximisation and harm-aversion. Congruent and incongruent dilemmas were also 
matched, which reduced the influence of confounding factors associated with the content of 
the text. Although, some of the dilemmas are more similarly matched in ‘story’ content than 
others.  
As this study was largely exploratory, we captured a range of physiological 
parameters used in prior moral dilemma research, to test whether these distinct parameters 
showed relationships with moral judgments, and whether interoception interacted with these 
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parameters. We standardised the physiological data within-participants to account for any 
bias associated with using absolute values, which can vary considerably between people 
(Braithwaite & Watson, 2015). Electrodermal activity is a solely sympathetically mediated 
measure of physiological arousal that is characteristically absent during moral dilemma tasks 
involving interpersonal harm for people with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(Moretto et al., 2010). Heart rate is sympathetically and parasympathetically mediated (Glick 
& Braunwald, 1965) and has been associated with emotional experience (Lang et al., 1993) 
and the valence of emotional response towards moral dilemmas of interpersonal harm 
(Carmona-Perera et al., 2013). Finally, the threat-reactivity index used is a relative measure 
of systemic vascular resistance (implicated in action-based harm aversion: Cushman et al., 
2012) and cardiac output, that is proposed to represent underlying motivational states of 
threat and challenge (Mendes et al., 2007). By gathering a more complete picture of changes 
to physiological arousal, we could be more precise in our conclusions about how distinct 
physiological responses may represent particular anticipatory emotional or motivational 
processes driving particular moral judgment response tendencies.  
Finally, a study using the same moral judgment stimuli found that vagal-tone (an 
index of neurovisceral integration associated with superior emotional regulation) was 
associated with outcome-maximisation but not harm-aversion, and suggested that this is 
because harm-rejection judgments do not require neuro-visceral integration (Park et al., 
2016). However, a recent study (Parton & McGinley, 2019) using a small set of moral 
dilemmas, did not replicate this finding, and suggested that vagal tone was not a reliable 
predictor of moral judgments. Like vagal tone, interoceptive accuracy has been associated 
with enhanced emotional regulation, particularly down-regulating negative emotional states 
(Füstös et al., 2013; Pinna & Edwards, 2020) which could influence the relationship between 
physiological arousal and outcome-maximisation and harm-aversion responses. Although 
anticipatory physiological arousal typically occurs for dilemmas involving direct 
interpersonal harm (Carmona-Perera et al., 2013; Cushman et al., 2012; Moretto et al., 2010), 
harm-aversion responses have been associated with both an aversion to harmful acts (action-
aversion) and an aversion to the negative consequences of harm (outcome-aversion) 
(Reynolds & Conway, 2018). This suggests that harm-aversion tendencies can be influenced 
by negative emotional processes that are other-focused (outcome) and self-focused (action), 
which may reveal different associations between physiological processes and moral 
judgments. Conversely, recent research has challenged the premise of dual process models 
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(Greene et al., 2001) that ‘utilitarian’ judgments are less ‘intuitive’ or require more 
deliberation than ‘deontological’ judgments (Bago & De Neys, 2019). Therefore, we used the 
complete moral dilemma stimuli that includes both direct and indirect acts of harm (Conway 
& Gawronski, 2013) to understand whether an ability to accurately perceive cardiac 
sensations accounted for any differences in the link between physiological arousal and harm-
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The Somatic Marker Hypothesis (Damasio et al., 1990; Damasio, 1996) was among 
the first theoretical accounts to explain how the processing of somatic signals in the brain 
could bias decision-making concerning ethical violations. The role of emotional and 
physiological factors in judgments concerning the morality of harmful acts is now well-
established (Cushman et al., 2012; Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Miller et al., 2014; Reynolds & 
Conway, 2018). Yet, individual differences in how people typically perceive or interpret 
physiological sensations in the body in the context of moral decision-making is little 
understood. Interoception broadly represents our sensory capacities to perceive visceral 
sensations in the body that are fundamentally connected with processes that manage 
homeostasis (Craig, 2015). Interoceptive processes are also closely tied to emotional 
experiences and motivation (Barrett & Simmons, 2015; Craig, 2015; Duschek et al., 2015). 
This within-participants experimental study (n=90) explored whether individual differences 
in interoception influenced the relationship between physiological arousal and moral 
judgments of harm. Interoceptive sensibility, interoceptive accuracy, interoceptive meta-
cognitive awareness (Garfinkel et al., 2015) and gastric interoception (Van Dyck et al., 2016) 
were measured. Moral dilemma stimuli enabled the calculation of harm-aversion and 
outcome-maximisation tendencies independently (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). Cardiac 
impedance, heart rate and electrodermal activity were measured during a moral dilemma task. 
We found a conditional effect of interoceptive accuracy in the relationship between 
anticipatory sympathetic cardiac impedance, heart rate and harm-aversion tendencies, and 
between heart rate and outcome-maximisation tendencies. Interoceptive meta-cognitive 
awareness and gastric interoception also moderated the relationship between electrodermal 
autonomic arousal and judgment response time. We suggest interoceptive accuracy may 
support enhanced regulatory processes when individuals are faced with aversive moral 
dilemmas, that can attenuate or strengthen the relationship between indices of physiological 
arousal and moral judgments.  
Keywords: interoception, moral dilemmas, moral judgment, outcome-maximisation, 





When making moral decisions in situations where we feel conflicted or have limited 
information, we may default to what feels ‘right’ to us in the moment (Haidt, 2001; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974). Oftentimes, we cannot access the origin of these inclinations, but 
metaphors relating to ‘gut feelings’ or ‘intuition’ helpfully conceptualise impalpable visceral 
processes that guide us towards or away from certain moral choices. Damasio’s Somatic 
Marker Hypothesis (SMH; Damasio et al., 1990; Damasio, 1996) was among the first 
theoretical accounts to explain how the processing of physiological experiences in the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPfC) could influence judgments and behaviour 
concerning moral violations (Damasio et al., 1990; Koenigs et al., 2007; Moretto et al., 2010; 
Young et al., 2010). The SMH proposes that the processing of somatic signals generated 
within the body provide intuitive guidance during decision-making. Damage to the VMPfC 
has been linked to deficits in social emotions such as empathy and guilt (Anderson et al., 
2013), anti-social behaviour (Damasio et al., 1990), and greater acceptance of personally 
harmful actions in moral dilemma paradigms (e.g. Moretto et al, 2010). In particular, 
individual differences in the aversive physiological response people have to the prospect of 
condoning personal harmful acts has shown to predict moral judgments harm (Carmona-
Perera et al., 2013; Cushman et al., 2012; Greene et al., 2001, 2004; McDonald et al., 2017; 
Moretto et al., 2010). A physiological aversion to harmful acts is believed to arise due to 
learned associations between characteristically harmful acts and human suffering (the 
unconditioned aversive stimulus). Over time the harmful act itself, even if only imagined, is 
able to generate an aversive emotional and physiological response (Blair, 1995; Miller et al., 
2014). However, people demonstrate distinct aversions to harmful actions and the negative 
outcomes of harm (Miller et al., 2014) which have both shown to be influential when forming 
moral judgments of harm (Reynolds & Conway, 2018).  
Interoception 
Our perceptual sensitivity towards visceral processes is also likely to be important in 
moral decision-making processes. For example, the sound of ‘quickening’ heartbeat feedback 
(Gu et al., 2013) has shown to bias ethical decision-making; demonstrating how the 
perception of physiological arousal alone is powerful enough to influence decision-making. 
Individual differences in sensitivity towards gastric sensations has been shown to predict the 
harshness of moral judgments (Schnall et al., 2008, 2015) and an awareness of cardiac 
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sensations has been associated with a propensity for antisocial behaviour (Nentjes et al., 
2013). Interoception refers to our perceptual awareness of visceral processes concerned with 
maintaining the homeostatic state of the body, such as those happening within the 
cardiovascular or gastrointestinal systems (Craig, 2015). Interoceptive signals regarding the 
body’s current state are periodically sent to the brain, which provides a motivational context 
(Damasio, 1996; Suzuki et al., 2003), colouring emotional experiences (Barrett et al., 2004) 
and facilitating the selection of adaptive behavioural responses (Bechara et al., 1997; Craig, 
2015; Damasio, 1996). Even though emotional and physiological experiences appear to play 
a critical role in moral decision-making (Damasio et al., 1990; Greene et al., 2001, 2004; 
Moretto et al., 2010), interoceptive processes have been comparatively understudied in this 
field. The current study is the first to investigate the role of individual differences in 
interoception in the relationship between anticipatory physiological arousal and moral 
judgments of harm.  
  Interoception is a multidimensional construct, consisting of sub-components of 
interoceptive abilities that are not necessarily related (Forkmann et al., 2016; Garfinkel & 
Critchley, 2013). Most commonly studied is interoceptive accuracy (IAc), which typically 
measures individual differences in people’s detection (Schandry, 1981) or differentiation 
(Whitehead et al., 1977) of visceral signals such as heartbeats. How much we might tend to 
focus on internal sensations such as heartbeats i.e. interoceptive sensibility (IS; Garfinkel & 
Critchley, 2013), is typically not correlated with interoceptive accuracy (Ainley & Tsakiris, 
2013; Ferentzi et al., 2018b). A measure that combines conscious awareness of sensations 
with perceptual ability is interoceptive meta-cognitive awareness (Garfinkel et al., 2015). 
Confidence ratings of the accuracy of our visceral percepts (e.g. heartbeats), can provide an 
indication of an individual’s awareness of the reliability of their interoceptive sensitivity. 
There is some evidence to suggest that cardiac and gastric interoceptive sensitivity may be 
related (Herbert et al., 2012; Whitehead & Drescher, 1980). Measures of gastric interoception 
are of particular relevance as physiological states, such as hunger have shown to influence 
moral judgments (Vicario et al., 2018), potentially due to hormonal changes associated with 
food consumption that increase feelings of nausea and potentially disgust, which may 
generalise to judgments of moral violations (Tracy et al., 2019). Consistent with this, 
individual differences in disgust sensitivity (Vicario et al., 2018) and how much people 
typically focus on gastric sensations (Schnall et al., 2008) can influence moral judgments, 
further highlighting the embodied nature of moral decision-making.  
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Individual differences in interoception may also moderate the relationship between 
physiological arousal and moral decision-making due to how people habitually respond to 
surprising interoceptive sensations. Predictive-coding models of interoception propose that 
prediction error in the brain represents a deviation from an expected interoceptive state, 
which indicates how ‘surprising’ interoceptive sensations are, within a given context (Seth, 
2013; Seth & Friston, 2016). More surprising sensations associated with greater prediction 
errors, are more likely to reach conscious awareness. Prediction error can lead to active and 
perceptual inference (Apps & Tsakiris, 2014; Farb et al., 2015; Seth & Friston, 2016). With 
active inference, the brain aims to match the interoceptive state with the expected state, 
facilitating behavioural responses to achieve sensory regulation. With perceptual inference, 
the expected state is altered to be in sync with the interoceptive state (Seth & Friston, 2016), 
meaning we are less fixed to prior interoceptive expectations and optimising the precision of 
the current sensation is prioritised (Farb et al., 2015). Farb and colleagues (2015) suggest 
more accurate interoceptive representations would be associated with perceptual inference, 
because with active inference ‘error’ states are more likely to be maintained. Farb et al (2015) 
also propose that perceptual inference may reduce overt regulatory behaviours directing at 
resolving prediction error, if a closer examination of the origin and nature of the interoceptive 
signal is allowed. 
An enhanced ability to direct attention towards heartbeat sensations is likely to be 
associated with enhanced precision of heartbeat signals (Ainley et al., 2016) which may 
support superior regulation of psychophysiological arousal states (e.g. Füstös et al., 2013). 
Consistent with this notion, interoceptive accuracy (IAc) has been associated with enhanced 
self-regulatory abilities during exercise (Pollatos et al., 2007a), pain tolerance (Weiss et al., 
2014) and antecedent and response-focused emotional regulation strategies (Füstös et al., 
2013; Kever et al., 2015). Heartbeat detection ability has been associated with more intense 
emotional experiences (Feldman Barrett et al., 2004; Wiens et al., 2000) and enhanced 
physiological reactivity to emotional stimuli and physical stressors (Eichler & Katkin, 1994; 
Pollatos et al., 2007b) suggesting a strong association between physiological arousal and 
subjective emotion in people who are more sensitive to visceral sensations. Importantly, trait 
anxiety has also been associated with IAc (Critchley et al., 2004; Pollatos et al., 2007a) and 
greater reactivity to emotional stimuli (Takahashi et al., 2005). Habitually higher levels of 
autonomic arousal may therefore support heartbeat detection ability (Eichler et al., 1987; 
Eichler & Katkin, Edward, 1994).  
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However, anxiety has also been linked to a hyper-awareness towards visceral 
sensations (Anderson & Hope, 2009; De Berardis et al., 2007) which may reflect a 
maladaptive self-reported tendency to focus on internal sensations along the dimension of 
interoceptive sensibility (IS) (Mehling et al., 2018). People who pay attention to bodily 
sensations more often are more likely to misinterpret changes in physiological sensations as 
meaningful (Clark et al., 1997; Domschke et al., 2010), which can intensify these experiences 
and increase expectations of negative outcomes and anxiety (Paulus & Stein, 2010). When 
bodily feedback is available, IS has shown to predict risk-averse behaviour (Salvato et al., 
2019). IS has also been indirectly associated with a reduced aversion to harmful acts, and 
more intuitive and incorrect responses on the Cognitive Reflection Task (Brown et al., 2020) 
which is proposed to provide a measure of people’s capacity to ‘override’ an intuitive 
response to a series of counterintuitive puzzles (Frederick, 2005). High IS may predict a 
reliance on intuitive heuristics when faced with cognitively demanding tasks like moral 
dilemmas (Brown et al., 2020).  
Moral dilemmas 
Historically, experimental moral dilemma paradigms exploring moral judgments of 
harm used conflict-dilemmas, such as the Trolley (Thomson, 1985) and Footbridge (Foot, 
2003) problems. These dilemmas ask people whether it is appropriate to sacrifice one person 
to save several more people on a train track in the path of a runaway train. In the Trolley 
dilemma, this choice is made by pulling a hypothetical lever to divert the path of the 
oncoming train to another track that has one person on it. In the Footbridge dilemma, the 
choice is made by pushing a large man of a bridge into the path of the runaway train, thus 
stopping the train. Although the outcome of choosing to harm the one person is the same in 
both dilemmas, people are more likely to accept harm in the Trolley dilemma and reject harm 
in the Footbridge dilemma (Greene et al., 2001). People’s inclinations to reject or accept 
harm, have typically been conceptualised as ‘utilitarian’ or ‘deontological’, although recent 
work has shown these judgments do not necessarily represent the proposed underlying moral 
philosophies (Kahane et al., 2018). Utilitarianism refers to the moral framework that good 
actions are those that maximise the wellbeing for the greatest number of people (Mill, 1998). 
Whereas, deontological ethics evaluates the goodness of an action on how the act itself 
upholds the rights and duties of individuals within a situation (Kant, 2018). Causing harm in 
both the Trolley and Footbridge dilemma is seen as morally appropriate in a utilitarian sense, 
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if it maximises outcomes, whereas a deontological stance would see harm as morally wrong 
regardless of the outcomes, as the act itself disregards the rights of the person being harmed.  
Moral judgments can be influenced by an aversion to the harmful action itself (action-
aversion), and an aversion to the negative outcomes of the harmful action (outcome-aversion) 
(Cushman, 2013; Miller et al., 2014). Furthermore, a motivation to reject harm and a 
motivation to maximise outcomes do not represent two ends of a bipolar scale (Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013). Traditional conflict dilemmas are unable to differentiate people’s 
motivation to reject harm (‘deontological’) or maximise outcomes (‘utilitarian’), as they only 
measure the strength of these competing motivations to inform the final moral judgment 
(Conway & Gawronski, 2013). A more recent method developed by Conway and Gawronski 
(2013) using process-dissociation (Jacoby, 1991), makes it possible to independently 
calculate people’s harm-aversion, and outcome-maximisation response tendencies. 
Participants make judgments in paired ‘incongruent’ and ‘congruent’ dilemmas that are 
matched in story structure but vary in whether harmful action maximises outcomes. 
Incongruent dilemmas are the same as traditional moral dilemmas (i.e. causing harm results 
in a greater good), whereby utilitarianism and deontological ethics disagree on the 
acceptability of harm. Here, individual differences in motivations to avoid harm and 
maximise outcomes would lead to divergent responses. Whereas in the congruent dilemmas, 
no greater good is achieved by causing harm, therefore utilitarianism and deontological ethics 
are in agreement that harm is wrong. Using a probability equation (see Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013), it is then possible to calculate someone’s tendency to maximise outcomes 
accounting for their tendency to reject harm.  
Physiological responses to harm-based moral dilemmas 
Harm rejection judgments have been associated with automatic, emotional and 
physiological processes in traditional moral dilemmas (Cushman et al., 2012; Greene et al., 
2001; McDonald et al., 2017; Moretto et al., 2010). Greene and colleagues influential dual 
process model (Greene et al., 2001, 2004) proposes that powerful emotional responses to the 
prospect of harming the one person, or insufficient resources to engage in cognitive 
deliberation to override this response, would predict strong harm-rejection judgments. Some 
recent work has challenged the notion that utilitarian decisions are less intuitive than 
deontological decisions (Bago & De Neys, 2019; Kahane, 2014). However, there is 
considerable empirical evidence favouring the dual process account. Utilitarian or outcome-
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based choices are associated with more deliberative cognitive processes (Baron et al., 2015; 
Greene et al., 2004; Patil et al., 2020), stress-inductions reduce utilitarian judgments and 
increase response time (Starcke et al., 2012), and an inability to identify emotional states has 
been associated with stronger utilitarian judgments (Patil & Silani, 2014). Physiological 
indices of sympathetic autonomic arousal believed to underlie motivational threat states 
(Blascovich & Mendes, 2000), such as increases in systemic vascular resistance (SVR; 
tightening of blood vessels following the release of epinephrine) (Cushman et al., 2012), and 
shortening of pre-ejection period (PEP; stronger myocardial contractility) (Parton & 
McGinley, 2019) have been associated with action-based harm aversion. Individual 
differences in cardiovascular threat reactivity when carrying out simulated harmful acts, have 
been shown to predict harm-rejection responses to sacrificial moral dilemmas when using a 
measure of SVR (Cushman et al., 2012), but not when using a measure of PEP (Parton & 
McGinley, 2019). Increases in skin conductance (McDonald et al., 2017) and anticipatory 
heart rate acceleration (Francis et al., 2016; Starcke et al., 2012) have been associated with an 
aversion to direct interpersonal harm. However, heart rate deceleration is typically associated 
with negative emotional experiences to aversive stimuli (Lang et al., 1993; Palomba et al., 
2000) including moral dilemmas involving direct interpersonal harm (Carmona-Perera et al., 
2013). Finally, lower vagal tone (resting heart rate variability) has shown to predict strong 
outcome-based moral preferences (Park et al., 2016), which the authors suggested is due to a 
reduced ability to integrate physiological signals into judgment formation; although this 
finding was not replicated in a later study (Parton & McGinley, 2019).  
Interoception and moral judgment 
It is possible that individuals higher in interoceptive accuracy (IAc) may habitually 
use forms of perceptual inference when faced with interoceptive prediction error (Ainley et 
al., 2016; Farb et al., 2015). Better heartbeat detection ability has shown to facilitate the 
modulation of affect-related arousal (Füstös et al., 2013) and enhanced emotional regulation 
processes (Kever et al., 2015), which, in the context of moral decision-making, could 
attenuate the relationship between anticipatory physiological arousal and harm-rejection 
judgments. If changes in physiological arousal lead to active inference (purportedly 
associated with less accurate interoceptive representations; Farb et al., 2015), this could 
encourage ‘knee-jerk’ responses to reject harmful actions, as a regulatory process aimed at 
alleviating an aversive arousal state.  
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An alternative hypothesis is that interoceptive accuracy strengthens the relationship 
between physiological arousal and moral judgments as better heartbeat detectors have 
demonstrated enhanced psychophysiological reactivity towards emotional stimuli (Eichler & 
Katkin, 1994; Pollatos et al., 2007b). Furthermore, using an intuitive reasoning task (IRT), 
Dunn et al (2010) found when anticipatory somatic signals supported advantageous intuitive 
decisions, enhanced IAc was helpful, whereas when somatic signals favoured 
disadvantageous decisions, IAc was unhelpful (see also Werner et al., 2009). Greater 
accessibility of interoceptive sensations could make higher IAc people more susceptible to 
concurrent physiological states when making moral judgments. However, although people 
may be conflicted about moral judgments, the nature of moral dilemmas means they do not 
(typically) have a ‘right’ answer, and the utility of somatic signals for predicting negative 
outcomes of moral decisions will not be positively or negatively reinforced during a moral 
dilemma task - unlike the IRT task (Dunn et al., 2010). Therefore, this moderation effect of 
IAc may manifest differently in the relationship between anticipatory arousal and moral 
judgment.     
Finally, previous research (Brown et al., 2020) suggests that interoception may 
influence egocentric harm judgments e.g. ‘Would you harm…?’, in a different way to 
allocentric harm judgments e.g. ‘How acceptable do you find…harmful action?’. Egocentric 
moral judgments require a degree of self-referential processing as we place ourselves in the 
shoes of the harmful actor to imagine self-relevant consequences (Sood & Forehand, 2005); 
which appear to engage emotional processes that allocentric judgments do not (Berthoz et al., 
2006; Tassy et al., 2013). Therefore, as interoception and egocentric judgments both entail a 
level of self-referential processing, interoception may be more influential for these types of 
judgments. 
Present study 
This study investigated the role of interoception in moral judgments of harm with a 
series of pre-registered (Brown et al., 2019; https://osf.io/m6f5j) and exploratory research 
questions. Physiological measures included electrodermal responses and cardiac impedance 
to capture anticipatory changes in sympathetic arousal previously associated with the 
rejection of personally harmful acts (e.g. Cushman et al., 2012; Moretto et al., 2010). Heart 
rate was also measured as a correlate of negative affective experiences (Lang et al., 1993), 
which has been associated with moral dilemmas involving direct interpersonal harm 
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(Carmona-Perera et al., 2013). We explored whether interoception of the cardiac and 
gastrointestinal system predicted moral appropriateness (egocentric) and moral acceptability 
(allocentric) judgments of harm, and whether interoceptive accuracy moderated the 
relationship between physiological arousal and moral judgments. As these specific 
physiological indices have not previously been measured using this moral dilemma paradigm, 
we also explored whether physiological arousal predicted outcome-maximisation or harm-
aversion tendencies. An exploratory research question was whether interoception moderated 
the relationship between physiological arousal and judgment response time. 
 
Pre-registered research questions 
R0. Does BMI, age, sex, time estimation accuracy or anxiety correlate with interoceptive 
accuracy or gastric sensitivity? 
R1. Is interoceptive accuracy associated with gastric interoception? 
R2. Does physiological arousal predict moral judgments of harm? 
R3. Does interoception predict moral judgments of harm? 
R4. Does interoceptive accuracy moderate the relationship between physiological arousal and 
moral judgments? Note: only interoceptive accuracy was included in R4, which is a 
refinement of the pre-registered research question that broadly stated ‘interoception’.   
Exploratory research question 
ER1. Does physiological arousal predict response-time differences between congruent and 





A within-participants experimental design was used. Moral appropriateness and moral 
acceptability judgments, and physiological responses were the primary dependent variables. 
Interoception and physiological responses were the primary independent variables. The 
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potential influence of age, sex, time-estimation accuracy, BMI and anxiety on interoception 
measures was investigated.    
Participants 
Following approval from the University of Bath ethics committee, participants were 
recruited from the University of Bath Student Participant Pool, the Psychology Department 
community panel database and via departmental email lists. Participants received course-
credit or £15 in exchange for their time. The study was advertised on the University 
noticeboard in the psychology department and various online recruitment platforms. 
Minimum sample size (n=77) was based on a priori power calculations using G*Power (α = 
0.05, β = 0.8, f 2=.015, df= 3, 71). A total sample of 90 participants took part in the study, 
comparable to similar interoception studies (e.g. Van Dyck et al, 2016; Dunn et al., 2010). 
Healthy right-handed participants aged 18-60 were recruited. Participants were not eligible to 
take part if they: were pregnant; engaged in intense physical activity regularly; had a 
heart/gastrointestinal condition or received surgery to those areas; had a history of mental 
illness; history of renal problems; had current physical conditions or medication that affect 
diet or weight or ability to safely take part in the study. The sample was 77.8% female and 
there was an age range of 18-50 years old (Median=21, SD=6.35). Two participants were left-




The State and Trait Anxiety Scale (Spielberger & Gorsuch, 1983) was used to 
measure anxiety. The scale included two identical 20-item scales with positive and negatively 
coded items. Participants reported their agreement (Not at all/Somewhat/Moderately so/Very 
much so), with twenty different statements e.g. ‘I feel calm’, ‘I feel tense’. The State and 
Trait measures ask people to rate how they feel right now and how they feel in general, 





Interoceptive sensibility was measured using the ‘Private Body consciousness’ 
subscale of The Body Consciousness Questionnaire (BCQ: Miller et al., 1981) which 
captures people’s tendency to notice bodily sensations, and has been used in prior 
interoception research (e.g. Ainley & Tsakiris, 2013; Sze et al., 2010; Werner, Duschek, et 
al., 2009). The subscale includes 5 statements including: ‘I'm very aware of changes in my 
body temperature’, ‘I am quick to sense the hunger contractions in my stomach’, ‘I know 
immediately when my mouth or throat gets dry’, ‘I am sensitive to internal bodily tensions’, 
and ‘I can often feel my heart beating’.  Participants reported how characteristic they believed 
each statement was (extremely uncharacteristic/uncharacteristic/ 
neutral/characteristic/extremely characteristic). The complete BCQ was used to maintain 
scale-validity. Scores for the Private Body Consciousness subscale were numerically coded 
1-5 (1=extremely uncharacteristic) and a mean score calculated.  
 
Moral dilemmas 
Moral dilemma stimuli developed by Conway and Gawronski (2013) were 
implemented to calculate harm-aversion and outcome-maximisation tendencies when faced 
with moral dilemmas of harm. Outcome-maximisation refers to the tendency to condone 
harmful action that results in a greater benefit or good overall. Harm-aversion represents the 
tendency to reject harmful actions, irrespective of the consequences of harm. The original 
stimuli include 20 moral dilemmas comprising 10 story-pairs. Story-pairs are matched in 
their content, but whereas one dilemma asks people whether it is morally appropriate to carry 
out harmful action that maximises outcomes (incongruent), the other proposes a harmful 
action that does not maximise outcomes (congruent); see Figure 1 for examples. People 
provide a judgment about whether they condone the harmful action or not: ‘Yes, this is 
appropriate’ or ‘No, this is not appropriate’. In the incongruent trials, people’s motivations to 
avoid harm or maximise outcomes could both be driving their moral judgment. Whereas, in 
the congruent trials, only an aversion harm will drive decision-making as there is no 
conflicting incentive to maximise outcomes (see Conway & Gawronski, 2013, for full 
probability equations). Harm-aversion and outcome-maximisation response tendencies were 
calculated based on the frequency that harm was accepted and rejected in congruent and 
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incongruent trials. These raw scores were subsequently transformed into z-scores. Dilemmas 
were presented in the order suggested by Conway and Gawronski (2013).  
 
Figure 1.   
Example of pair of moral dilemma stimuli (Conway & Gawronski, 2013) 
 
Incongruent: Causing harm maximises 
outcomes 
Congruent: Causing harm does NOT 
maximise outcomes 
You find a time machine and travel back to 
the year 1920. While checking into a hotel, 
you meet a young Austrian artist and 
veteran of the First World War. You realize 
this is Adolf Hitler before his rise to power 
in Nazi Germany. He is staying in the hotel 
room next to yours and the doors are not 
locked. It would be easy to simply smother 
him with a pillow in his sleep and 
disappear, stopping the Second World War 
and the Nazi party before they even start. 
However, he has not committed any crimes 
yet and it seems wrong to hurt an innocent 
person.  
 
Question:  Is it appropriate for you to kill 
an innocent young Hitler in order to 
prevent the Second World War? 
You find a time machine and travel back to 
the year 1920. While checking into a hotel, 
you meet a young petty criminal. You realize 
this is George Brackman, a man who later on 
abducted a child and held her for a week 
until her family paid him some ransom 
money. He is staying in the hotel room next 
to yours and the doors are not locked. It 
would be easy to simply smother him with a 
pillow in his sleep and disappear, stopping 
the abduction and ransom demands before 
they even start. However, he has not 
committed any crimes yet and it seems 
wrong to hurt an innocent person. 
 
Question:  Is it appropriate for you to kill 
George Brackman in order to prevent him 







In addition to the harm aversion and outcome-maximisation measures, we 
implemented a moral acceptability scale. This allowed us to assess the strength of people’s 
moral judgments of utilitarian and non-utilitarian harmful acts proposed in the moral 
dilemmas from an allocentric perspective. The item read: ‘How morally acceptable or 
morally unacceptable do you find the proposed action to be?’, with response options: 1 = 
Completely unacceptable, 2 = Moderately unacceptable, 3 = Slightly unacceptable, 4 = 
neither acceptable nor unacceptable, 5= Slightly acceptable, 6= Moderately acceptable, 7= 
Completely acceptable (adapted from Schnall et al., 2008). 
Interoception tasks 
Interoceptive accuracy and meta-cognitive awareness 
Cardiac interoceptive accuracy was measured using procedures from Schandry’s 
(1981) heartbeat detection task (HBD). Participants were seated, asked to remove any 
watches, and a pulse oximeter (BLYL CMS 50D+) was attached to the index finger on the 
right hand. They were instructed to silently count their heartbeats for four trial periods; 30, 
50, 40, and 20 seconds (in the same order). The experimenter signalled the beginning of each 
trial and the end of each trial was signalled by an alarm. For each trial participants reported 
how many heartbeats they perceived and verbally reported how sure they were that their 
answer reflected the actual amount of heartbeats; How sure are you that the amount of 
heartbeats you counted for that interval were correct? (0=not sure at all, 8= absolutely sure). 
Participants underwent a time estimation task to test whether time accuracy ability correlated 
with performance on the HBD task. Equivalent to the HBD task, participants were asked to 
estimate the length in seconds of four trial periods of 45, 35, 55, and 25 seconds. Within-
subjects’ correlations (Pearson’s R) of tracking accuracy and confidence ratings provided the 
interoceptive meta-cognitive awareness measure, representing participants’ awareness of 
their own tracking ability, therefore, scores could range between 1 (perfect positive 




The formula used to calculate interoceptive accuracy (and time accuracy) was adopted from 
Garfinkel et al (2015) and Hart (2013): 
                                           1- 
 | nbeatsreal −nbeatsreported | 
; 
(nbeatsreal + nbeatsreported)/ 2 
 
Using this formula, scores can range from -1 to +1 (see Forkmann et al, 2016 for a 
discussion), where 1 is perfect accuracy. Moderate deviations between real heartbeats and 
reported heartbeats range between 0 and 1, whereas for larger differences between real and 
reported heartbeats “e.g., perceived <33% or >300% of recorded heartbeats” (pg 73, 
Forkmann et al, 2016), it is possible to obtain a negative value up to -1 (Forkmann et al, 
2016; Hart et al, 2013). By having the reported heartbeats included in the denominator 
(whereas in Shandry’s (1981) formula only real heartbeats are the denominator), this 
accounts for overestimations and underestimations in heartbeats. In a comparison of 
Shandry’s (1981) and Hart’s (2013) formulae for calculating heartbeat detection accuracy, 
Forkmann et al (2016) did not find evidence for a large influence of formula on interoceptive 
accuracy scores. 
Gastric interoception 
Gastric interoception was measured using a two-step Water-Load Test (Van Dyck et 
al., 2016) that was designed to measure interoceptive sensitivity to gastric processes. 
Participants sat in a normal upright position and drank non-carbonated tap water at room 
temperature. Participants were asked to drink water freely and as continuously as possible 
until they noticed 1) the first sensations of stomach bloating or distention (Zeng et al., 2007), 
and 2) when their stomachs were completely full of water. Participants notified the 
experimenter at each time point and the water consumed was measured. Participants were 
reminded they could stop the experiment at any time and to notify the experimenter should 
they feel unwell. Total drinking time was around 5 minutes. Participants drank from a 400ml 
opaque flask with a straw and provided with more water as needed in 200ml amounts to blind 
them to the amount they were drinking. A safe maximum amount of water available to 
participants was 1300ml, a maximum that they were not aware off. We added 2.5ml of 
electrolyte solution (Elete electrolyte) to the water to mitigate against a loss of sodium in the 
blood. Gastric interoception was calculated as the percentage of water drunk from the first 
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signs of stomach distension at step 1, to achieve maximum fullness at step 2, providing an 
index of gastric sensitivity not confounded by stomach capacity (Van Dyck et al., 2016). 
Gastric interoception thus represents the onset of somatic awareness from the first signs of 
stomach distension to complete fullness. We conceptualised lower scores as indicating an 
increased sensitivity to gastric processes, as fullness is reached after a longer period of 
drinking from first noticing stomach filling. As a manipulation check, a short hunger and 
thirst questionnaire was completed before and after the task: How hungry do you feel at this 
moment? (1=not at all, 9=extremely hungry), How thirsty do you feel at this moment? (1=not 
at all, 9=extremely hungry).  
Physiological data collection 
Impedance cardiographic (ICG), electrocardiographic (ECG) and galvanic skin-
response signals (AUC) were recorded using a wireless BIOPAC MP160 (BIOPAC Systems, 
2020) at a rate of 2000 samples per channel of data. Cardiac output (CO; volume of blood 
ejected from the heart at systole), systemic vascular resistance (SVR; amount of resistance in 
circulatory system to achieve blood flow around the body), heart rate (HR; beats-per-minute), 
and skin conductance activity (SC) were measured. Physiological waveforms were digitised, 
stored and analysed using Acqknowledge software (BIOPAC Systems, 2015). Electrodes 
were placed either side of participants’ neck, and upper torso to capture ICG data. An 
Einthoven lead II configuration was used to collect ECG data. Electrodes on participants 
index and second finger captured electrodermal data. The wireless ICG, ECG and SC 
amplifiers were attached to participants with a chest-strap and wrist-strap. An estimation of 
SVR, CO and HR were calculated using Acknowledge software. A clinically validated blood 
pressure monitor (OMRON) was used to measure mean arterial pressure (MAP) (Cushman et 
al., 2012) which is used to estimate SVR. Blood pressure was measured twice during the 
experiment, specifically during presentation of 1) several congruent trials in a row and 2) 
several incongruent trials in a row. MAP was calculated using the formula:  
MAP= (systolic pressure +2(diastolic pressure))/3 
 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to not consume any food or drink for at least 2 hours or 
consume any alcohol or any (unprescribed) drugs or engage in intense physical exercise 24 
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hours prior to the study. After providing informed consent, participants completed all 
questionnaire measures, excluding the hunger/thirst scales. Participants provided some basic 
demographic details and completed a short health form to ensure they were feeling well and 
had completed the pre-study protocol. Their height and weight measurements were taken 
before completing the heartbeat detection and time-estimation tasks. Physiological data 
recording equipment was setup 5-10 minutes before recording. To aid waveform-calibration 
and allow physiological responses to stabilise at rest, data acquisition began 2-3 minutes 
before the moral dilemma task while participants were seated at the computer. E-Prime 
stimulus presentation software was used for the moral dilemma task, and instructions 
provided at the beginning. Participants were asked to keep as still as possible, uncross their 
legs and place their right arm resting near the keyboard. Blood pressure was taken before the 
experiment to habituate participants to the device and collect a baseline comparison. Their 
left arm remained raised and resting on a table in front of them (palm-up) throughout the 
moral dilemma task. Blood-pressure readings were taken at a further two time-intervals listed 
above. Presentation of moral dilemma stories was standardised depending on length of the 
text (Range= 21-35 sec; mean congruent = 28.89sec, mean incongruent = 29sec). Several 
participants reported missing key information during the allocated reading time, and the 
experimenter verbally repeated critical details missed in the text. Following each dilemma, 
participants were asked whether they condoned carrying out a harmful act associated with the 
dilemma and how morally acceptable they judged the proposed harmful action to be. They 
responded with a key press using their right hand. Response time was not capped to avoid 
time-pressured responses. A blank screen was presented for 3-seconds between the second 
moral judgment response and the presentation of the next moral dilemma text. After a short 
rest and removal of recording equipment, participants completed the water-load task and 
hunger/thirst scales. The experiment took approximately 1.5 hours to complete. Participants 
were debriefed and thanked for their time.   
Physiological data processing 
A 12.5msec delay was added to digital event marker channels before data processing 
to account for signal latency from the wireless amplifiers. Waveforms were checked and 
cleaned for motion-artefacts and noise. As ICG data is prone to motion-artefacts, a relaxed 
SFLC motion-artefact filter was applied to the majority of ICG waveforms. ICG waveforms 
for two participants required a more aggressive motion-artefact filter. Two SVR and CO 
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scores were calculated for each participant by inputting the associated MAP value for the 
congruent and incongruent trials into the ICG analysis in Acqknowledge (BIOPAC Systems, 
2015). Average MAP was 82.04 ± 7.33 for congruent trials and 83.61 ± 7.89 for incongruent 
trials. Digital event markers symbolising presentation of the moral dilemma stories, questions 
and response-clicks were recorded on the data file to allow precise measurement-windows for 
analysis. Programming scripts were used to automate the calculation of mean CO, SVR, HR 
and SC data for the congruent and incongruent trials separately for the three measurement 
windows: 1) story contemplation phase; 2) between presentation of first moral judgment 
question and response; 3) between presentation of the second moral judgment question and 
response. A 1-second offset was applied to the beginning and end of SC measurement 
windows to account for delay in SC responses.  
Cardiac reactivity  
Due to the large inter-individual variation in physiological responses, all raw 
physiological data was transformed into relative values (z-scores) within each subjects’ 
dataset to improve reliability and validity of individual differences analyses (Boucsein et al., 
2012; Braithwaite et al., 2013; Braithwaite & Watson, 2015). Means and standard deviations 
used to derive z-scores were calculated for measurement windows 1-3. The CO and SVR 
scores were transformed into a combined threat-challenge reactivity score (see Scheepers et 
al., 2012; Turner et al., 2013). According to the biopsychosocial model (Blascovich & 
Mendes, 2010; Mendes et al., 2007), cardiovascular states are the product of an evaluation of 
whether the demands of the situation exceed our personal resources. When resources meet or 
surpass demands, a challenge motivational state occurs resulting in an efficient 
cardiovascular response associated with an increase in CO, and low SVR. A threat 
motivational state arises when the demands of the situation outweigh our resources, resulting 
in a reduction in CO and increase in SVR. To calculate the threat-challenge reactivity index, 
raw SVR scores were subtracted from CO scores. Higher scores reflect a higher challenge 
state, and lower scores indicate a higher threat state.  Threat-challenge reactivity (TCR) and 
heart rate (HR) values for all trials within each timeframe (1-3 separately) were transformed 
into z-scores, and then t-scores to provide a relative measure of HR and TCR across all 
congruent and incongruent trials. Average t-scores were then calculated for each timeframe 
within congruent and incongruent trials. 
 
 cxviii 
Skin conductance  
Skin conductance (SC) data was converted into Area Under the Curve (AUC; Naqvi 
& Bechara, 2006). A moving-average smoothing filter was first applied to the SC waveform 
(2000 samples). The waveform was then resampled at 125Hz, and a difference transformation 
with an interval of 6 samples was applied. Area under the curve is calculated as the area 
bounded by the curve and the chord connecting the juncture of the curve with the endpoints 
of each measurement window (Naqvi & Bechara, 2006). Area was divided by the time in 
seconds for that measurement interval, to calculate a rate of micro-siemens per second 
(AUC). This method provides an indication of both the amplitude and temporal features of 
electrodermal activity and does not require subjective interpretation about SC responses 
(Naqvi & Bechara, 2006). Within each measurement window (1) story contemplation, 2) pre-
moral judgment 1 and 3) pre-moral judgment 2), a ‘log (AUC + 1)’ transformation was 
applied to raw AUC scores to normalise the data while allowing for zero values ( Braithwaite 
et al., 2013; Braithwaite & Watson, 2015). The logged AUC scores were then transformed 
into z-scores, and finally t-scores to remove negative values (see Braithwaite & Watson, 
2015). Means and standard deviations used for these calculations were based on all trials 
(congruent and incongruent) within each measurement window. Average t-scores for 
measurement windows 1-3 (including those with zero values) were calculated for the 
incongruent and congruent trials separately, providing a time-corrected measure of AUC for 
each measurement window within congruent and incongruent trials.  
 
Results 
Statistical analysis was carried out using SPSS v26. Boxplots of the dependent 
variables were inspected for outliers. Data points with standardised residuals ± 3 standard 
deviations were investigated with boxplots, with any exclusions noted below. Pearson’s 
bivariate correlations were carried out to assess relationships between independent and 
dependent variables. Data are mean ± standard deviation (SD) unless otherwise stated. 
Moral judgments 
Responses for one of the moral dilemma questions were not collected for all 
participants, due to a technical issue. To ensure consistent physiological and moral judgment 
data across the entire sample we excluded this moral dilemma pair and corresponding 
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physiological data from analysis, resulting in a total of 18 complete matched moral dilemmas: 
9 congruent items and 9 incongruent items. Conway and Gawronski’s (2013) formulae to 
calculate harm-aversion and outcome-maximisation parameters were adjusted accordingly. 
Eight participants were excluded from all moral acceptability judgment analyses due to a 
technical problem resulting in missing data on two trials. Boxplots revealed two outliers for 
the acceptability_congruent dependent variable who were also excluded from the moral 
acceptability analyses. A log10 transformation was carried out on the acceptability_congruent 
scores (2.873 ± .734) to normalise a strong positive skew. A Shapiro-Wilks test (SWT) 
showed the logged acceptability_congruent scores and acceptability_congruent (3.815 ± 
.812) scores had normal distribution (p>.05). The z-transformed outcome-maximisation and 
harm-aversion parameters were not normally distributed (SWT, p<.05) but inspection of Q-Q 
plots indicated fairly normal distribution. Harm-aversion and outcome-maximisation 
parameters showed non-significant negative correlation (r=-.143, p=.179), providing support 
for the distinction between these two motivations. Potential confounding variables of age, sex 
and anxiety did not correlate with outcome-maximisation or harm-aversion tendencies 
(p>.05), although men were more likely to judge harmful action as more morally acceptable 
on incongruent trials (r= -.236, p=.035).  
 
Moral judgments across incongruent and congruent trials 
Paired-sampled t-tests (bootstrappedx1000) were performed to assess whether 
participants were more likely to accept harmful action in the congruent dilemmas versus the 
incongruent dilemmas by comparing the percentage of accepting harm (i.e. ‘Yes, this is 
morally appropriate’) in congruent versus incongruent dilemmas. We found people condoned 
harmful action significantly more often for dilemmas where harm maximised outcomes, than 
when harm did not maximise outcomes (.309 ± .164), t (89) =17.87, p<.001, 95% CI [.274 to 
.342]. A second paired-samples t-test assessed whether people were more likely to accept or 
reject harm when harm maximised outcomes- this is the traditional ‘utilitarian’ versus 
‘deontological’ analysis. Although people were marginally more likely to accept than reject 
harm in the interests of the ‘greater good’ (.067 ± .338), this was just below significance, t 
(89) =1.869, p=.051, 95% CI [-.002 to .128]. Finally, we tested whether participants rated 
harmful actions in the incongruent trials (where harm maximised outcomes) as more morally 
acceptable than in the congruent trials. Indeed, people judged harmful acts as more morally 
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acceptable on trials where harm maximised outcomes (3.374 ±.730), and this was significant, 
t (79) = 41.309, p=.001, 95% CI [3.219 to 3.538].  
R0. Association between interoception and potential confounding variables  
We explored bivariate correlations of all the interoception variables and potential 
confounding factors, including age, sex, BMI, anxiety and time-estimation accuracy (Table 
1). Four participants were excluded from all interoception analyses: one participant disclosed 
they had guessed on the HBD task, and three did not follow the pre-study requirements 
regarding the consumption of food/drink. For the water-load task 8.1% of participants drank 
the maximum (1300ml) water available (mean=707.62, SD=305.14). We treated 
interoceptive accuracy as a continuous variable because the lower interoceptive accuracy 
group (using median-split procedure) showed a strong negative skew. None of the 
interoception variables showed correlation with each other, providing justification for 
conducting separate statistical analyses for each dimension. Age was significantly negatively 
correlated with interoceptive accuracy, suggesting younger people were more accurate in 
tracking heartbeats. Surprisingly, trait anxiety was negatively associated with IAc, suggesting 
higher levels of anxiety in general hindered heartbeat counting ability. Descriptive statistics 














Table 1.  
Bivariate correlations between Interoceptive Accuracy, Interoceptive Sensibility, Interoceptive meta-cognitive awareness, 
Gastric interoception and potential confounding variables 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Age 1 -.136 .316** -.090 -.016 -.010 -0.042 -.242* .034 .191 
2. Sex  1 -.091 .163 .256* .168 -.027 -.183 -.090 .173 
3. BMI   1 .144 .142 .006 .085 -.139 .002 .181 
4. State Anxiety    1 .537** .037 -.226* -.120 -.152 .173 
5. Trait Anxiety     1 .086 -.225 -.280** -.188 .129 
6. IS      1 .059 .028 -.049 -.048 
7. Time Acc       1 .100 .002 -.241* 
8. IAc        1 .015 -.176 
9. IAc-meta         1 -.092 
10. Int-Gastric           1 
Note. 2. *p<.05, **p<.01. Body Mass Index= BMI, Interoceptive sensibility= IS, Time estimation accuracy= Time Acc, 
Interoceptive Accuracy = IAc, Interoceptive meta-cognitive awareness = IAc-meta, Gastric interoception = Int-Gastric. 
 
Table 2.  
Descriptive statistics for interoception variables 
 
 Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Gastric interoception 96.15 3.85 100 47.25 19.42 
Interoceptive sensibility (IS) 3.60 .40 4.00 2.54 .77 
Interoceptive accuracy (IAc) 1.98 -1.00 .98 .35 .52 




R1. Association between interoceptive accuracy and gastric interoception 
A bootstrapped (x1000) linear regression model tested whether IAc was associated 
with gastric interoception. Interoceptive accuracy did not predict gastric interoception, 
R2=.040, F (1, 84) =3.538, p=.063. IAc also did not predict the total amount of water drunk, 
R2=.006, F (1, 84) =.526, p=.470, the amount of water drunk to achieve perceptual awareness 
of gastric distension, R2=.003, F (1, 84) =.256, p=.615, or maximum fullness, R2=.022, F (1, 
84) =1.932, p=.168, on the task.  
 
R2. Physiological arousal and moral judgments of harm 
R2.1. Arousal differences between congruent and incongruent trials 
Using paired-samples t-tests (bootstrappedx1000), we investigated whether 
physiological arousal was significantly different when participants contemplated dilemmas 
where harm maximised outcomes (incongruent) compared to dilemmas where harm did not 
maximise outcomes (congruent) (Table 3). Six participants were excluded from all 
physiological analyses: three outliers were identified from inspection of boxplots, 
electrodermal electrodes became detached during data collection for two participants, and 
blood pressure was not able to be taken for one person. Physiological data for each 
measurement window were normally distributed (SWT, p>.05), with the exception of 
electrodermal activity (AUC) during the story contemplation and moral judgment 1 phase for 
both congruent and incongruent trials. The t-tests revealed, participants threat-challenge 
reactivity (TCR) when making Moral judgment 1, t (83) =-2.942,  p=.007, 95% CI [-3.433 to 
-.671], and Moral judgment 2, t (83) =-3.262, p<.005, 95% CI [-3.513 to -.889], was 
significantly higher in the congruent trials, indicating a greater threat-state (scores <50) when 
contemplating their choices on the incongruent trials. TCR was not significantly different in 
the story contemplation phase between congruent and incongruent trials (p>.05). AUC was 
also significantly higher for incongruent trials in all phases: story contemplation, t (83) = 
4.234, p<.001, 95% CI [1.221 to 3.141], moral judgment 1, t (83) = 6.814, p<.001, 95% CI 
[2.253 to 4.065] and moral judgment 2, t (83) = 8.064, p<.001, 95% CI [2.859 to 4.659], 
indicating greater autonomic arousal during dilemmas when harm did not maximise 
outcomes. Despite heart rate being lower for the incongruent trials, this was only significantly 
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lower for the Moral judgment 2 timeframe i.e. moral acceptability judgments, t (83) = -2.684, 
p=.012, 95% CI [-2.267 to -.348].   
 
Table 3.  
Mean and standard deviation physiological arousal scores for congruent and incongruent trials 
 
  Incongruent trials Congruent trials 








































































































Note: Scores represent mean and standard deviation t-scores for congruent and incongruent trials for story contemplation, 
moral appropriateness judgment formation (Moral Judgment 1) and moral acceptability judgment formation (Moral 
judgment 2). NB. 50 is the mean score for t-values. Mean scores >50 on incongruent trials indicate greater physiological HR, 
TCR (challenge state) and AUC relative to congruent trials.  
 
R2.2. Strength of physiological arousal and moral judgments 
We tested whether the relative strength of physiological arousal when making moral 
judgments predicted judgment response tendencies. An arousal-index for the physiological 
variables for the decision-making measurement windows (Moral judgment 1 and Moral 
judgment 2) were calculated, by subtracting the mean threat-challenge reactivity (TCR), Area 
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Under the Curve (AUC), and heart rate (HR) for the congruent trials, from the means on the 
incongruent trials. Index scores greater than 1 indicate greater mean HR, AUC and TCR on 
incongruent trials (NB. higher TCR indexes indicate a greater ‘challenge’ state). Indexes 
within each measurement window were not correlated. Hierarchical linear regression models 
were performed for the dependent variables of harm-aversion and outcome-maximisation. 
The TCR index was inputted at step-1, AUC index at step-2, and HR at step 3, for the moral 
judgment 1 timeframe. For harm-aversion tendencies, neither Model 1, R2=.022, F (1, 82) 
=1.840, p=.179, Model 2, R2=.026, F (1, 81) =1.068, p=.349, nor Model 3, R2=.068, F (1, 80) 
=1.931, p=.131 were significant. For outcome-maximisation tendencies, neither Model 1, 
R2=.001, F (1, 82) =.100, p=.752, Model 2, R2=.025, F (1, 81) =1.039, p=.359, nor Model 3, 
R2=.032, F (1, 80) =.886, p=.452, were significant. Therefore, the relative strength of 
physiological arousal between dilemma types did not predict harm-aversion or outcome-
maximisation tendencies on the task.  
A further two hierarchical regression models were performed, with 
acceptability_congruent and acceptability_incongruent scores as the dependent variables. 
TCR index was inputted at step-1, AUC index at step-2 and HR index at step-3 for the Moral 
Judgment 2 timeframe. For acceptability_congruent judgments, Model 1 was not significant 
R2=.005, F (1, 72) =.387, p=.536. Inclusion of the AUC index in Model 2, R2=.045, F (1, 71) 
= 1.666, p=.196, and HR in Model 3, R2=.048, F (1, 70) = 1.178, p=.324, did not improve 
model fit. For acceptability_incongruent judgments, Model 1 was not significant R2=.023, F 
(1, 72) =1.731, p=.192, but the inclusion of the AUC index in Model 2 led to a significant 
increase in variance explained, R2=.075, F (1, 71) =2.897, p=.062, Sig. F Change=.05, B=-
.042, p=.047, 95% bootstrapped CI [-.082 to -.001]. The addition of HR in model 3 did not 
significantly improve model fit, R2=.077, F (1, 70) =1.950, p=.129. Therefore, people 
exhibiting stronger AUC in the incongruent trials relative to the congruent trials were more 
likely to rate harm that maximised outcomes as less morally acceptable. With the exception 
of this finding, the relative strength of physiological arousal people demonstrated between 
congruent and incongruent trials did not appear to influence their moral judgments. 
R3. Interoception and moral judgments of harm 
Hierarchical regression analyses were performed to determine whether individual 
differences in cardiac or gastric interoception influenced moral judgments. Harm-aversion, 
outcome maximisation, acceptability_congruent and acceptability_incongruent scores, were 
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the dependent variables. In each regression, the potential confounding variables of age, sex, 
time-estimation accuracy, state and trait anxiety, and BMI were entered at step-1. 
Interoceptive accuracy (IAc), Interoceptive sensibility (IS), Interoceptive meta-cognitive 
awareness (IAc-meta) and gastric interoception were entered at step-2 in separate regression 
analyses. For harm-aversion, Model 1 was not significant, R2=.013, F (6, 78) =.178, p=.982. 
In each regression, the inclusion of IAc, (R2=.041, F (1, 77) =.466, p=.856), IAc-meta, 
(R2=.023, F (1, 77) =.260, p=.967), IS, (R2=.044, F (1, 77) =.500, p=.832) or gastric 
interoception, (R2=.023, F (1, 77) =.260, p=.967) at step-2 did not improve model fit. For 
outcome-maximisation tendencies, Model 1 was not significant, R2=.068, F (6, 78) =.947, 
p=.467. Again, the addition of IAc, (R2= .068, F (1, 77) = .801, p=.589), IAc-meta, (R2=.068, 
F (1, 77) = .801, p=.589), IS, (R2=.087, F (1, 77) =1.053, p=.402), or gastric interoception 
(R2=.070, F (1, 77) =.824, p=.571) at step-2 did not significantly improve model fit. For 
moral acceptability ratings, Model 1 did not significantly predict acceptability_incongruent 
judgments, R2=.103, F (6, 68) =1.303, p=.268. The inclusion of IAc (R2=.134, F (1, 67) 
=1.482, p=.189), IAc-meta, (R2=.127, F (1, 67) =1.398, p=.221), IS, (R2=.104, F (1, 67) 
=1.108, p=.368) or gastric interoception, (R2=.105, F (1, 67) =1.126, p=.358) at step-2 did not 
significantly improve model fit. For acceptability_congruent judgments, Model 1 was not 
significant, R2=.077, F (6, 68) =.945, p=.469. The inclusion of IAc (R2=.088, F (1, 67) = 
.925, p=.493), IAc-meta (R2=.077, F (1, 67) = .801, p=.589), IS (R2=.105, F (1, 67) = 1.118, 
p=.363) or gastric interoception (R2=.078, F (1, 67) =.814, p=.579) did not improve model fit 
at step-2. Overall, it appears a sensitivity or perceptual awareness of cardiac or gastric 
sensations did not fundamentally influence moral judgments on the task.  
R4. Moderating role of interoceptive accuracy  
We explored whether people’s level of interoceptive accuracy (IAc) moderated the 
relationship between the strength of physiological arousal and moral judgments. SPSS scripts 
for moderation analyses (Model 1; PROCESS) were adopted from Hayes (2018) which 
applies a bootstrapping method (5000xsamples) as default. Moderation effects are probed at 
the 16th, 50th and 84th percentiles. The Johnson-Neyman (JN) technique was used to identify 
regions of significance for moderation (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Interoceptive accuracy 
(IAc) was entered as the moderator. Each arousal index (TCR, HR, AUC) was entered as a 
predictor in separate regression models. For clarification, a lower TCR index represents an 
increased threat-state on incongruent trials (relative to congruent trials).  
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Harm-aversion and outcome-maximisation 
There was a significant interaction between IAc and the TCR index for predicting 
harm aversion scores, R2-chng=.052, F (1, 78) = 4.458, B=.0715, p=.038 in the model, 
R2=.094, F (78, 3) =2.696, p=.052. The JN technique revealed a lower TCR index (increased 
threat-state on incongruent trials) predicted reduced harm-aversion tendencies, but only for 
people scoring above .5698 on the IAc scale, 45.12% of the sample. Therefore, for people 
who were better at perceiving cardiac sensations, a greater threat-response on incongruent 
trials (relative to congruent trials) predicted more harm-acceptance responses. When 
inputting outcome-maximisation as the dependent variable, we did not find an interaction 
between IAc and TCR index, R2=.0205, F (78, 3) =.5441, p=.654. These findings suggest that 
a certain level of interoceptive accuracy is necessary for cardiovascular threat-reactivity to 
predict harm-aversion responses. Although higher IAc perceivers did experience a 
cardiovascular threat response prior to making judgments on incongruent trials, this did not 
predict an increase in harm-aversive tendencies.  
When inputting HR as the predictor for harm-aversion, TCR was entered as a 
covariate to control for its potential competing influence. The overall model was significant, 
R2=.1221, F (77, 4) =2.676, p=.038. Although the interaction between HR and IAc was not 
significant, R2-chng=.0345, F (1, 77) = 3.023, B=. 0917, p=.086, the conditional effects of 
HR on harm-aversion was significant at the 50th [.0017 to .0949] and 84th [.0198 to .1405] 
percentiles on the IAc scale. The JN technique showed that 51.22% of the sample scoring 
above .469 on the interoceptive accuracy scale (indicating greater heartbeat counting 
accuracy), gave more harm-aversive responses if they demonstrated greater anticipatory heart 
rate on incongruent trials, relative to congruent trials. We also found IAc moderated the 
relationship between HR and outcome-maximisation tendencies, R2-chng=.051, F (1, 78) = 
4.274, B=-.1096, p=.042, in the model, R2=.0688, F (78, 3) =1.921, p=.133. This time, a 
negative relationship between HR and outcome-maximisation tendencies was only significant 
for people scoring above .796 on the IAc scale, 20.73% of the sample. Therefore, lower 
anticipatory HR on incongruent trials was associated with greater outcome-maximisation 
tendencies, but only for people who were particularly good at perceiving cardiac sensations. 
Finally, when inputting AUC as the predictor of harm-aversion and TCR and HR as 
covariates, we did not find a significant interaction with IAc in the model R2=.0963, F (76, 5) 
=1.618, p=.165. Similarly, IAc did not moderate the relationship between AUC and outcome 
maximisation scores (inputting HR as a covariate), in the model, R2=.0463, F (77, 4) =.934, 
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p=.449. Therefore, the relative strength of anticipatory electrodermal responses did not 
influence harm-aversion and outcome-maximisation tendencies, regardless of IAc ability. 
Together, these findings suggest people’s ability to detect cardiac sensations may only 
moderate the relationship between indices of cardiac arousal and moral appropriateness 
judgments.  
Moral acceptability judgments 
We next inputted TCR, HR and AUC indexes for the moral judgment 2 window, as 
predictors in separate regression models. Acceptability_incongruent and 
acceptability_congruent were the dependent variables. The relationship between TCR and 
acceptability_congruent judgments was not moderated by interoceptive accuracy, R2=.0084, 
F (68, 3) =.1914, p=.902. There was no interaction between IAc and TCR for 
acceptability_incongruent judgments, R2-chng=.015, F (1, 68) = 1.163, p=.285. However, the 
coefficient for IAc alone was significant (B=.474, p=.012) in the model, R2=.111, F (68, 3) 
=2.822, p=.045, suggesting IAc may influence acceptability judgments on congruent trials, 
but only when cardiovascular threat-reactivity scores remain constant. There was no 
interaction between HR and IAc for acceptability_incongruent, R2=.093, F (68, 3) =2.325, 
p=.082, or acceptability_congruent scores, R2=.031, F (68, 3) =.732, p=.537. The relationship 
between AUC and acceptability_congruent scores was also not moderated by IAc, R2=.0732, 
F (68, 3) =1.789, p=.157. However, we did find an interaction between IAc and AUC for 
predicting acceptability_incongruent scores, R2-chng=.0461, F (1, 68) = 3.871, B=.086, 
p=.053, in the model R2=.189, F (68, 3) =5.314, p=<.005. The JN technique revealed higher 
AUC on incongruent trials was associated with greater disapproval of harmful acts that 
maximised outcomes, but only for people scoring below .440 on the IAc scale, 47.22% of the 
sample. Therefore, autonomic arousal was associated with greater moral disapproval of 
harmful acts that maximised outcomes, but only for people with relatively lower levels of 
interoceptive accuracy. To rule out any confounding influence of trait anxiety on IAc, we 
included trait anxiety as a covariate in all models showing significant IAc moderation. Trait 
anxiety did not significantly change any of the moderation effects found and provided no 






ER1: Does physiological arousal predict response-time on incongruent trials, and is this 
moderated by interoception?  
We tested whether relative physiological arousal predicted the difference in response 
time for congruent and incongruent trials. To create response time indexes, we subtracted 
mean response time (RT) for the congruent trials from the mean RT for the incongruent trials 
for the Moral judgment 1 (appropriateness) and Moral judgment 2 (acceptability) timeframes. 
Lower scores indicate longer time-taken to make judgments on the incongruent trials. We 
also explored moderation effects of interoceptive ability. As we had no clear hypotheses 
about which dimensions of interoception would be relevant, IAc, IS, IAc-meta and gastric 
interoception were inputted as moderators in separate regression analyses using PROCESS 
Model 1 (Hayes, 2018). 
Moral appropriateness judgments 
We inputted the arousal indexes as predictors of RT for moral judgment 1 into a 
bootstrapped (x1000) hierarchical linear regression model; TCR index (step-1), AUC index 
(step-2) and HR index (step 3). Casewise diagnostics identified two outliers that were 
removed. In Model 1, TCR did not significantly predict RT for moral judgment 1, R2=.001, F 
(80, 1) =.073, p=.788, but the addition of the AUC index in Model 2 led to a significant 
increase of variance explained, R2=.119, F (79, 1) =5.337, p=.007. The addition of HR in 
model 3 did not significantly improve model fit, Sig F Chng=.447, but the model was 
significant R2=.126, F (78, 1) =3.734, p=.015. AUC represents the strength of electrodermal 
activity between question presentation and response, divided by response time. Therefore, a 
stronger and more sustained electrodermal response when making moral appropriateness 
judgments on incongruent trials, was associated with longer response times for these trials. 
We did not find any of the interoception variables moderated the relationship between AUC 
and RT, (F<1, p>.05). 
Moral acceptability judgments 
We repeated the former analysis for RT in the moral judgment 2 timeframe, inputting 
the arousal indexes into the hierarchical regression as before. Casewise diagnostics revealed 3 
outliers that were removed. Model 1 including just the TCR index did not predict RT for 
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moral judgment 2, R2=.009, F (79, 1) =.716, p=.400. As before, the inclusion of AUC in 
Model 2, led to a significant increase in variance explained, R2=.158, F (78, 1) =7.329, 
p=.001. Inputting HR in Model 3 did not significantly improve model fit, Sig F Chng= .582, 
but the model was significant, R2=.162, F (77, 1) =4.944, p=.003. Again, a more sustained 
electrodermal response when making moral acceptability judgments on incongruent trials 
(where harm maximises outcomes) predicted longer response times on these trials. 
Interestingly, here we found both IAc-meta, R2 chng=.0512, F (75, 1) =4.837, p=.031 in the 
model, R2=.206, F (75, 3) =6.499, p=.0006, and gastric interoception R2chng=.0432, F (75, 1) 
=4.073, p=.047 in the model, R2=.204, F (75, 3) =6.398, p=.0006, moderated the relationship 
between AUC and response time. A reduced awareness of one’s ability to accurately perceive 
cardiac sensations (IAc-meta) strengthened the relationship between AUC and response time 
i.e. stronger electrodermal responses predicted even longer reaction times (Figure 1).  The JN 
technique revealed moderation was present for people scoring below .313 on the IAc-meta 
scale, 69.62% of the sample; indicating this effect did not apply to people very aware of their 
interoceptive accuracy. For gastric interoception, stronger electrodermal responses were also 
associated with longer response times for people with a reduced sensitivity to stomach 
sensations. However, the JN technique showed moderation was not significant for people 
with very high gastric sensitivity i.e. those scoring below 31.83 on the gastric interoception 













Figure 1.  
Regression lines depicting moderation effect of interoceptive meta-cognitive awareness (IAc-meta) in relationship between 
AUC index and Response time (RT) index (RT incongruent - RT congruent) for moral acceptability judgments (MJ2) 
 
 
Note: Legend symbols represent moderation effects probed at 16th, 50th and 84th percentiles of IAc-meta. Moderation was 













Figure 2.  
Regression lines depicting moderation effect of gastric interoception in relationship between AUC index and Response time 
(RT) index (RT incongruent - RT congruent) for moral acceptability judgments (MJ2) 
 
 
Note: Legend symbols represent moderation effects probed at 16th, 50th and 84th percentiles of gastric interoception. 
Moderation was significant (p<.05) at 50th and 84th percentiles.  
 
Discussion 
Interoceptive processes are central to shaping motivation, emotional experience and 
facilitating adaptive behavioural responses to our environment (Craig, 2015; Feldman Barrett, 
2017; Friston, 2010). Despite the fundamental influence of emotional and physiological 
processes in moral decision-making (Cushman et al., 2012; Damasio et al., 1990; Damasio, 
1996; Greene et al., 2001; Moretto et al., 2010; Parton & McGinley, 2019), relatively little is 
known about how individual differences in interoceptive experiences could influence the 
relationship between physiological processes and moral judgments. This is the first study to 
examine the role of interoception in the relationship between anticipatory physiological 
arousal and moral judgments of harm. Our results suggest interoceptive accuracy in 
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particular, plays a role in moderating the effect of physiological arousal on moral judgments 
of harm. Interestingly, we found the moderated effects of heart rate, cardiovascular threat-
reactivity and electrodermal responses showed diverging relationships with moral judgments. 
This suggests that discrete somatic markers may be associated with distinct psychological 
processes leading up to moral judgments, which can be enhanced or attenuated by an ability 
to accurately perceive visceral sensations. 
Contrary to some prior research (Herbert et al., 2012; Whitehead & Drescher, 1980), 
we did not find any association between interoceptive accuracy (IAc) and any measures of 
gastric interoception (R1), indicating a sensitivity to visceral sensations within the cardiac 
and gastrointestinal systems were distinct (Ferentzi et al., 2018a). Although, this predictive 
relationship was just below significance (p=.063). Further higher-powered studies are 
necessary to determine whether individual differences in interoceptive sensitivity are 
consistent across visceral systems. None of the interoception variables predicted any of the 
moral judgment variables (R3), suggesting a perceptual awareness or sensitivity to internal 
sensations did not fundamentally influence moral judgments, contrary to previous work 
showing a link between gastric-related sensitivity (Schnall et al., 2008; Vicario et al., 2018), 
and IS (Brown et al., 2020) with moral judgments.  We did find that the physiological arousal 
parameters were higher in incongruent compared to the congruent trials (R2.1). Specifically, 
electrodermal responses and sympathetic cardiovascular arousal was significantly higher 
when making appropriateness and acceptability judgments on the incongruent trials compared 
to the congruent trials. Participants were more likely to condone harm on the incongruent 
trials, which suggests anticipatory physiological reactions were higher prior to harm-
acceptance judgments. Heart rate was lower for incongruent trials, but only significantly 
lower when contemplating moral acceptability judgments. This is consistent with previous 
work finding an association between heart rate deceleration when contemplating dilemmas of 
direct interpersonal harm (Carmona-Perera et al., 2013), and suggests participants were 
experiencing a stronger negative emotional reaction towards incongruent dilemmas (Lang et 
al., 1993).  
Despite these differences in physiological arousal, the relative difference in 
physiological arousal between incongruent and congruent trials, was not associated with 
people’s harm aversion and outcome maximisation tendencies (R2.2). However, in R4, we 
found several moderation effects of interoceptive accuracy (IAc) in the relationship between 
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arousal and moral judgments. On incongruent trials: increased cardiovascular threat-reactivity 
predicted reduced harm-aversion tendencies but only for higher IAc perceivers; increased HR 
predicted increased harm-aversion tendencies and decreased HR predicted increased 
outcome-maximisation tendencies but only for higher IAc perceivers. Finally, increased 
electrodermal arousal predicted stronger disapproval of harmful acts that maximised 
outcomes but only for relatively lower IAc perceivers. These findings are discussed further 
below. 
Strength of physiological arousal and moral judgments 
We did not find the relative strength of physiological arousal on congruent versus 
incongruent trials predicted moral judgments, with the exception of electrodermal responses 
which predicted lower moral acceptability ratings for incongruent trials. There is some 
evidence to suggest the strength of physiological arousal may not always predict moral 
judgments of harm (Cecchetto et al., 2018; Francis et al., 2018), but other evidence suggests 
the strength or frequency of electrodermal responses (e.g. McDonald et al., 2017; Moretto et 
al., 2010) and individual differences in cardiovascular threat-reactivity (Cushman et al., 
2012) predicts harm rejection responses in personal moral dilemma scenarios. However, prior 
psychophysiological studies did not use a ‘congruent’ comparison dilemma to calculate the 
difference in physiological arousal for ‘incongruent’ trials. Furthermore, the moral dilemma 
stimuli in the current study (Conway & Gawronski, 2013) included a majority of situations 
involving personal harm, and several situations that involved more indirect harm. As negative 
emotional and physiological arousal has previously been associated with an aversion to the 
former (Carmona-Perera et al., 2013; Cushman et al., 2012; Greene et al., 2001; McDonald et 
al., 2017), it is possible that the dilemmas involving direct interpersonal harm were 
responsible for the significantly higher physiological arousal for the incongruent trials. If 
arousal was not significantly higher on incongruent trials involving more indirect harm 
(compared to the matched congruent trials), this would explain the lack of correlation 
between our arousal measures and judgment response tendencies. 
Moderating effect of IAc on relationship between arousal and moral judgments 
Although the relative difference in physiological arousal on incongruent trials did not 
predict outcome-maximisation or harm-aversion tendencies, we found these relationships 
were moderated by people’s ability to perceive cardiac sensations (IAc). Greater 
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cardiovascular threat-reactivity on incongruent trials was associated with reduced harm-
aversion tendencies, but only for people with relatively higher interoceptive accuracy, ~45% 
of the sample. This suggests that a greater probability of accepting harmful actions overall, 
was associated with a greater threat response on incongruent trials, and likely represents an 
anticipatory aversive response to the prospect of accepting harm. In other words, greater 
threat reactivity did not deter these people from accepting harm but instead appears to be 
associated with the prospect of accepting harm. We found a similar moderation effect with 
heart rate (HR), whereby increased HR on incongruent trials was associated with an increase 
in harm-aversive response tendencies, but only for ~50% of people with higher IAc ability. 
This is consistent with the moderation effect for cardiovascular threat-reactivity, as increases 
in heart rate are associated with increases in cardiac output, which was used to calculate the 
cardiovascular threat-reactivity index. 
These findings suggest that cardiovascular threat reactivity may be associated with 
harm-aversion response tendencies towards both ‘personal’ harmful acts (Cushman et al., 
2012) and more impersonal harmful acts, at least for higher IAc perceivers.  Conversely, 
higher IAc perceivers demonstrating relatively higher cardiac output to systemic vascular 
resistance (associated with cardiovascular ‘challenge’ states) on incongruent trials was 
associated with an increase in harm-aversion response tendencies. It is possible that better 
heartbeat detectors appraised the incongruent dilemmas as more of a ‘challenge’ than the 
congruent dilemmas, as these dilemmas involved a moral conflict that was absent from the 
congruent dilemmas. However, on average people demonstrated significantly greater 
cardiovascular threat-reactivity in the pre-decision timeframe on incongruent trials, compared 
to congruent trials, suggesting these trials were generally experienced as more 
physiologically aversive. 
The finding that a greater difference in cardiovascular reactivity on incongruent trials, 
was only associated with overt harm-aversion tendencies for people with relatively better 
heartbeat detection ability, is consistent with evidence showing heartbeat detection ability 
predicts heightened reactivity to emotional stimuli (Eichler & Katkin, Edward, 1994; Pollatos 
et al., 2007b). Ainley et al (2016) suggest that because individuals who are better at detecting 
heartbeats update interoceptive priors more often (due to more precise prediction errors 
associated with heartbeat detection ability), they will demonstrate greater autonomic 
reactivity to an affective stimulus if the stimulus influences their heartbeat in a way that is not 
completely predicted, and subsequently results in interoceptive prediction errors. Greater 
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changes in cardiovascular arousal on incongruent trials is likely to evoke larger prediction 
errors, which may explain why better heartbeat detectors were more autonomically reactive 
to the moral dilemma stimuli, which in turn meant their overt moral judgments were 
associated with cardiovascular arousal (Ainley et al., 2016). However, higher IAc individuals 
appear to have been less influenced by increases in aversive psychophysiological arousal 
(threat reactivity and lower heart rate) on incongruent trials, which has shown to lead people 
to reject harmful action in traditional moral dilemmas of personal harm, such as the 
Footbridge dilemma (Carmona-Perera et al., 2013; Cushman et al., 2012; Greene et al., 2001; 
Moretto et al., 2010). If IAc was associated with enhanced accuracy of interoceptive 
representations associated with perceptual forms of inference (Farb et al., 2015; Seth & 
Friston, 2016), this may have tempered regulatory behaviours aimed at alleviating a negative 
arousal state (i.e. rejecting harm). Therefore, better heartbeat detectors may demonstrate 
superior interoceptive regulatory processes, that allow them to accept harmful actions even if 
it feels physiologically aversive to do so. Consistent with this, better heartbeat detectors have 
shown to be more effective at regulating negative emotional states (Füstös et al., 2013) and 
IAc predicts both antecedent and response-focused emotional regulation strategies (Kever et 
al., 2015). Action aversion (aversion to harmful actions) and outcome aversion (aversion to 
negative consequences of harm) have both been associated with harm-aversion tendencies 
using this moral dilemma task (Miller et al., 2014; Reynolds & Conway, 2018). However, 
cardiovascular threat reactivity (systemic vascular resistance) has previously been associated 
with an aversive response to performing harmful actions and not with witnessing the 
consequences of harm (Cushman et al., 2012), therefore IAc may be uniquely important in 
regulating the influence of threat-reactivity associated with action-aversion, on harm-aversion 
response tendencies.  
IAc did not influence the relationship between cardiac threat-reactivity and outcome-
maximisation tendencies and is consistent with prior work showing vagally-mediated 
measures of cardiac reactivity (i.e. resting heart rate variability) are associated with outcome-
maximisation tendencies but not harm-aversion tendencies (Park et al., 2016). We did find 
that lower HR on incongruent trials, predicted greater outcome-maximisation tendencies for 
~20% of the sample scoring particularly high on IAc. A greater negative emotional response, 
potentially characterised by heart rate deceleration (Lang et al., 1993), is believed to occur 
during the evaluation of moral violations (Rozin et al, 1999), particularly in dilemmas 
involving personal harm (Carmona-Perera et al., 2013). Painful injury-related disgust has also 
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been associated with heart rate deceleration (Shenhav & Mendes, 2014). Changes in cardiac 
sensations across congruent and incongruent trials may have been more accessible for higher 
IAc perceivers, strengthening the relationship between cardiovascular arousal and outcome-
maximisation tendencies. There is evidence to suggest that deficits in the perception of 
somatic markers (Carmona-Perera et al., 2013), results in an absence of cardiac reactivity 
(HR) when contemplating dilemmas of personal harm, resulting in more utilitarian judgments 
in traditional moral dilemmas. However, whether an increase in utilitarian judgments was 
related to a reduced aversion to harm or increased motivation to maximise outcomes was 
unclear (Carmona-Perera et al., 2013). Our findings suggest that people with a superior 
ability to perceive cardiac sensations, may more effectively modulate their heart rate when 
contemplating moral dilemmas that involve personal and impersonal harm, which predicts an 
increase in outcome-maximisation tendencies and a reduction in harm-aversion tendencies. 
We did not find IAc moderated the relationship between electrodermal responses and 
harm-aversion or outcome-maximisation tendencies. However, electrodermal responses did 
predict lower moral acceptability ratings on incongruent trials for people scoring relatively 
lower on IAc, 47.22% of the sample. Therefore, greater autonomic arousal on incongruent 
trials was associated with stronger disapproval of harmful acts that maximised outcomes, but 
only for people who were relatively poorer at perceiving internal sensations. This is 
counterintuitive to the work of Dunn et al (2010) who found that IAc strengthened the 
relationship between somatic markers and intuitive decision-making. This is potentially 
because the moral dilemma task does not provide the opportunity for people to learn about 
the reliability of somatic markers for predicting positive or negative outcomes, which is 
fundamentally different to the intuitive reasoning task used by Dunn et al (2010). In the 
context of moral dilemmas, one possibility is that people with less accurate interoceptive 
representations (lower IAc) may engage in forms of active inference when faced with 
surprising changes in autonomic arousal (Farb et al., 2015). Specifically, stronger disapproval 
of violations of harm may have acted as a means of sensory regulation, to alleviate an 
aversive emotional response associated with harmful action (Farb et al., 2015). Overall these 
moderation effects suggest that a greater ability to perceive internal sensations can sometimes 
strengthen and sometimes weaken the relationship between physiological arousal and moral 
judgments. IAc may be particularly relevant for selectively regulating the influence of 
somatic signals (Füstös et al., 2013; Kever et al., 2015) on moral judgments, depending on 
the nature or utility of the signal at the time. Further work is needed to establish the 
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robustness of these effects, and the potential adaptive influence of IAc in the relationship 
between arousal and moral cognition.    
Arousal, interoception and response time 
An exploratory analysis examined whether the link between physiological arousal and 
response time was moderated by interoception. We found that a stronger, more sustained 
electrodermal response on incongruent trials predicted longer reaction times for both moral 
appropriateness and moral acceptability judgments. Greene et al’s (2001) original fMRI study 
found longer reaction times preceded harm acceptance judgments in personal moral 
dilemmas that they attributed to the ‘emotional incongruence’ of their response, i.e. 
condoning immoral action was counterintuitive to their emotional response. In the current 
study, greater sympathetic autonomic arousal generated on incongruent trials, may have 
predicted longer reaction times if people were more conflicted about choosing a ‘utilitarian’ 
response that was incongruent with their strong emotional reaction to the prospect of harm. 
The link between electrodermal response and moral appropriateness judgments was not 
moderated by interoception. However, we found stronger electrodermal responses were 
associated with even longer reaction times for moral acceptability judgments for people lower 
in gastric interoception and lower in IAc-meta (an awareness of one’s interoceptive accuracy 
ability). Importantly, these moderation effects were not significant for people very low in 
gastric sensitivity and very high in IAc-meta.  
Our measure of gastric interoception captured how early people noticed 
gastrointestinal processes associated with stomach-filling. People with lower scores were 
aware of sensations of gastric distension much sooner in the drinking process, before 
reaching maximum fullness. Gastrointestinal processes such as hunger and disgust sensitivity 
(Schnall et al., 2008; Vicario et al., 2018) have shown to influence allocentric judgments of 
ethical violations in previous studies, potentially due to the link with disgust-related emotions 
(Tracy et al., 2019). Gastric myoelectrical activity strongly correlates with measures of 
arousal following exposure to emotional stimuli and appears to be associated with changes in 
the sympathetic nervous system (Vianna & Tranel, 2006). Electrodermal responses have also 
been associated with disgust (Rohrmann & Hopp, 2008). These associations may explain the 
interaction between gastric interoception and electrodermal responses. If a sensitivity to 
stomach sensations heightened people’s awareness to disgust sensations, which was 
reciprocated by an increase in electrodermal-activity, this could reduce reaction time i.e. if 
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disgust-related somatic signals were more accessible as a form of intuitive guidance, this 
might precipitate a swifter, more confident response. As we did not measure myoelectrical 
gastric processes, it is unclear how gastric interoception may have been influenced by 
concurrent gastrointestinal signals.  
The IAc-meta moderation effect is also consistent with some recent work by Vega 
and colleagues who found meta-cognition (expressed as a confidence rating) influenced how 
‘right’ people felt their moral decisions to be, which influenced choices to rethink their 
answer and overall response time (Vega et al., 2020). A reduced awareness of one’s ability to 
accurately perceive visceral sensations could indicate lower confidence in the reliability of 
somatic markers associated with task-related arousal; resulting in longer deliberation times to 
determine a judgment that ‘felt’ right. IAc meta may therefore contribute to people’s sense of 
somatic intuition about the ‘rightness’ (Thompson, 2009; Vega et al., 2020) of their moral 
choices. Together, these novel findings suggest gastric interoception and IAc-meta may 
influence how quickly somatic signals associated with autonomic arousal translate into 
action, when making allocentric judgments about harmful acts that maximise outcomes.  
Limitations 
We acknowledge several limitations of this study. As we were interested in exploring 
the broader influence of interoceptive and physiological processes on people’s harm-based 
response tendencies (Conway & Gawronski, 2013), we used a moral judgment measure that 
incorporates several situations of impersonal harm. As prior research has shown a stronger 
link between the physiological parameters and dilemmas involving personal harm, this may 
be why we did not find linear associations between the strength of physiological arousal and 
moral judgments. In addition, we did not measure myoelectrical gastric processes during the 
moral judgment task which prevents us from exploring interactions between gastric somatic 
signals and gastric interoception during the moral judgment task. In addition, future iterations 
would benefit from trait measures of action-aversion and outcome-aversion (Miller et al., 
2014), to better understand how these motivational factors may interact with IAc, 
physiological arousal and moral judgments. Furthermore, the validity of the heartbeat 
detection task (Schandry, 1981) has been challenged by evidence that beliefs about heart rate 
can influence performance on this task (Kleckner et al., 2015; Ring et al., 2015; Ring & 
Brener, 2018). In addition, future replications of this study could include an attention check 
to rule out the possibility that engagement with the task influenced moral judgments in any 
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way. Lastly, although we had a reasonable sample size for psychophysiological studies, 
further work is needed to demonstrate the robustness of these novel findings in different 
populations. Exploring the relationship between physiological arousal and interoception in 
more immersive, emotive virtual-reality moral dilemmas could shed light on the role of 
bodily perception in moral behaviour in more ecologically valid settings.    
Conclusion 
This study explored the role of interoceptive processes in the link between 
physiological arousal and moral judgments of harm. Fundamentally we have shown how 
individual differences in the perception of visceral sensations, can shape how physiological 
signals influence moral decision-making. Cardiac and gastric interoception did not 
fundamentally influence moral judgments, however, greater accuracy in perceiving cardiac 
sensations (IAc) moderated the link between cardiovascular arousal and egocentric moral 
judgments of harm, and between electrodermal-activity and allocentric moral judgments of 
harm. Interestingly, the moderation effects of IAc were different for each physiological 
parameter, suggesting IAc may be important in selectively enhancing or diminishing the 
effect of physiological arousal on decision-making, depending on the nature of the somatic 
signal. We suggest IAc may indicate a reduced reactivity towards aversive physiological 
arousal that allows people to accept harmful actions, in spite of an aversive state. IAc may 
also facilitate more adaptive modulation of heart rate when presented with aversive moral 
dilemma stimuli, which leads to an increase in outcome-maximisation response tendencies. 
The moderating role of gastric interoception and interoceptive meta cognitive awareness in 
the relationship between electrodermal activity and response time is intriguing and warrants 
further investigation. Importantly, we did not find that interoception was influential for moral 
judgments alone, and the moderation effects found were conditional upon a certain level of 
interoceptive accuracy. Therefore, individual differences across other measures of 
interoception, such as sensibility and awareness, may be less relevant to moral decision-
making processes.  This study provides many avenues for future research to explore the role 
of interoception in moral cognition, potentially investigating its broader role in anticipatory 
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 Overall, an ability to detect heartbeat sensations had several interesting moderation 
effects on the relationship between cardiovascular arousal and harm aversion and outcome 
maximisation tendencies. It is possible that we did not find the direct relationships between 
the strength of physiological arousal and moral judgments as in prior psychophysiological 
studies (e.g. Moretto et al., 2010) because we used a fundamentally different moral dilemma 
paradigm that measures the relative motivation to avoid harm or maximise outcomes, as 
opposed to inferring motivation from moral judgments that are simultaneously influenced by 
both of these drives (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). These stimuli have revealed nuances in 
the socio-emotional motivations behind people’s judgments that traditional sacrificial 
dilemmas could not (Reynolds & Conway, 2018). Thus, the findings clarify some of the 
relationships between physiological arousal and discrete motivational tendencies of harm 
aversion and outcome maximisation when making egocentric moral judgments, and for 
allocentric acceptability judgments of ‘non-utilitarian’ and ‘utilitarian’ harmful acts.  
The moderating effect of interoceptive accuracy in the relationship between 
cardiovascular arousal and moral judgments applied mostly to egocentric moral judgments 
(harm-aversion and outcome-maximisation), suggesting that an ability to perceive one’s 
heartbeats may only prove influential in decisions where we consider ourselves as being the 
agents of harm, which is consistent with related neuropsychological evidence. A 
neuroimaging study found the amygdala was activated only when participants considered 
their own transgressions of social norms, compared to someone else’s transgressions, 
indicating activation of this area is modulated by intentionality and agency (Berthoz et al., 
2006). The authors suggest the amygdala is implicated in emotional processes concerning 
personal welfare, as the transgressions are weighed up according to the self-relevant 
consequences. Afferent cardiac signals can directly influence activation of the amygdala, 
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which is key in the processing of threatening stimuli, and is sensitive to changes in autonomic 
arousal (Garfinkel & Critchley, 2016). For example, patients with amygdala damage also 
show deficits in their ability to perceive arousal based negative emotions (Adolphs et al., 
1999). The Somatic Marker Hypothesis (Damasio, 1996) suggests that bodily states encoding 
reward versus punishment values of potential outcomes can bias decision-making under 
uncertainty. These bodily states are activated by areas including the amygdala to 
communicate a holistic representation of information about the bodies internal state, current 
goals, and the external context. The insula is believed to play a role in calculating risk 
associated with specific actions (Damasio, 1996; Naqvi, Nasir & Bechara, 2010); is centrally 
implicated in interoceptive processing (Craig, 2015; Seth & Friston, 2016); and is activated 
when people pay attention to internal bodily states (Critchley et al., 2004; Terasawa et al., 
2013). In the current study, greater cardiovascular threat reactivity was associated with 
reduced harm aversion tendencies for people who could more accurately perceive their heart 
rate. For these people, weighing up the prospect of accepting harmful action on incongruent 
trials was associated with an enhanced sympathetic cardiovascular response, potentially 
generated by consideration of the negative consequences of causing harm for their personal 
welfare i.e. social condemnation and reputational damage associated with carrying out 
harmful acts. However, better heartbeat detectors may have a superior ability to integrate 
bodily feedback regarding self-relevant consequences of harming one person with 
information about the wider context of the dilemma, associated with risk assessment 
processes in the insula. This may have manifested in relatively reduced harm-aversive 
response tendencies, if they were less likely to reject harm on the basis of an aversive bodily 
state.  
We speculated that the inverse relationship between cardiovascular threat reactivity 
and harm-aversion may be facilitated by a greater tendency among higher IAc people to 
exhibit perceptual inference in the presence of interoceptive prediction error (i.e. update the 
relative precision of the prior) when faced with surprising changes in interoceptive signals 
(Farb et al., 2015; Ainley et al., 2016). Heartbeat detection ability has been associated with a 
superior ability to enhance the precision of incoming interoceptive prediction errors 
compared to prior states in memory, as better heartbeat perceivers are able to use attention to 
prioritise interoceptive information over other sensory information, which results in a 
reduction in prediction error and energy usage over time (Ainley et al., 2016). Both active 
(updating interoceptive state to assimilate with prior expectation) and perceptual forms of 
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inference can be adaptive forms of interoceptive inference. However, Farb et al (2015) 
suggest there may be benefits to perceptual forms of inference for reducing the likelihood of 
overt behavioural responses to achieve sensory regulation, which facilitates greater ‘non-
reactivity’ to surprising interoceptive information. We suggested this overt behavioural 
response in the context of moral dilemmas would be to reject harmful actions, in the presence 
of an aversive physiological response originating from behavioural conditioning linking 
harmful actions with aversive outcomes (Miller et al., 2014). Importantly, Farb et al (2015) 
suggest that beyond interoceptive sensitivity, goals of regulation versus accuracy will 
determine whether active or perceptual inference is overriding, but forms of perceptual 
inference may support greater reflection of the evolving time-course of arousal rather than 
facilitating a rapid regulatory response. Further work using EEG or fMRI methods is needed 
to understand the potential neural mechanisms underlying the inverse relationship between 
greater cardiovascular threat reactivity and a reduction in harm-aversion for better heartbeat 
detectors.  
Another key finding was that lower heart rate on incongruent trials compared to 
congruent trials, was associated with outcome-maximisation tendencies, but only for people 
with superior heartbeat detection ability. This has implications for dual-process models 
(Greene et al., 2001, 2004), as it suggests that there is an emotional component to outcome-
based moral judgments that is influenced by individual differences in an ability to perceive 
cardiac sensations. Evidence for an emotional component in outcome-based moral judgments 
is consistent with Reynold and Conway’s (2018) finding that an affective concern for others 
was associated with the outcome-maximisation parameter using the same moral dilemma 
task. Heart rate deceleration is associated with negative emotional responses to aversive 
stimuli (Lang et al., 1993) including ‘personal’ moral dilemmas (Carmona-Perera et al., 
2013). However, heart rate deceleration has also been associated with the facilitation of 
sensory processing (Lacey & Lacey, 1978) as a means to reduce afferent feedback associated 
with heartbeats that can distract from perceptual and cognitive processes (Garfinkel & 
Critchley, 2016). Therefore, lower heart rate on incongruent trials may have represented a 
functionally adaptive response to support visual and cognitive processing of the moral 
dilemma stimuli. Subsequently, lower heart rate may have been positively associated with 
outcome-maximisation response tendencies, if greater sensory processing of the moral 
dilemmas encouraged people to fully consider the context of the dilemma, potentially 
‘overriding’ a negative emotional response to the prospect of accepting harm and choosing a 
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response that benefitted the most people. Conversely, greater heart rate also predicted an 
increase in harm-aversion tendencies for better heartbeat detectors. A link between heart rate 
acceleration and harm-aversive responses suggests that moral judgments on incongruent trials 
were potentially preceded by shallower sensory processing of the moral dilemma stimuli, 
possibly resulting in more harm-rejection responses. Further work is needed to clarify the 
roles of emotional experience and sensory processing in the link between anticipatory heart 
rate deceleration and acceleration and moral judgments of harm. 
The discrete influences of the physiological parameters on moral judgments suggests 
a ‘selectivity’ ability among better heartbeat perceivers, in weighing up different types of 
bodily feedback when forming moral judgments and could be an important consideration for 
future psychophysiological studies using this paradigm. Heart rate remains an ambiguous 
parameter of emotional arousal which warrants further investigation in this context. Overall, 
capturing a range of physiological measures has shown to be useful for understanding how a 
constellation of psychophysiological events may offer unique contributions to moral 
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 The primary aim of study 3 was to explore the role of interoception in moral dilemma 
situations where the participant is physically immersed in a sensory environment and their 
body is physically involved in carrying out harmful acts that could generate stronger 
aversions to action-based harm (Cushman et al., 2012; Francis et al., 2017). Ultimately, we 
wanted to understand whether interoception interacted with physiological arousal to influence 
moral behaviour in a different way to moral decision-making found in study 2. This was 
largely driven by recent VR work (e.g. McDonald et al., 2017; Patil et al., 2014), showing 
that people experience strong emotional and/or physiological response in virtual reality moral 
dilemmas which can predict the likelihood that they will carry out harm. VR research in this 
field has also revealed discrepancies between what people say they would do when 
responding to a text-based moral dilemma, and what they actually do when faced with similar 
scenarios in VR (Francis et al., 2017; Patil et al., 2014).  
  The context of semi-autonomous vehicles presents a modern-day moral dilemma in 
terms of the prospective, automated morality algorithms currently being developed for these 
vehicles. But, more urgently, there is a need to better understand how humans may behave in 
morally sensitive driving situations where they are required to ‘rubberstamp’ or take control 
of automated functions that could have implications for the wellbeing of others. In the near 
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future, drivers are likely to be required to provide oversight to vehicle AI in a way that will 
fundamentally change the driving experience, and our sense of responsibility and agency in 
the driving seat (Limerick et al., 2014). Driving dilemmas also provide a useful, and more 
ecologically valid context than traditional Trolley and Footbridge dilemmas to expose 
participants to multiple ‘plausible’ and novel moral dilemma scenarios. We used matched 
congruent and incongruent moral dilemmas, to explore a scaled VR version of Conway and 
Gawronski’s (2013) procedure for exploring harm-aversion and outcome-maximisation 
tendencies. In the incongruent dilemmas, participants had to decide whether to harm one 
person (a pedestrian) in the path of the vehicle, in order to save more people in the vehicle 
who would be fatally harmed in an unavoidable collision (incongruent). In the congruent 
dilemma, the context was the same but harming the pedestrian only resulted in avoiding 
damage to the vehicle, therefore, a motivation to maximise outcomes would not be driving 
choices to harm the pedestrian. Again, this allowed us to explore differences in physiological 
arousal in moral dilemma conditions where there is a conflict between motivations to 
maximise outcomes (utilitarian) and avoid harm (deontological), and conditions where there 
is no motivation to maximise outcomes. 
We were also interested in whether action-based harm-aversion could predict different 
physiological and behavioural responses for typical (an accelerator foot-pedal) versus non-
typical (a button-press) harmful actions. These actions do not involve direct contact with 
another person but instead require carrying out an action in a vehicle the participant is sitting 
in to cause harm, whereas previous studies exploring action-based harm aversion have used 
simulated actions such as hitting, cutting and hammering another person (Cushman et al., 
2012; Parton & McGinley, 2019). We wanted to explore whether the directness of harm 
(Greene et al., 2001) could extend to actions that use the agents’ body but are not physically 
touching the victim, with the foot-pedal condition potentially resembling a more aversive 
action, due to learned associations with pressing an accelerator pedal when driving. The 
dilemmas were presented in the same order, as order effects have been found for judgments 
in text-based moral dilemmas if a more arousing dilemma is presented after a less arousing 
dilemma (Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2012).   
We expected that individual differences in interoception would facilitate a different 
relationship between moral behaviour and arousal, compared to study 2, due to fundamental 
differences in their role in the task. The egocentric perspective when carrying out harmful 
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actions (Francis et al., 2017) and the contextual saliency of the potential consequences of 
harm are enhanced in VR dilemmas (Patil et al., 2014). As the self-relevant consequences of 
harmful action are clearer, this could lead to greater activation of brain areas implicated in 
emotional processes regarding personal welfare (Berthoz et al., 2006). Here the participants 
were ‘drivers’ in a semi-autonomous vehicle where the choice to harm a pedestrian outside of 
the vehicle had consequences for themselves and other people in the vehicle. Therefore, their 
‘role’ in carrying out harmful action was much more socially visible, but they also had a 
more immediate ‘stake’ in the outcome of their decision, as they could see the impending 
collision with another vehicle that required a rapid response. All these things considered, we 
expected interoceptive processes would be influential in situations where the [hypothetical] 
physical integrity of participants bodies were on the line. In addition, due to the fundamental 
associations proposed to exist among experiences of conscious presence, interoception and 
agency (Seth et al., 2012) we wanted to investigate the relationship between interoception, 
arousal, presence and virtual-reality sickness in VR moral dilemmas, as a novel investigation 
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In the near future, humans will be required to oversee morally sensitive decisions in 
semi-autonomous vehicles that have implications for public safety. Greater psychological 
distance from immoral acts can minimise the emotional responses towards them (Eyal & 
Liberman, 2012). In particular, more directly harmful acts are seen as less acceptable and 
more emotionally aversive than more indirect acts that achieve a utilitarian outcome 
(Cushman et al., 2006; Greene et al., 2001). Thus, we suggest how drivers interact with non-
typical automation in semi-autonomous vehicles to execute decisions in emergency situations 
could reduce aversive responses to carrying out potentially harmful acts. This initial study 
(n=25) explored whether carrying out harm with a more typical driving action (pressing a 
foot-pedal), compared to a less typical action (pushing a button) influenced physiological 
arousal, willingness to carry out harm and response time to carry out harm in VR moral 
dilemma driving scenarios. Interoception (i.e. perception of visceral sensations) was also 
measured, due to fundamental associations with emotional experience and physiological 
reactivity (Craig, 2015; Füstös et al., 2013; Pollatos et al., 2007b). Greater electrodermal 
activity was associated with longer response times to carry out harmful action. The 
relationship between cardiovascular reactivity (pre-ejection period) and response time 
differed between the foot-pedal and button-press conditions and appeared to be associated 
with interoceptive accuracy. An ability to perceive one’s heartbeats (interoception) may 
influence the regulation of aversive physiological states in moral dilemma scenarios where 
harmful action must be performed to achieve a utilitarian outcome. These preliminary 
findings highlight the need to consider interoceptive processes in higher-powered moral 
dilemma studies.   
 Keywords: virtual reality, VR, moral dilemmas, interoception, arousal, physiology, 









The role of the body in moral decision-making 
The body plays an important role in how we feel an aversion to condoning harmful 
acts (e.g. Greene et al., 2001) and in how the sensorimotor qualities of harmful acts become 
laden with aversive qualities themselves, independent of their outcome (Cushman et al., 
2012; Miller et al., 2014; Parton & McGinley, 2019). Greene and colleagues’ (2001) 
influential dual process model emphasised how strong emotional reactions to the prospect of 
physically harming others can lead people to reject harm in hypothetical moral dilemmas, 
even when harm serves a ‘greater good’. An aversion to action-based harm has been 
associated with individual differences in indexes of sympathetic cardiovascular arousal 
(Cushman et al., 2012; Parton & McGinley, 2019). Importantly, individual differences in the 
perception of visceral sensations, like heartbeats, is likely to be important in the link between 
physiological arousal and moral decision-making (e.g. Brown, Proulx, & Fraser, 2020; Dunn 
et al., 2010; Gu et al., 2013; Schnall et al., 2008). Interoception refers to the perception of the 
current physiological state and processes of our body and is fundamentally connected with 
our autonomic nervous system (Craig, 2015). Individual differences in interoception may 
characterise the relationship between body and mind (Feldman Barrett et al., 2004; Farb et 
al., 2015; Pollatos et al., 2007a, 2015) and shed light on the relationship between 
physiological arousal and harm-based moral decision-making.  
The Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH; Bechara et al., 2005; Damasio, 1996) was the 
first neuropsychological theory to illuminate how the processing of physiological signals in 
the ventromedial pre-frontal cortex (VMPfC) could bias moral decision-making (Damasio et 
al., 1990; Koenigs et al., 2007; Young et al., 2010). Damage to the VMPfC has been 
associated with greater harm-acceptance in moral dilemma paradigms (Moretto et al., 2010) 
and deficits in social emotions (Anderson et al., 2013). The centrality of emotional, 
physiological, and bodily factors in harm-based moral decision-making highlights the 
limitations of ‘cold’ lab-based moral judgment research for understanding more realistic 
moral decision-making. Researchers are increasingly capitalizing on virtual reality (VR) 
technology to investigate moral behaviour in more immersive moral dilemma scenarios 
(Francis et al., 2016; Pan & Slater, 2011; Patil & Silani, 2014) including moral dilemma 
driving scenarios (Uijong et al., 2019), that would be ethically impossible in the real-world. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, people are more likely to carry out harmful actions in VR sacrificial 
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dilemmas (where one person must be sacrificed to save several others), despite condemning 
the same action in text-based dilemmas (Francis et al., 2016; Patil et al., 2014). Lab-based 
moral judgment research often gives way to lengthy reasoning processes not present in real-
life situations (Haidt, 2001). Our emotional reactions tend to be greater for events closer in 
time and space and when events happen to us rather than others (Eyal & Liberman, 2012; 
Trope & Liberman, 2010).  
In sacrificial VR dilemmas, the enhanced contextual saliency of the negative 
outcomes of not causing harm can surpass the negative value associated with carrying out a 
harmful act (Cushman, 2013; Patil et al., 2014). Furthermore, the embodied and egocentric 
perspective of participants (Francis et al., 2017; Sood & Forehand, 2005; Tassy et al., 2013), 
physical agency to carry out ‘harmful’ actions (Francis et al., 2017), and self-preservation 
motivations in situations of ‘self-sacrifice’ (Faulhaber et al., 2018; Uijong et al., 2019), may 
be key factors influencing emotional experience and moral behaviour. In particular, VR 
offers a useful methodology for investigating moral behaviour in semi-autonomous (SA) 
vehicles. This new technology is fundamentally changing the driving experience, and in the 
near future these vehicles are likely to require human supervision in dynamic, morally 
sensitive situations such as an unavoidable collision. How drivers interact with SA vehicles in 
instances representing real-life moral dilemmas, could have serious implications for their 
behaviour and the wellbeing of pedestrians and other drivers.   
What stops us from carrying out harmful acts? 
Historically, moral dilemma research has focused heavily on sacrificial dilemmas like 
the Trolley and Footbridge problems. The Trolley dilemma (Thomson, 1985) asks whether it 
is morally acceptable to switch a driverless trolley travelling towards five people (who would 
be killed) to an alternate track with one person on it. Whereas the Footbridge dilemma (Foot, 
2003) asks whether it is acceptable to push a large man off a footbridge to stop the trolley 
from killing the five people but sacrificing the man in the process. Utilitarianism would see 
harm as being morally acceptable (Mill, 1998), as it maximises good for the most people, 
whereas deontological ethics would disagree, as this would undermine the rights of the 
individual harmed (Kant, 2018). The net-outcome of causing harm in the Trolley and 
Footbridge problems is the same, yet people are more accepting of pulling the switch than 
pushing the man (Greene, 2009; Greene et al., 2001; McDonald et al., 2017). Greene et al 
(2001) found that the Footbridge dilemma evokes a negative emotional response not elicited 
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by the Trolley dilemma, and utilitarian judgments showed patterns of brain activation in 
regions associated with cognitive control (Greene et al., 2004). Greene’s dual-process model 
(2001) proposed that deontological judgments, were the result of a strong emotional response 
to the prospect of harming someone, or a reduced ability to engage in cognitive deliberation, 
and has gained considerable empirical support (e.g. Baron et al., 2015; Byrd & Conway, 
2019; Cushman et al., 2012; Patil et al., 2020; Starcke et al., 2012).  
People typically rate harmful actions that involve physical contact as less morally 
acceptable than harmful actions without physical contact (Cushman et al., 2006). However, 
the effect of ‘personal force’ i.e. using the body to inflict harm, has shown to only influence 
moral judgments in the absence of an ‘intention’ of carrying out harm (Greene et al., 2009). 
Outcome-aversion and action-aversion are proposed to be two distinct motivations deterring 
us from carrying out harmful actions. These aversions are proposed to represent other-
focused (outcome) versus self-focused (action) emotional drivers that influence our choices 
to accept or reject harm (Miller et al., 2014; Reynolds & Conway, 2018). Outcome-aversion 
is associated with a negative reaction to witnessing real-harm even if we are not the cause. In 
contrast, action-aversion represents our negative emotional response to carrying out 
prototypically harmful actions independent from our emotional response to the consequences 
of harm. Following consistent pairings of harmful actions (e.g. punching someone) with 
victim distress (e.g. facial expressions indicating pain, fear) the motoric and perceptual 
features of harmful actions become laden with aversive qualities (Miller et al., 2014) that can 
generate a negative emotional response (Blair, 1995; Cushman et al., 2012) which can predict 
moral judgments of personal harm (Cushman et al., 2012). Moreover, individual differences 
in self-reported action-aversion and outcome-aversion have shown to predict the rejection of 
harm in text-based moral dilemmas (Miller et al., 2014; Reynolds & Conway, 2018). 
Harm rejection judgments are typically associated with aversive anticipatory 
physiological responses to harmful action, including skin-conductance (McDonald et al., 
2017; Moretto et al., 2010) and heart rate deceleration (Carmona-Perera et al., 2013). In 
particular, measures of cardiovascular sympathetic reactivity including systemic vascular 
resistance (Cushman et al., 2012) and pre-ejection period (Parton & McGinley, 2019) are 
associated with an action-based aversion to harm. Systemic vascular resistance (SVR) is 
measure of resistance in the circulatory systems that corresponds with the release of 
epinephrine and the tightening of blood vessels and is associated with activation of the 
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sympathetic nervous system and psychological threat states (Blascovich & Mendes, 2000). 
Whereas challenge states are associated with adaptive increases in cardiac output and heart 
rate (Blascovich & Mendes, 2000; Scheepers et al., 2012). Pre-ejection period is a 
sympathetically innervated measure of cardiac contractility (Newlin & Levenson, 1979) and 
is proposed to be a more appropriate measure of sympathetic arousal than SVR, in situations 
that require active [as opposed to passive] coping- characterised as the ability to influence the 
outcome of an event through mental or physical effort (Parton & McGinley, 2019; Sherwood 
et al., 1990). Decreases in PEP when carrying out prototypically harmful actions are 
associated with increased sympathetic activation, attributed to the effort required to make the 
action and the aversive nature of the harmful act (Parton & McGinley, 2019).  
Interoception and psychophysiological arousal 
In a given context, our emotional responses and behavioural motivations towards 
environmental stimuli will be generated by interoceptive processes, influenced by the body’s 
current state (Feldman Barrett & Simmons, 2015). Afferent heartbeat signals can support the 
processing of threatening stimuli (Garfinkel & Critchley, 2016) and even the belief of 
heightened cardiovascular arousal can influence moral decision-making (Gu et al., 2013). 
However, the role of interoceptive capacities in the relationship between physiological 
arousal and moral behaviour has not previously been explored. Interoception is multi-
dimensional and can be assessed across visceral systems in the body. Interoceptive 
dimensions have shown to be distinct (Garfinkel et al., 2015) and may be associated with 
moral judgments in different ways (Brown, Proulx, & Fraser, 2020; Brown, Proulx, & Fraser, 
2020b). 
Interoceptive accuracy (IAc), refers to an ability to accurately perceive or detect 
internal sensations such as heartbeats (Schandry, 1981), whereas interoceptive sensibility (IS) 
refers to a self-reported tendency to focus on or pay attention to bodily sensations, such as 
heartbeats, or changes in body temperature (Garfinkel et al., 2015; Miller et al., 1981). 
Interoceptive meta-cognitive awareness (IAc-meta) captures someone’s awareness of their 
interoceptive accuracy which can be measured as how confident people are that their 
perceptions of internal sensations, such as heartbeats, accurately reflect real visceral events 
verified by physiological recording devices (e.g. Garfinkel et al., 2016). Differences in 
sensitivity to gastric processes like hunger have been linked to moral judgments in prior 
research, potentially due to a link with disgust emotions (e.g. Brown, Proulx, & Fraser, 
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2020b; Schnall et al., 2008; Vicario et al., 2018), but individual differences in gastric 
interoception has not previously been explored in studies of moral behaviour. 
Interoceptive accuracy in particular has been associated with more intense emotional 
experiences (Wiens, 2005) and psychophysiological reactivity to physical stress (Eichler & 
Katkin, 1994; Pollatos et al., 2007a) and emotional stimuli (Pollatos et al., 2007b). Pre-
ejection period (PEP) in particular has been associated with heartbeat detection and 
represents the strength of heart contractions, with shorter PEP indicating a stronger force of 
myocardial contraction (Eichler & Katkin, 1994). Katkin (1985) proposed that when the heart 
contracts with greater power, this may give a more pronounced visceral “thump” sensation 
which contributes to better heartbeat detection. In support, Eichler et al (1987) found PEP 
was greater for better heartbeat detectors when exposed to aversive stimuli. However, trait 
anxiety has also been associated with heightened physiological reactivity to stressors 
(Pollatos et al., 2007a; Takahashi et al., 2005) and ability to perceive heartbeats (Critchley et 
al., 2004; Pollatos et al., 2007a). People who typically focus on visceral sensations may be 
more likely to perceive changes in physiological arousal and misinterpret these changes as 
meaningful (Clark et al., 1997; Domschke et al., 2010), which could potentially lead to 
increases in anxiety (Paulus & Stein, 2010). This also relates to the dimension of 
interoceptive sensibility; as self-reported hypervigilance to somatic sensations has been 
implicated in a range of anxiety disorders (e.g. Anderson & Hope, 2009; De Berardis et al., 
2007). 
A recent study found IAc moderated the relationship between cardiovascular threat-
reactivity and harm-aversion tendencies in a moral dilemma task (Brown, Proulx, & Fraser, 
2020b). Therefore, although IAc may predict greater physiological reactivity towards 
stressors, higher IAc people may be less ‘behaviourally reactive’ towards aversive 
physiological sensations when making moral judgments (Brown, Proulx, & Fraser, 2020b). 
Predictive coding models of interoception suggest that when there is a mismatch between 
expected and actual (or desired) sensory information i.e. prediction error, comparisons are 
made between current sensations and simulated sensations in the past and future (Apps & 
Tsakiris, 2014; Farb et al., 2015; Friston et al., 2010; Seth & Friston, 2016). Larger 
magnitudes of prediction error are more likely to reach conscious awareness and drive a 
regulatory response. These comparisons can lead to active and perceptual forms of inference 
that motivate behaviour to resolve the conflict.  
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Perceptual inference prioritises accuracy and precision of sensory information i.e. the 
expected state is altered to be in-line with the current sensory state. Whereas, less accurate 
interoceptive representations may be associated with active forms of inference that prioritise 
sensory regulation, where the sensory state is changed to fit with the expected state (Apps & 
Tsakiris, 2014; Farb et al., 2015). Farb and colleagues (2015) propose perceptual inference is 
likely to be associated with more accurate interoceptive representations and may reduce the 
power of strong, surprising interoceptive signals to influence overt behaviour. Relatedly, 
Ainley et al (2016) suggest that people who are able to direct attention to their heartbeats on a 
heartbeat detection task, must also have the ability to prioritise interoceptive signals over 
other sensory modalities and therefore higher IAc people would generate more precise 
interoceptive predictions. Whereas, for people who are poorer at perceiving heartbeats, the 
sensory modality of interoception would be less routinely salient (Ainley et al., 2016).  
It is possible that a superior sensitivity towards interoceptive states may support more 
adaptive regulation of emotional responses as changes in physiological sensations can be 
perceived more accurately (e.g. Füstös et al., 2013). Interoceptive accuracy has been 
associated with more adaptive self-regulatory abilities in a range of domains, including self-
control and down-regulation of cravings (Kruschwitz et al., 2019), pain-tolerance (Weiss et 
al., 2014), regulation of exercise (Herbert et al., 2007) and aversive states associated with 
social exclusion (Pollatos et al., 2015). Moreover, IAc has been positively associated with 
antecedent and response-focused emotional regulation strategies and downregulation of 
negative affective states (Füstös et al., 2013; Kever et al., 2015). We speculate that 
interoceptive accuracy may support perceptual forms of inference and adaptive emotional 
regulation strategies which could moderate the relationship between aversive physiological 
reactions toward harm, and harmful ‘utilitarian’ actions in a VR moral dilemma task.  
Interoception is also closely tied to conscious experiences of presence in and outside 
VR, as predictions about our sensory experiences are mismatched with our current sensory 
experiences in virtual environments (Diemer et al., 2015; Seth et al., 2012). Presence refers to 
subjective experiences of ‘being there’ in a virtual environment (Slater & Wilbur, 1997). 
Interoceptive sensibility has recently been positively linked with experiences of presence in 
VR and negatively associated with motion-sickness, suggesting that attending to bodily 
sensations may improve feelings of spatial presence and reduce sensory-mismatch issues 
associated with cybersickness (Farb et al., 2015; Heeter et al., 2020). Diemer and colleagues 
 clxix 
(2015) propose that cognitive appraisals of presence are partially due to the level of 
emotional arousal experienced and attributed to VR environments. It is currently unclear how 
individual differences across other interoceptive dimensions, alongside changes in 
physiological arousal may contribute to experiences of presence in VR moral dilemma.  
Action aversion: a semi-autonomous vehicle scenario 
As the sensorimotor properties of harmful acts have been shown to be important for 
evoking an emotionally aversive response (Cushman et al., 2012; Miller et al., 2014), we 
hypothesised that typical actions required to carry out harm in a semi-autonomous (SA) 
vehicle may be more effective at triggering an aversive response than others. As drivers, we 
associate the typical action of pressing an accelerator pedal with our foot, with a vehicle 
moving forward at increasing speed. In addition, cultural references of dramatic car accidents 
or collisions in films, tv, and books, and even personal experiences, pave the way for learned 
associations between pushing an accelerator pedal downwards and hitting another object such 
as a wall, another car, or even a person. As a comparison, we have not built up the same 
associations between pushing an arbitrary button on the dashboard, with accelerating 
forwards or any other consistent outcome as this would represent (for the majority of cars) a 
novel driving action.  
In particular, buttons, such as doorbells or light switches, were originally designed to 
be every-day objects, effortless to operate. They simplified labour or domestic tasks by 
making the interaction between human and machine more “automatic”- hiding the complex 
processes of the technology (Plotnick, 2018). Whereas, an accelerator foot-pedal in a vehicle 
alters speed to varying degrees of pressure and is a more context-specific interaction. The 
design of cars, their functions and how we drive them is likely to change with the 
development of autonomous vehicles, potentially creating more distance between the driving 
acts we perform and the consequences of these actions. Psychological distance from immoral 
acts can influence moral judgments of these acts (Eyal & Liberman, 2012). In the Trolley 
dilemma, pulling a lever may feel like a relatively innocuous act, that creates both physical 
and psychological distance from the harmful consequences, whereas in the Footbridge 
dilemma, there is no escaping the direct association between pushing the man, and the harm 
caused to him (e.g. Francis et al., 2017). Novel or non-typical actions [that may cause harm] 
are likely to create more distance from the harmful nature of the act and could have 
implications for driving behaviour. We explored whether the nature of a harmful action in a 
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vehicle influences physiological responses to harmful actions and moral behaviour in a 
collision situation.  
Present study 
We investigated whether drivers of a semi-automated vehicle in VR, chose to 
‘override’ the car’s automatic braking function to harm a pedestrian in the path of the vehicle 
in order to avoid a collision that would kill all passengers in the vehicle (Figure 1). We tested 
whether physiological responses of participants predicted harm-avoidance behaviour or 
response time, and whether this differed depending on the harmful action-type. Harmful 
action type was either typical (foot-pedal) or non-typical (pushing a button). We hypothesised 
the typical ‘foot-pedal’ condition would be more physiologically aversive. A primary aim of 
this study was to explore individual differences in interoception in the relationship between 
physiological arousal and moral behaviour. The study protocol was pre-registered on the 
Open Science Framework (Brown, Fraser, & Proulx, 2020a; https://osf.io/vhbdy). Due to the 
onset of coronavirus, the planned study was relegated to a preliminary study and all 
hypotheses are presented as exploratory.   
Exploratory hypotheses 
H1. There will be an effect of dilemma-type (congruent versus incongruent), 
timeframe (pre-warning, pre-decision, post-decision) and action-type (button-press 
versus foot-pedal) on physiological arousal. 
 
H2. There will be an interaction between physiological arousal and action-type for 
predicting moral behaviour in the VE. 
 
H3. Interoceptive accuracy (IAc) will be associated with greater cardiovascular 
reactivity on incongruent trials. 
 
H4. Interoception will be associated with experiences of presence in the VE. 
 




H6.1. There will be an interaction between PEP reactivity and action-type for 
predicting response time for harmful action. 































Figure 1.  
 
Screenshots of the VR moral dilemma scenes. 1. Bus collision dilemma 2 (top left), 2. Pedestrian dilemma 1 (top right), 3. 
Text depicting outcome (below 1.), 4. Rest screen (below 2.), 5. Passengers (below 3), 6. Collision warning dilemma 3 









This was a 2 (dilemma type: congruent versus incongruent) x 2 (action type: button-
press versus foot-pedal) mixed design (n=25). Action type was the between-subjects factor. 
Interoception, and physiological arousal during the moral dilemma task were the primary 
independent variables. Physiological arousal, harmful action on congruent and incongruent 
trials and response time for harmful action were the primary dependent variables.  
Participants 
Ethics approval was received from University of Bath ethics committee. Participants 
were recruited from University of Bath Student Participant Pool, the Psychology Department 
community panel database and departmental email lists. Subjects received course-credit or 
£10-15 in exchange for their time. Using G*power (α = 0.95, β = 0.8, d=.05), sample size 
recommendation was 51 participants per condition (n=102), although 40 per condition was 
considered a more feasible aim. We achieved a total sample of 25 participants (button-press 
n=19, foot-pedal n=6), due to the onset of the coronavirus pandemic in March 2020. The 
sample was 64% female, with age range 18-28 (Median=20, SD=2.78). Healthy righthanded 
people aged 18-50 with driving experience were recruited. Participants were ineligible to take 
part if they were pregnant; had heart/gastrointestinal surgery or condition; were experiencing 
mental health issues; history of renal problems; had experienced a traumatic road incident in 
the past; had physical conditions or medication that affected diet or weight or ability to safely 
take part in the study. A virtual reality health and safety checklist was also completed by 




The State and Trait Anxiety Scale (Spielberger & Gorsuch, 1983) asks people to 
indicate their agreement (Not at all/Somewhat/Moderately so/Very much so) with twenty 
positively and negatively coded items e.g. ‘I feel calm’, ‘I feel tense’, ‘I feel at ease’. There 
are two identical scales that ask people to report how they feel in the current moment (State 
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anxiety) and how they feel in general (Trait anxiety). Coded responses are added together to 
calculate measures of State and Trait anxiety. 
Interoceptive sensibility 
Interoceptive sensibility was measured using the Private Body Consciousness (PBC) 
subscale of The Body Consciousness Questionnaire (BCQ: Miller et al., 1981). The complete 
BCQ was used to maintain scale-validity. The PBC subscale includes 5 statements: ‘I'm very 
aware of changes in my body temperature’, ‘I am quick to sense the hunger contractions in 
my stomach’, ‘I know immediately when my mouth or throat gets dry’, ‘I am sensitive to 
internal bodily tensions’, and ‘I can often feel my heart beating’.  Participants are asked to 
rate how characteristic each item is of themselves (extremely uncharacteristic/ 
uncharacteristic/ neutral/characteristic/extremely characteristic). Scores were numerically 
coded 1-5 (1=extremely uncharacteristic) and a mean score calculated.  
Presence 
Subjective experiences of presence in the VR environment (VE) were measured using 
an adapted SUS (Slater-Usoh-Steed) VR Presence scale (Slater et al., 1995, 2000). The scale 
included six items that capture 1) the sense of physically ‘being in’ the VE, 2) the extent the 
VE becomes the prevailing reality and 3) how much the VE resembles a memory of a 
“place”. We adapted the scale questions for our VR environment e.g. “The car and city seem 
to me to be more like...” (0= ‘Images that I saw’, 7= ‘Somewhere that I visited’), and “I had a 
sense of ‘being there’ in the car and city” (0= ‘At no time’, 7= ‘Almost all the time’). The 
scoring method for SUS proposes a response variable calculation of the number of answers 
that were a rating of 6 or 7. The small sample size meant the proportion of people reporting 
scores of 6 and 7 was relatively low, therefore, we also calculated a mean score from the 6 
items to represent a continuous measure of presence.  
Virtual reality sickness 
As interoceptive awareness has shown to be negatively associated with motion 
sickness (Heeter et al., 2020), we included a measure of virtual reality sickness to explore 
associations with the interoception variables. The virtual reality sickness questionnaire 
(VRSQ) (Kim et al., 2018) was used. The scale assesses oculomotor (e.g. fatigue, eyestrain) 
and disorientation (e.g. blurred vision, headache) experiences. People are asked to rate how 
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much they experienced each symptom during the VE (not at all, slightly, moderately, very). 
Oculomotor and disorientation symptoms are computed separately (Oculomotor 
([1]/12)*100, Disorientation ([2]/15)*100), and a total score calculated (Oculomotor score + 
Disorientation score)/2.  
Interoception tasks 
Interoceptive accuracy and meta-cognitive awareness 
Cardiac interoceptive accuracy was measured using procedures from Schandry’s 
(1981) heartbeat mental tracking task. A pulse oximeter (BLYL CMS 50D+) was attached to 
the index finger on the right hand. Participants were instructed to silently count their 
heartbeats for four trial periods; 30, 50, 40, and 20 seconds (in the same order), while seated. 
The beginning of each trial was indicated by the experimenter and an alarm signalled the end 
of each trial. Participants reported how many heartbeats they perceived for each trial and 
reported their confidence in the accuracy or their estimation i.e. How sure are you that the 
amount of heartbeats you counted for that interval were correct? (0=not sure at all, 8= 
absolutely sure). Within-subjects’ correlations (Pearson’s R) of tracking accuracy and 
confidence ratings provided the interoceptive meta-cognitive awareness measure. 
Interoceptive accuracy was calculated using the formula below (Garfinkel et al., 2015; Hart et 
al., 2013): 
 
                                           1- 
 | nbeatsreal −nbeatsreported | 
; 
(nbeatsreal + nbeatsreported)/ 2 
 
Gastric interoception 
Gastric interoception was measured using a two-step Water-Load Test (Van Dyck et 
al., 2016) to capture interoceptive sensitivity to gastric processes. Participants were sat 
upright and drank non-carbonated tap water at room temperature from a 400ml opaque flask 
with a straw. They were asked to drink freely until 1) they noticed sensations of stomach 
bloating or distention (Zeng et al., 2007), and 2) when their stomachs were completely full of 
water, at which time they notified the experimenter and the water consumed was measured. 
Participants were expressly reminded they could stop at any time and to notify the 
experimenter if they felt unwell. Maximum drinking time was ~5 minutes. The maximum 
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amount of water available was 1300ml, but participants were provided with water in 200ml 
amounts to blind them to the amount they were drinking. We added 2.5ml of electrolyte 
solution to the water to mitigate against a loss of sodium in the blood. Gastric interoception 
was calculated as the percentage of water drunk from the first signs of stomach distension at 
step 1, to achieve maximum fullness at step 2- providing an index of gastric sensitivity not 
dictated by stomach capacity (Van Dyck et al., 2016). This measure indicates the onset of 
visceral awareness from the first signs of stomach distension to complete fullness. Lower 
scores indicate an increased sensitivity to gastric processes earlier in the stomach-filling 
process. As a manipulation check, a short hunger and thirst measure were completed before 
and after the task: How hungry do you feel at this moment? (1=not at all, 9=extremely 
hungry), How thirsty do you feel at this moment? (1=not at all, 9=extremely hungry).  
 
Moral dilemma task 
Moral dilemma stimuli 
The moral dilemma stimuli involved six moral dilemmas (3 x incongruent and 3 x 
congruent that were matched) for each participant. Incongruent dilemmas involved a situation 
where harm (killing a pedestrian) was necessary to maximise outcomes (save all passengers 
in the vehicle), whereas congruent dilemmas involved a situation where harm resulted in 
trivial outcomes (e.g. damage to vehicle), as described by Conway and Gawronski’s (2013) 
text-based moral dilemma procedure. This was to assess whether we could calculate the 
probability people would avoid harm, while controlling for their tendency to maximise 
outcomes. Each dilemma involved an unfolding collision event with a vehicle from behind 
(Dilemma 1), a vehicle approaching from the left (Dilemma 2) and a vehicle approaching 
from the right (Dilemma 3) in three different locations around a VR city. Each dilemma was 
around 1 minute long.  
There were two passengers in the vehicle each time, introduced as a female friend and 
a friend’s son. The participant was in the driver’s seat. Participants learned during pre-
training, that the vehicle could not harm human pedestrians outside the vehicle and would 
automatically brake if there was a person in the path of the vehicle, even if that risked the 
lives of people inside the car. Participants were aware that they could ‘override’ the auto-
braking function in an emergency situation, which would keep the car moving forward, 
causing fatal harm to any pedestrians in the path of the vehicle. The override button was 
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either a green button in the middle of a steering wheel, or a foot-pedal on the floor. Pressing 
‘override’ triggered a high-pitched beep sound. The car AI communicated warnings about 
pedestrians and collisions with other vehicles via audio and a heads-up-display system, along 
with some other information such as a welcome message, or road conditions. In each 
situation, the first warning (~20 seconds in) directed attention towards a hazard such as a 
lorry on fire (Dilemma 1), or a motorcyclist that had fallen in the path of the vehicle 
(Dilemmas 2/3). The second warning was the collision alert whereby the AI informed 
participants if the car braked to avoid a pedestrian, there would be a collision with another 
vehicle coming towards it which was presented ~15 seconds after warning 1 in Dilemma 1, 
and ~5 seconds after warning 1 in Dilemma 2 and 3. In all dilemmas if the participants 
omitted to act, the car would automatically brake, and a collision would ensue. The 
seriousness of the collision was communicated quickly by audio-visual ‘risk red’ and ‘risk 
yellow’ warnings emphasised in the pre-training, which served as the ‘incongruent’ and 
‘congruent’ conditions respectively. ‘Risk red’ indicated fatal harm to people inside the 
vehicle if the car remained stationary. ‘Risk yellow’ indicated damage to the vehicle or minor 
injuries to passengers if the car remained stationary. The vehicles in each dilemma were 
appropriate to the ‘risk’ of fatality (Table 1). Following the collision warning, participants 
were told that they could press the ‘override’ button to keep the car moving and reminded of 
the outcome of pressing the override button. The pedestrian was either crossing the road in 
front of the vehicle and screamed (1) or was on the road and in distress after falling off a 
motorbike (2/3). In Dilemma 1 (incongruent), the override button was only activated when 
the audio collision warning was finished to ensure the car was a certain distance away from 
the pedestrian, which was discussed in pre-training. If ‘override’ was pressed before it was 
activated, participants were informed by the experimenter when the button became activated 
(also discussed during training). Participants had ~15 seconds to make a decision from the 
onset of the collision warning, and ~5 seconds from the end of the collision warning. No 
graphic or gruesome information was presented to participants. The scene ended just before 
hitting the pedestrian or just before the collision with the other vehicle. A text display after 









Risk red and risk yellow dilemmas 
 
 Risk red (incongruent) Risk yellow (congruent) 
Fatalities to all passengers if 
‘override’ not pressed? 
Yes No 
Vehicles involved in collision 
in each matched dilemma pair 
Dilemma 1: Lorry 
Dilemma 2: Bus 
Dilemma 3: Train 
Dilemma 1: Campervan 
Dilemma 2: Car 
Dilemma 3: Tram 
 
Foot-pedal and button-press 
The foot-pedal and steering wheel button are presented in Figure 2. The action of 
pressing was recorded with a mouse button beneath the surface of the green button and foot 
pedal. Actions were carried out with either the right hand (button) or right foot (pedal). 
Participants practiced these actions prior to the task and asked to place their foot at the base 
of the foot-pedal, or close to the button on the steering wheel so they could make the action 
without difficulty. Participants were also asked to have their right hand on the steering wheel 
in the foot pedal condition.  
 
Figure 2.  
 





Measures of moral behaviour 
As Conway and Gawronski’s (2013) process dissociation formula for calculating 
harm-aversion (deontological parameter) and outcome-maximisation (utilitarian parameter) 
scores requires no zero values for the outcome-maximisation parameter (which occurs when 
no non-utilitarian responses are made), we were unable to establish harm-aversion scores for 
many participants as the majority of people choose to carry out harmful action on all 
incongruent trials. A greater number of trial-pairs would potentially reduce the likelihood of 
this error and increase variation in responses. Subsequently, our measures of moral behaviour 
included: 1) percentage of harmful acts carried out on incongruent trials (where harming the 
pedestrian would save the lives of all people in the vehicle), 2) percentage of harmful acts 
carried out on congruent trials (where harming the pedestrian did not save the lives of people 
in the vehicle), 3) response time for harmful action on incongruent trials.   
 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to not consume any food or drink for at least 2 hours or 
consume any alcohol or (unprescribed) drugs 24 hours prior to the study. After providing 
informed consent, participants completed the anxiety and interoception questionnaires at a 
desktop computer and provided basic demographic information. Height and weight were 
measured, and the heartbeat counting task completed. Twelve participants who completed the 
heartbeat detection and water load tasks in a previous study, did not complete these tasks as 
they provided informed consent for their data to be re-used.  Physiological data recording 
equipment was setup and participants read through a training sheet on the computer to 
explain the VR environment and their role in the task. Participants were expressly reminded 
they could end the VR experiment at any time by saying a safe-word or removing the 
headset. The ‘override’ button was indicated as either the foot pedal or button on the steering 
wheel. They were unaware of the other action-type. The experimenter asked several questions 
to assess they understood the procedure. Participants first experienced an orientation scene in 
VR where they were sitting in the moving car with other passengers, the headset was then 
removed. Physiological data acquisition began 2-3 minutes before the moral dilemma task 
while participants were seated at the computer. Participants were asked to keep as still as 
possible. Blood pressure was taken twice before the experiment. Their left arm remained 
raised and resting on a table in front of them (palm-up) throughout the task. They were also 
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asked to place their right hand on the steering wheel. The VR headset was placed again, and 
the VR moral dilemma task began, starting with a 20 second rest screen. They experienced 6 
moral dilemmas in the same order incongruent (1); congruent (2); incongruent (3); congruent 
(1); incongruent (2); congruent (3). In each dilemma, following their choice a text screen 
stated the outcome, followed by a 20 second rest screen. Participants were in the VR 
environment for about 10 minutes in total. Immediately following the task blood pressure was 
measured. There was a short rest period before participants completed the presence and 
motion sickness questionnaires. Finally, they completed the water-load task and hunger/thirst 
scales. The experiment took 1-1.5 hours to complete. Participants were debriefed and thanked 
for their time.   
Physiological data collection 
Impedance cardiographic (ICG), electrocardiographic (ECG) and electrodermal 
signals were recorded using a wireless BIOPAC MP160 (BIOPAC Systems, 2020). Cardiac 
output (CO; blood volume ejected from the heart at systole), systemic vascular resistance 
(SVR; resistance in circulatory system to achieve blood flow), pre-ejection period (PEP; 
latency between depolarisation of the left ventricle of the heart and ventricular ejection), heart 
rate (HR; beats-per-minute), and skin conductance activity (SC) were measured. 
Physiological data were digitised, stored and analysed using Acqknowledge software 
(BIOPAC Systems, 2015). To capture ICG, electrodes were placed either side of participants 
neck, and upper torso. An Einthoven lead II configuration was used to collect ECG data. 
Electrodes on the index and second finger captured electrodermal data. Wireless ICG, ECG 
and SC amplifiers were attached with a chest-strap and wrist-strap. Acknowledge software 
was used to calculate SVR, PEP, CO and HR. A clinically validated blood pressure monitor 
(OMRON) was used to calculate mean arterial pressure (MAP) (Cushman et al., 2012). Blood 
pressure was measured twice before entering the VR environment and once immediately after 
to calculate an average MAP for the ICG analysis, and was calculated using the formula:  
 





Physiological data processing 
A 12.5msec delay was added to digital event marker channels before data processing 
to correct signal latency from the wireless amplifiers. Waveforms were checked and cleaned 
for motion-artefacts and noise. SVR, CO and PEP was calculated for each participant in 
Acqknowledge (BIOPAC Systems, 2015). Digital event markers were recorded on the data 
file to ensure exact measurement-windows for analysis. Programming scripts were used to 
calculate mean CO, SVR, HR, PEP and SC data for the three measurement windows: 1) start 
to the second collision warning; 2) second collision warning to action-choice; 3) action 
choice to end of rest period. A 1-second offset was applied to SC measurement windows to 
account for signal delay. Importantly, measurement window 3) for the final rest period 
(congruent 3) was shorter than the other dilemmas, as participants removed the headset 
shortly after presentation of the final text screen. 
Cardiac reactivity  
All raw physiological data was transformed into relative values (z-scores) within each 
participant’s dataset which can improve reliability and validity of individual differences 
analyses (Boucsein et al., 2012; Braithwaite et al., 2013; Braithwaite & Watson, 2015). 
Means and standard deviations used to compute z-scores were calculated within measurement 
windows 1-3. CO and SVR scores were transformed into one threat-challenge reactivity score 
(see Scheepers et al., 2012; Turner et al., 2013). According to the biopsychosocial model 
(Blascovich & Mendes, 2010; Mendes et al., 2007), cardiovascular states are a manifestation 
of an evaluation of the demands of a situation. A challenge motivational state occurs when 
resources meet or exceed demands leading to an efficient cardiovascular response: an 
increase in CO and reduction in SVR. When demands outweigh resources a threat 
motivational state arises: a decrease in CO and increase in SVR. To calculate the threat-
challenge reactivity index, raw SVR scores were subtracted from CO scores. Higher scores 
reflect a higher challenge state, and lower scores indicate a higher threat state. Shorter PEP is 
associated with stronger myocardial contractility and sympathetic autonomic activation on 
active coping tasks (Sherwood et al., 1990). Threat-challenge reactivity (TCR), heart rate 
(HR) and pre-ejection period (PEP) values for all trials within each measurement window (1-
3) were transformed into z-scores and then t-scores to provide a relative measure of HR and 
TCR within each timeframe on congruent and incongruent trials.  
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Skin conductance  
Skin conductance data was transformed into Area Under the Curve (AUC; Naqvi & 
Bechara, 2006). A moving-average smoothing filter was first applied to the SC waveform 
(2000 samples). The waveform was resampled at 125Hz, and a difference transformation 
(interval = 6 samples) was applied. Area under the curve represents the area bounded by the 
curve and the chord connecting the curve with endpoints of each measurement window 
(Naqvi & Bechara, 2006). Area was divided by the time in seconds for that measurement 
interval, to calculate a rate of micro-siemens per second (AUC). This method provides an 
indication of amplitude and temporal features of electrodermal activity and removes the need 
for subjective interpretation about the presence of SC responses (Naqvi & Bechara, 2006). A 
‘log (AUC + 1)’ transformation was applied to raw AUC scores within each measurement 
window to allow for zero values and normalise skew (Braithwaite et al., 2013; Braithwaite & 
Watson, 2015). Within each measurement window, logged AUC scores were transformed 
into z-scores, and finally t-scores to remove negative values (see Braithwaite & Watson, 
2015). Means and standard deviations used for z-score calculations were based on all 
congruent and incongruent within each measurement window. Average t-values for 
measurement windows 1-3 were calculated for the incongruent and congruent trials. 
 
Results 
Statistical analysis was carried out using SPSS v26. A bootstrapping method (x1000) 
was applied to confidence intervals for ANOVA and regression analyses. A Shapiro Wilks 
test confirmed normal distribution of the physiological variables (p>.05) except for heart rate 
in the pre-decision timeframe and electrodermal activity in the post-decision timeframe. 
Levene’s tests confirmed equality of variances of the physiological variables between foot-
pedal and button-press conditions (p>.05). Three outliers were identified for the AUC data in 
the pre-warning timeframe but retained in the interests of sample size. Data are mean ± 
standard deviation unless stated otherwise. 
Correlations 
We explored bivariate correlations of potential confounding variables of age, sex, and 
anxiety with the dependent variables of harm acceptance on congruent and incongruent trials, 
and response time on incongruent trials. Age, sex and anxiety did not predict choices to harm 
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on congruent or incongruent trials or response time to harm on incongruent trials. We further 
explored any confounding influence of age, sex, BMI and anxiety with any of the 
interoception variables, and any relationships between interoception variables (Table 2). Age, 
sex and BMI did not predict any of the interoception variables. Surprisingly, state anxiety 
was negatively correlated with interoceptive sensibility (p=.015), suggesting that people with 
a greater tendency to pay attention to internal sensations were less anxious at the time. None 
of the interoception variables showed correlation with each other, supporting the 
independence of these dimensions (Garfinkel et al., 2015). 
 
Table 2.  
 
Bivariate correlations between potential confounding variables, key dependent variables and interoception 
 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. State anx .675** .004 -.089 .094 -.375 -.165 -.018 -.092 -.480* -.090 -.385 
2. Trait anx 1 -.011 -.083 -.283 -.124 .136 -.181 .038 -.196 -.078 -.190 
3. Sex   1 .022 .203 -.019 .171 .167 -.170 .269 .102 -.067 
4. Age   1 .184 -.114 -.212 .022 .187 -.008 -.259 -.081 
5. RT (inc)    1 -.149 -.764** .206 -.056 .077 .112 -.041 
6. Gastric int.     1 .047 .229 .153 .159 -.025 .089 
7. Harm (Inc)      1 .055 .072 .102 -.035 -.056 
8. Harm (Con)       1 -.130 .260 -.119 -.240 
9. BMI        1 .103 -.320 -.004 
10. IS         1 .290 -.044 
11. IAc          1 .213 
12. IAc-meta           1 
 
Note: 1. State anxiety, 2. Trait anxiety, 3. Sex (male=1), 4. Age, 5. Response time for harmful action, 6. Gastric 
interoception, 7. Harmful action incongruent trials, 8.Harmful action congruent trials, 9. Body mass index, 10. Interoceptive 
sensibility, 11. Interoceptive accuracy, 12. Interoceptive meta-cognitive awareness 
 
H1. Effect of dilemma, action-type and timeframe on physiological arousal 
We investigated whether physiological arousal was affected by dilemma type, 
timeframe and action type. None of the physiological variables were correlated except HR 
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and threat-challenge reactivity, which were positively correlated within each timeframe 
(p<.05). For each physiological arousal index, we conducted 2 (dilemma-type: congruent vs. 
incongruent) x 3 (timeframe: pre-warning, pre-decision, post-decision) mixed-factor 
ANOVAs. Action-type (foot-pedal vs button-press) was entered as a between participant’s 
factor. Means and standard deviations for each condition are in Table 3. To account for 
pairwise comparisons p-values (α) were set to <.025. We did not find main effects of 
dilemma-type, action-type or time period for HR, threat-reactivity or PEP (p>.05). For AUC, 
there was a main effect of dilemma type, F(1, 23) = 9.791, p=.005, partial η2=.299, and a 
significant interaction between dilemma-type and timeframe for people in the button-press 
condition, F(2, 36)=6.164, p=.005, partial η2=.255, but not for the foot-pedal condition, F(2, 
10)=1.374, p=.297, partial η2=.216. Specifically, AUC was higher post-decision (54.65 ± 
3.75) compared to pre-decision (51.55 ± 4.33) in the incongruent conditions, but lower post-
decision (45.34 ± 3.75) compared to pre-decision (48.84 ± 4.33) in the congruent conditions, 
which was significant, p=.006, 95% CI [-6.065 to -.940]. We also found a main effect of 
dilemma type on AUC for the foot-pedal condition in the pre-decision timeframe, F (1, 5) = 
11.05, p=.021, partial η2=.688. Specifically, AUC was significantly higher in the incongruent 
condition (54.99 ± 3.68) compared to the congruent condition (45.00 ± 3.68) prior to carrying 















Table 3.  
 
Physiological responses (HR, PEP, AUC, Threat-challenge reactivity) for button-press and foot-pedal conditions for 
incongruent trials 
 
  Button-press Foot-pedal 
  Pre-warning  Pre-
decision 


























































































































Note. Mean t scores > 50 indicate increased HR, TCR, and AUC relative to congruent trials 
 
H2. Physiological arousal, action-type and behaviour 
We tested whether physiological arousal and an interaction between group type and 
physiological arousal predicted behaviour in the moral dilemma task. Multinomial logistic 
regressions were conducted for the dependent variables 1) frequency of harmful action on 
incongruent trials, 2) frequency of harmful action on congruent trials. A hierarchical 
regression was carried out for the dependent variable 3) response time for harmful action on 
incongruent trials. One person was excluded from RT analysis in the foot-pedal condition as 
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they did not carry out any harmful actions. Twenty-one people carried out harm on 3/3 
incongruent trials, two people carried out harmful action on 2/3 trials, and one person on 1/3 
trials. Interaction terms for action-type*physiological index for the pre-decision timeframe on 
incongruent trials were entered as predictors (e.g. AUC*Foot-pedal).  
There was no interaction between action-type and physiological arousal for predicting 
frequency of harmful action on incongruent trials, X2 (12) =15.958, p=.193, or on congruent 
trials, X2 (4) =4.730, p=.316. Although the likelihood ratio for action-type*HR approached 
significance, X2 (1) =3.326, p=.068, suggesting people who carried out harmful action on 
congruent trials in the foot-pedal condition had relatively higher HR on these trials, compared 
to the button-press condition. For response time, physiological indexes for the pre-decision 
timeframe were entered at step 1, and the interaction terms (e.g. action-type*AUC), at step 2. 
Model 1 was significant, R2=.384, F (4, 19) = 2.961, p=.047. Specifically, greater AUC 
significantly predicted longer response times (b=.588, p=.005). Contrary to H2, the addition 
of the interaction terms in model 2, did not significantly improve model fit, R2=.535, F (4, 
15) = 2.153, p=.095, suggesting action-type did not influence this effect. Figure 3 shows a 

























Figure 3.  
 




H3. Interoceptive accuracy and sympathetic reactivity 
We explored whether sympathetic reactivity in the incongruent conditions relative to 
congruent conditions was associated with interoceptive accuracy (IAc). Using a median-split 
procedure we calculated high and low reactivity groups for the physiological variables in the 
pre-decision time frame. High reactivity was defined as greater sympathetic activation in 
incongruent trials characterised as an increase in HR and AUC, and a decrease in PEP and 
threat-challenge reactivity (relative to congruent trials) (Table 4). This method of comparing 
interoceptive accuracy among high and low reactivity groups was chosen to compare our 
findings with a recent study using several of the same physiological parameters, comparing 
interoceptive accuracy differences for participants high and low in cardiovascular reactivity 
during an exercise task (see Pollatos et al., 2007a). As participants’ physiological data was 
standardised within-subject, this provided a comparable measure of physiological ‘reactivity’ 
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for each person, that accounted for inter-individual differences in baseline physiological 
reactivity.  
IAc was the dependent variable, and PEP, HR, Threat-challenge reactivity and AUC 
reactivity groups were entered as between subjects’ factors in a 4-way ANOVA (Table 4). In 
support of H3, IAc was significantly greater in the low PEP group, F (1, 14) =11.577, p=.004, 
partial η2=.453, but not significantly different between groups for HR, F (1, 14) =1.935, 
p=.186, partial η2=.121, threat-challenge reactivity, F (1, 14) =.186, p=.673, partial η2=.013, 
or AUC, F (1, 14) =.196, p=.664, partial η2=.014. Interestingly, IAc showed a positive 
relationship with PEP in the pre-decision timeframe on incongruent trials (r=.449, p=.024) 
(Figure 4). Greater PEP is associated with reduced sympathetic autonomic arousal (Sherwood 
et al., 1990), and motivational challenge states (Tomaka et al., 1993) and may indicate a 
greater psychological challenge state among higher IAc perceivers on trials where moral 
conflict was present (incongruent), compared to trials where there was no moral conflict.  
 
 
Table 4.   
 
























Mean -.135 .548 .042 .413 .360 .068 .325 .107 















Figure 4.  
 




H4. Interoception, presence and virtual reality sickness 
We explored whether interoception influenced experiences of presence in the VR 
environment. We carried out a hierarchical linear regression model, inputting the between 
subjects’ factor action-type and trait and state anxiety scores at step 1, as potential 
confounding variables (Bouchard et al., 2008). The interoception variables (IAc, IS, IAc-meta 
and gastric interoception) were entered at step 2. Model 1 was not significant, R2=.044, F (3, 
21) = .323, p=.809. Model 2 was also not significant, R2=.410, F (4, 17) = 1.686, p=.179, but 
a significant coefficient for IAc indicated that interoceptive accuracy was positively 
associated with greater experiences of presence b=.487, p=.031, providing support for H4.  
However, when using the conservative SUS approach that calculates presence as the number 
of 6 or 7 scores provided, IAc did not significantly predict presence in a multinomial 
regression, x2 (4) = 2.60, p=.627. Therefore, IAc may be associated with greater experiences 
of presence when calculated as a continuous SUS score but not when conceptualised as the 
 cxc 
presence of high scores. This is potentially due to the small sample size, with 52% of people 
scoring zero using the 6 or 7 scoring approach. We did not find any of the interoception 
variables significantly predicted motion-sickness in separate linear regression models 
(p>.05), suggesting interoceptive sensitivity did not influence oculomotor or disorientation 
disturbances associated with the VR environment.  
 
H5. Presence and physiological arousal 
To test whether experiences of presence were associated with greater physiological 
arousal on incongruent trials, we carried out a hierarchical linear regression model inputting 
presence as a continuous dependent variable. Anxiety, action-type and IAc were entered at 
step-1. The high and low sympathetic reactivity groups for PEP, HR, AUC and threat-
challenge index in the pre-decision timeframe on incongruent trials were entered at step-2. 
Model 1 was not significant, R2=.270, F (4, 20) =1.854, p=.158, but the coefficient for IAc 
was significant, b=.479, p=.022. The addition of the physiological variables at step-2 did not 
significantly improve model fit, R2=.494, F (4, 16) = 1.956, p=.121. However, the coefficient 
for IAc remained significant, b=.522, p=.035, suggesting that IAc independently predicted 
experiences of presence when accounting for physiological reactivity on the incongruent 
trials. Additionally, the coefficient for threat-challenge reactivity group approached 
significance (b=.595, p=.067). People in the ‘low’ threat-challenge reactivity group 
demonstrated a relatively greater psychophysiological ‘challenge’ state [as opposed to 
‘threat’ state] on incongruent trials and experienced greater levels of presence (mean=3.54, 
SD=1.07) than people in the high threat-challenge reactivity group (mean=2.97, SD=1.09).  
 
H6.1. PEP reactivity, action-type and response time 
To investigate an interaction between PEP reactivity and action-type on response 
time, we conducted a 2 (action-type: button-press vs foot-pedal) x 2 (PEP reactivity: high vs 
low) ANOVA. There was no main effect of action-type, F (1, 20) =2.547, p=.126, partial 
η2=.113, or PEP reactivity, F (1, 20) =.240, p=.629, partial η2=.012, but the interaction 
between action-type and PEP reactivity approached significance, F (1, 20) =3.421, p=.079, 
partial η2=.146. We conducted planned pairwise comparisons (Faraway, 2015) with 
Bonferroni adjustment and found an effect of action-type in the high PEP reactivity group, 
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F(1, 20) =5.072, p=.036, partial η2=.202. Specifically, the foot-pedal condition was 
associated with longer reaction times for carrying out harmful action, but only for people 
demonstrating higher [sympathetic] PEP reactivity on incongruent trials relative to congruent 
trials (Figure 5).   
H6.2. Interoceptive accuracy, action-type and response time 
Following the findings in H6.1 and the association between PEP and interoceptive 
accuracy (H3), we explored the possibility that action-type moderated the relationship 
between IAc and response time for harmful action (RT). None of the interoception measures 
(IAc, IS, IAc-meta and gastric interoception) were significantly associated with response time 
in a multiple regression model, R2=.156, F (4, 19) = .879, p=.495. IAc was also not 
significantly different between the button-press and foot-pedal conditions, t (22) =.051, 
p=.960. A hierarchical regression model was used to test the interaction between IAc and 
action-type on RT. IAc and dummy variables for action-type were entered at step 1, and the 
interaction terms for action type and IAc entered at step 2. Model 1 was not significant, R2 
=.078, F (2, 21) =.882, p=.429, but the addition of the IAc*action-type at step 2 led to a 
statistically significant increase in variance explained, R2 chng=.191, F chng= 5.238, Sig. F 
chng =.033 in the model, R2 =.269, F (1, 20) =2.453, p=.093. Simple slopes analysis showed 
there was a statistically significant positive relationship between IAc and response time in the 
button-press condition (b=.934) but a significantly negative relationship between IAc and 
response time in the foot-pedal condition (b=-.517), p=.033, 95% CI [.427 to 9.211]. These 
findings suggest that IAc predicted shorter response times in the foot-pedal condition, and 
















Figure 5.  
 

























Figure 6.  
 






We investigated whether physiological arousal, interoception and action-type 
influenced harmful actions in moral dilemma driving tasks. The majority of participants 
carried out harmful action on incongruent trials (i.e. where harm maximised outcomes). Very 
few people chose to carry out harm on congruent trials, indicating that people were typically 
averse to carrying out harm that did not maximise outcomes. A high level of utilitarian 
responses is consistent with previous VR studies, for example, Francis et al (2017) found 
>56% of people chose to carry out utilitarian action in a VR Footbridge dilemma, despite 
only 10% of people condoning this response when asked to provide a moral judgment of the 
text-based dilemma. As Patil et al (2014) proposed, in VR, the contextual saliency of the 
potential negative outcomes of not carrying out harmful action can overcome the potential 
negative value associated with carrying out a harmful act. Electrodermal activity was higher 
in incongruent trials and the strength of electrodermal activity predicted longer response 
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times for harmful action but showed different patterns of temporal activity for the button-
press and foot-pedal conditions. Overall, pre-ejection (PEP) period shortened in the pre-
decision time frame relative to the pre-warning timeframe, but this reduction was greater for 
the foot-pedal condition, although not significant. Better heartbeat perception (IAc) predicted 
a lengthening of pre-ejection period prior to carry out harmful action which suggests a 
reduction in sympathetic autonomic arousal and greater psychophysiological challenge states. 
Sympathetic PEP reactivity was associated with longer response times in the foot-pedal 
condition, and shorter response times in the button-press condition. Relatedly, we found the 
relationship between IAc and response time was moderated by action-type. IAc was also 
associated with greater experiences of presence. These findings are discussed further below. 
In H1, we explored the effects of dilemma type, timeframe and action-type for each of 
the physiological variables; heart rate (HR), electrodermal activity, threat-challenge reactivity 
and pre-ejection period (PEP). Electrodermal activity was highest in the pre-decision 
timeframe in the foot-pedal condition but highest post-decision in the button-press condition. 
Greater anticipatory autonomic arousal prior to pushing the foot-pedal may be due to a 
greater aversive response to the pedal action than the button-press, where arousal was higher 
after the action was taken. Previous work using text-based dilemmas has found stronger 
electrodermal responses predict harm-rejection judgments, especially when harm requires 
direct interpersonal force (e.g. McDonald et al., 2017; Moretto et al., 2010). However 
heightened electrodermal activity [relative to text-based dilemmas], has been associated with 
carrying out ‘utilitarian’ harmful actions in virtual reality dilemmas (e.g. Patil et al., 2014). 
This is consistent with our finding that people experienced greater electrodermal responses on 
trials where harmful action was required to achieve a utilitarian outcome, but harmful action 
was still carried out.  
We did not find any significant effects of dilemma type, timeframe or action-type for 
indices of HR, threat-reactivity or PEP. Prior work has found that increased systemic vascular 
resistance (SVR; Cushman et al., 2012) and shorter pre-ejection period is associated with an 
aversion to action-based harm (Parton & McGinley, 2019). A larger sample size may be more 
effective at detecting these effects. Importantly, a shortening of PEP observed on incongruent 
trials (see Table 3) in the pre-decision timeframe (relative to congruent trials) is likely 
partially due to the exertion required to carry out the actions (pushing pedal/button) 
(Sherwood et al., 1990) compared to congruent trials where action was typically not 
performed.  
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In partial support of H2, we found electrodermal activity significantly predicted 
longer response times for carrying out harmful action, but not the choice to carry out harmful 
action or not. The measure of electrodermal activity used (AUC; Naqvi & Bechara, 2006), 
provides a measure of both the temporality and amplitude of emotional arousal and suggests 
longer response times were associated with a greater emotional response to the prospect of 
carrying out harm. Other work has found longer response times when contemplating personal 
as opposed to impersonal dilemmas (Moretto et al., 2010) and a recent study found greater 
electrodermal responses predicted longer reaction times on a text-based moral judgment task 
(Brown, Proulx, & Fraser, 2020b). Electrodermal activity has also been associated with 
cognitive load in driving simulations (Solovey et al., 2014), which may have been associated 
with lengthier deliberation of the costs and benefits of harmful action in this study, before 
making a choice. Contrary to H2, there was no interaction between electrodermal activity and 
action-type, suggesting the influence of electrodermal activity on response time was 
independent of the typicality of the action.  
In H3 we found high and low PEP reactivity in the pre-decision timeframe on 
incongruent trials predicted interoceptive accuracy (IAc), but not as expected. Whereas prior 
research has found heartbeat detection ability predicts shorter PEP reactivity to aversive 
stimuli, arithmetic tasks and physical stressors (Eichler et al., 1987; Eichler & Katkin, 1994; 
Pollatos et al., 2007b) we found IAc was associated with longer PEP on incongruent trials. 
Shorter PEP has been associated with active coping on motor tasks (Sherwood et al., 1990) 
and carrying out simulated harmful acts requiring physical effort (Parton & McGinley, 2019). 
Therefore, people with better heartbeat detection ability showed reduced sympathetic 
activation prior to carrying out harmful acts, compared to people with poorer heartbeat 
detection ability. Interestingly, in active coping motor-tasks people showing greater reactivity 
in systemic vascular resistance demonstrate a lengthening of PEP, whereas people who show 
greater cardiac output reactivity show a shortening of PEP (Sherwood et al., 1990). This 
suggests that individual differences in cardiovascular reactivity may influence the direction of 
PEP when faced with active coping tasks. Furthermore, on arithmetic active coping tasks, 
longer PEP has been associated with psychological challenge states, and shorter PEP with 
psychological threat states (Tomaka et al., 1993). It is possible that people scoring highly on 
IAc, appraised the task of carrying out harmful action as more of a challenge than a threat.  
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In line with the above explanation, there is evidence to suggest IAc may contribute to 
more effective emotional regulation of aversive states (Füstös et al., 2013), including the 
reappraisal and suppression of emotional responses (Kever et al., 2015). IAc has also been 
associated with more pronounced heart rate modulation in response to emotional stimuli 
(Pollatos et al., 2007b). It has been suggested that higher IAc may facilitate a more flexible 
use of emotional regulation strategies (Kever et al., 2015), which could support more 
adaptive behavioural responses (Aldao, 2013) to environmental stimuli, especially when there 
is little time to act. In a related study, Brown et al (2020b), found that IAc moderated the 
influence of an aversive physiological response on harm-aversive judgments, indicating 
better heartbeat detectors may be less reactive to negative emotional states generated by the 
prospect of harm, that may otherwise lead people to reject harmful action (e.g. Cushman et 
al., 2012; Greene et al., 2001; Parton & McGinley, 2019). As Farb et al (2015) suggest, 
interoception is a dynamic process, involving the integration of interoceptive sensations with 
appraisals of interoceptive states to facilitate the selection of an adaptive behavioural 
response. It is possible that people’s ability to detect cardiovascular signals with precision, 
may support more adaptive modulation of cardiovascular arousal in scenarios where aversive 
harmful action is required to achieve a utilitarian outcome. Alternatively, or perhaps 
relatedly, IAc may have predicted reduced effort exerted when carrying out harmful actions 
during the task. People with higher IAc ability have shown to exert less physical and 
cardiovascular effort during exercise, potentially due to their enhanced ability to perceive 
bodily signals associated with physical and cardiovascular load (Herbert et al., 2007). It may 
be that these people were better able to regulate their physical and cardiovascular exertion 
when performing the actions. If so, this may undermine future research efforts to investigate 
associations between cardiovascular parameters of action-based harm aversion and moral 
behaviour.  
In H6.1, we found that higher sympathetic PEP reactivity on incongruent trials was 
associated with longer reaction times to carry out harmful action, but only for the foot-pedal 
condition. For the low PEP reactivity group, response time was similar for the button-press 
and foot-pedal conditions. Relatedly, in H6.2, we found interoceptive accuracy (IAc) 
predicted longer response times in the button press-condition, but shorter response times in 
the foot-pedal condition. This speaks to the finding in H3, whereby high PEP reactivity on 
incongruent trials in the foot-pedal condition was associated with the longest reaction times. 
IAc however, predicted lower [sympathetic] PEP reactivity on incongruent trials, and was 
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therefore associated with quicker response times for harmful action in the foot-pedal 
condition. Afferent heartbeat signals have shown to influence the processing of fearful 
stimuli (Garfinkel & Critchley, 2016), and whereas some indices of cardiac activity such as 
heart rate deceleration have shown to support richer sensory processing, others such as heart 
rate acceleration, are associated with shallower sensory processing to support action and 
quicker response times (Lacey & Lacey, 1978). IAc may facilitate faster response times due 
to low sympathetic PEP reactivity if afferent signals associated with the lengthening of PEP 
inhibits richer sensory processing; but in the absence of empirical support this supposition 
remains speculative.  
More generally, when faced with aversive emotional stimuli, IAc may facilitate 
superior cardiovascular modulation (Pollatos et al., 2007b) and emotional regulation 
strategies (Füstös et al., 2013; Kever et al., 2015) associated with the aversive action, that 
potentially allow them to engage in this action more quickly to achieve a utilitarian outcome. 
The positive relationship between IAc and response time in the button-press condition, 
however, challenges this explanation. This may be because, in the button-press condition, 
people in the high PEP reactivity group demonstrated the fastest response times overall, and 
comparatively, higher IAc people may have provided slightly longer response times. 
Importantly, our sample size was underpowered to conduct moderation analyses and should 
be considered cautiously.  
IAc was also associated with greater experiences of presence (H4) even when 
accounting for high and low physiological reactivity on incongruent trials (H5), but only 
when assessed as a continuous scale and not the presence of high scores (Slater et al., 2000). 
Interestingly, people demonstrating physiological ‘challenge’ states on incongruent trials 
(captured by the threat-challenge reactivity index), experienced greater levels of presence in 
VR. Consistent with this, psychological ‘flow’ states (characterised by complete immersion 
in what one is doing; Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2005) is typically associated with 
increased cardiac output (Ullén et al., 2013), which has also been linked with greater 
presence (Weibel et al., 2008). Diemer and colleagues (2015) suggest people partly determine 
their sense of cognitive presence based on their level of emotional arousal. Although some 
work has not found associations between emotional experience and presence (Felnhofer et al., 
2015), a recent study (Heeter et al., 2020) found greater self-reported attention towards 
internal sensations predicted greater experiences of presence, using the Multidimensional 
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Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness scale (MAIA; Mehling et al., 2018). Seth et al’s 
(2012) predictive coding model of conscious presence holds that interoceptive or emotional 
states [in VR] are continuously compared with expected states, and that presence arises when 
the incongruence between actual and expected signals is resolved. Farb et al (2015) suggest 
that in instances of perceptual inference, the greater precision weighting of current sensations 
over rigid expectations (‘priors’), may support experiences of embodied presence which 
could explain the positive association between heartbeat detection ability and presence in the 
current study.  
Limitations 
Our sample was smaller than planned and group conditions unequal in size due to the 
onset of coronavirus and is underpowered to detect some of the effects tested. Likewise, the 
significant findings observed should be considered prudently, as further higher-powered 
replications are required to determine the robustness of these effects. For example, we chose 
not to conduct a MANOVA including all arousal indexes in H1, due to the substantial 
reduction in degrees of freedom in smaller samples. It is worth noting that for the interaction 
between electrodermal activity, dilemma type and timeframe (H1), effect sizes for the two 
conditions (button-press and foot-pedal) were of similar size, which suggests that an increase 
in sample size could be promising to detect physiological effects of action-type in future 
iterations using this paradigm. 
Secondly, the actions required to carry out harm in the foot-pedal and button press 
conditions aimed to be as close to in task-involvement and physical labour as possible but 
were qualitatively different, i.e. a pushing action with right hand versus pushing action with 
right foot. Therefore, we cannot rule out that these actions contributed to differential effects 
on the cardiovascular parameters measured (Parton & McGinley, 2019; Sherwood et al., 
1990). Future iterations could contrast a greater range of physically ‘matched’ typical and 
non-typical driving actions, to observe differences in their effect on cardiovascular reactivity. 
Furthermore, despite piloting the relative ‘aversiveness’ of the foot-pedal and button-press 
with a small audience, we did not capture participant reports of the relative aversiveness of 
the food-pedal versus button-press which limits our understanding of whether the foot-pedal 
action was subjectively experienced as more aversive.  
In addition, it was not possible to calculate harm-aversion and outcome-maximisation 
parameters as outlined in Conway and Gawronski’s (2013) text-based method. A greater 
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number of trials, situations, or a higher level of uncertainty about the outcome of carrying out 
harm may increase variation of responses to calculate these parameters. Moreover, the 
heartbeat detection method (Schandry, 1981) used to calculate interoceptive accuracy has 
been criticised for its validity, as some studies have shown that heartbeat detection is 
influenced by other factors, such as subjective beliefs about resting heart rate (Kleckner et al., 
2015; Ring et al., 2015; Ring & Brener, 2018; Windmann et al., 1999). However, predictive 
coding model perspectives of interoception (Ainley et al., 2016; Seth & Friston, 2016) 
suggest heart rate beliefs are likely to be generated as a result of both explicit and implicit 
knowledge about heart rates, which may explain the associations found between heart rate 
beliefs and heartbeat detection ability.  
Finally, VR driving simulations have limited validity for more ambiguous real-world 
driving tasks in semi-automated vehicles. As with other VR dilemmas studies, participants 
were presented with a highly improbable level of certainty about the outcomes of taking 
harmful action. Although a systematic analysis of this issue has yet to be conducted; longer 
decision-making timeframes allows greater cognitive processing which can influence harm-
acceptance decisions (Suter & Hertwig, 2011). Other VR driving dilemma studies have used 
shorter response timeframes than the current study (Ju et al., 2016; Skulmowski et al., 2014; 
Sütfeld et al., 2017) but were not investigating a collaborative decision-making situation with 
a vehicle AI. We aimed to provide a greater level of storytelling and immersion with the VR 
dilemmas used, and relatively fast-paced emerging collision events. Panic-driven behaviour is 
likely to be much more inconsistent and erratic and has been highlighted as a particular issue 
of moral dilemma studies like this (Pan & Slater, 2011). For example, in Dilemma 1 
(incongruent), a majority of participants pressed the ‘override’ button before the collision 
warning was presented, despite receiving pre-training about the task. The early presses often 
coincided with an explosion from a vehicle behind and shows how fear-induced, knee-jerk 
behaviours can occur even in highly controlled hypothetical VR dilemmas. Some researchers 
are experimenting with a series of continuously emerging VR moral dilemmas that measure 
participants’ harmful actions in less predictable, more dynamic ‘apocalyptic’ scenarios 
(Cristofari & Guitton, 2014).  
Conclusion 
In the near future, humans will be required to supervise morally sensitive decisions of 
autonomous vehicle AI in dynamic collision situations which could have serious 
 cc 
consequences for passengers, pedestrians and other drivers. Although correspondence 
between moral decision-making in VR versus ‘real-life’ is likely an unattainable goal, 
measuring the emotional and physiological correlates of behaviour in VR moral dilemmas 
brings us closer to being able to draw conclusions about the transferability of lab-based moral 
judgment research to more realistic moral dilemma scenarios. Psychological (Eyal & 
Liberman, 2012) and physical distance (Cushman et al., 2012; Greene et al., 2001; Miller et 
al., 2014) are important in our emotional responses to harmful acts. It is possible that 
reducing the typicality of specific driving actions in these vehicles, such as replacing a foot-
pedal with a button, may increase distance between driving actions and their outcomes. This 
may affect behaviours such as driving speed, braking distance, taking manual control of 
automation, or even relying more heavily on automation to make difficult decisions in real-
life moral dilemma scenarios. We found anticipatory physiological responses (specifically 
electrodermal activity and pre-ejection period; PEP) influenced response time to carry out 
harmful utilitarian action in VR moral dilemma driving scenarios. The typicality of the 
harmful action (button-press versus foot-pedal) was associated with differing patterns of 
physiological reactivity and response times. Individual differences in interoceptive accuracy 
predicted different patterns of PEP reactivity and response time in the foot-pedal and button-
press conditions. Heartbeat detection ability may contribute to different patterns of 
cardiovascular reactivity when harmful action is required to achieve a utilitarian outcome 
which may influence response time to act. However, we did not find that the other parameters 
of interoception, beyond interoceptive accuracy, were significant in the relationship between 
physiological arousal and moral judgments. People’s tendency to notice bodily sensations, 
their awareness of their interoceptive accuracy and gastric sensitivity appeared unrelated to 
the moral behaviour outcomes in this preliminary study. Since Damasio’s (1996) pivotal 
Somatic Marker Hypothesis, exploring individual differences in interoception has been 
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Although this study sample was smaller than planned due to the coronavirus 
pandemic, the findings introduce some interesting avenues for future research exploring the 
link between arousal, moral behaviour and interoception. Using four different measures of 
physiological arousal provided insights into the utility of each of these parameters for 
predicting moral behaviour in VR moral dilemmas. As Parton and McGinley (2019) found, 
pre-ejection period (PEP) and not our index of systemic vascular resistance (SVR; Cushman 
et al., 2012) was associated with individual differences in interoceptive accuracy and group 
differences (button press versus foot-pedal) in response time. These findings are in agreement 
with evidence showing PEP is a more appropriate measure of sympathetic cardiovascular 
reactivity in active-coping tasks (Sherwood et al., 1990) such as VR moral dilemmas 
exploring action-based harm aversion (Parton & McGinley, 2019).  
Electrodermal activity showed positive correlation with response time in both the 
foot-pedal and button-press conditions. In the Iowa Gambling Task, healthy controls 
[compared to patients with ventromedial damage] tend to show an anticipatory electrodermal 
response prior to taking a card from a ‘bad’ deck, which does not happen for ‘good’ decks 
(Bechara et al., 1996). This anticipatory response also happens for controls before endorsing 
‘personal’ harmful acts in moral dilemmas, but not for patients with ventromedial lesions 
(Moretto et al., 2010). Damasio et al (1996) suggested skin conductance responses, may serve 
as an anticipatory ‘alert’ response [initiated from the ventromedial cortex] to the prospect of a 
negative outcome, which can bias decision-making. Therefore, a stronger, more sustained 
electrodermal response may indicate an inhibitory ‘alert’ response that prevented people from 
acting quickly. The fact that electrodermal activity showed the same relationship with 
response time in the foot-pedal and button-press conditions, suggests this may have been an 
indiscriminate ‘alert’, ahead of anticipating a bad outcome that was not influenced by the 
type of harmful action used. Electrodermal activity may be associated with a more 
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generalised warning associated with negative outcomes, as opposed to the actions, in moral 
dilemmas. For example, Patil et al (2014) found that skin conductance responses were higher 
in VR dilemmas that were ‘impersonal’ (akin to the Trolley problem), compared to text-based 
versions. It is possible that the particularly arousing nature of VR moral dilemmas may 
increase hyper-vigilance towards taking actions that are morally wrong, as the consequences 
and responsibility for the outcomes of harm are more socially visible (Patil et al., 2014).    
The finding that interoceptive accuracy predicted a lengthening of PEP reactivity 
(reduced force of myocardial contractility) prior to harmful action on incongruent trials 
relative to congruent trials was surprising. Although it is possible that people experienced the 
congruent trials as more ‘stressful’, we expected most people to demonstrate heightened 
sympathetic reactivity on incongruent trials - as the condition necessitating harmful action to 
save ‘lives’ of passengers. Earlier studies have found that better heartbeat detection is 
associated with faster/shorter PEP reactivity to aversive stimuli (Eichler et al., 1987; Eichler 
& Katkin, 1994) and physical stress tasks (Pollatos et al., 2007a). Whereas, our results 
suggest interoceptive accuracy predicted longer PEP reactivity, which is more typically 
associated with motivational ‘challenge’ states on active coping tasks (Tomaka et al., 1993). 
This pattern of results could be due to fundamental individual differences in people’s 
cardiovascular reactivity to active coping tasks (Sherwood et al., 1990). Alternatively, it 
could be associated with a reduced ‘effort’ among these people to carry out the harmful 
actions. Herbert et al (2007) found that people higher on interoceptive accuracy exerted less 
physical effort during exercise, proposedly due to their superior ability to perceive bodily 
signals. Physiological measures such as PEP may not show the expected patterns of results 
for better heartbeat perceivers in tasks requiring physical effort, which may mean that the 
associations between physiological arousal and harmful moral action are not so 
straightforward. However, the relationship between IAc and response time was moderated by 
action-type and suggests that if better heartbeat detectors had a superior ability to regulate 
physical and cardiovascular effort when carrying out the actions, this did not apply equally to 
typical and non-typical actions.  Relatedly, another study found that ‘Consistency’ (a measure 
of people’s ability to focus on and stick to a small group of valuable goals) was associated 
with slower PEP on a mental effort task (Silvia et al., 2013). They speculatively suggested 
that people high on consistency may not appraise short term tasks as useful to achieve 
valuable goals, and therefore may deem them less important. Furthermore, reviews of 
cardiovascular parameters of challenge and threat suggest that systemic-vascular resistance 
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and cardiac output are stronger indicators of challenge and threat associated with the 
biopsychosocial model (Blascovich & Mendes, 2000), and measures of heart rate and PEP 
are more reliably associated with task engagement (Behnke & Kaczmarek, 2018; Seery, 
2011). Seery (2011), suggested that previous work showing corresponding changes in HR 
and PEP alongside changes in SVR and CO, may be due to greater task engagement, which 
may have been conflated with ‘challenge’ states. Further work is needed to understand how 
PEP and physical exertion during moral behaviour experiments are associated with 
interoceptive accuracy and self-reported task engagement.  
We did not find a significant association between trait or state anxiety and IAc in 
Study 3, contrary to prior research finding positive correlations between trait anxiety, 
heartbeat detection ability and cardiovascular reactivity (e.g. Critchley et al., 2004; Pollatos et 
al., 2007a). This may be due to the small sample size. Anxiety was also not associated 
(p>.05) with any of the physiological indexes in the pre-decision timeframe, suggesting that 
anxiety was not responsible for changes in cardiovascular reactivity prior to taking harmful 
action on incongruent trials. In Study 2, we found a negative association between trait anxiety 
and IAc, but trait anxiety did not influence any of the moderation effects of IAc in the 
relationship between physiological arousal and moral judgment. Consistent with this finding, 
Pollatos and colleagues (2007a) suggested that despite common variation among measures of 
heartbeat detection ability and anxiety, cardiovascular reactivity may be independently 
associated with these two variables.  
The absence of a positive relationship between IAc and anxiety in Study 2 and 3, may 
be due to eligibility criteria stating that participants should not be experiencing any current 
mental health conditions. This may have reduced the opportunity for particularly high levels 
of anxiety within the sample. This criterion was consciously set to reduce the possibility of 
anxiety confounding our interoception analyses, and also due to the potentially distressing 
nature of the studies. The negative relationship between trait anxiety and IAc in Study 2, is 
consistent with evidence showing heartbeat detection ability is negatively associated with a 
range of measures of health anxiety, indicating that at least health-related forms of anxiety 
are associated with less accurate interoceptive sensitivity (Krautwurst et al., 2014). However, 
in Study 3, interoceptive sensibility was negatively associated with state anxiety, (p<.05), 
which challenges the notion that a greater tendency to notice bodily sensations is associated 
with heightened self-reported arousal. This may be due to the measure of interoceptive 
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sensibility used (Miller, Murphy & Buss, 1981). In Study 1 this measure of interoceptive 
sensibility positively correlated with self-reported mindfulness, which suggests this measure 
may sometimes capture more adaptive forms of bodily attention. 
We did not find any associations between any of the other interoception measures and 
the moral behaviour measures. Action-based harm aversion has historically been associated 
with cardiovascular indexes of sympathetic arousal (Cushman et al., 2012; Parton & 
McGinley, 2019). This could explain why we only found associations between interoceptive 
accuracy, PEP and response time in Study 3 as this dimension of interoception is most likely 
to moderate the relationship between cardiovascular arousal and behaviour. Gastric 
interoception in particular may not play as pivotal role in moral behaviour experiments, as 
participants are not required to subjectively assess the moral acceptability of harmful action. 
Evaluating the acceptability of harmful actions retrospectively from an allocentric perspective 
(as in Study 2), could have provided opportunity to refer to embodied sensations of disgust 
previously found to be associated with judgments of ethical violations including harmful acts 
of others (Schnall et al., 2008; Vicario et al., 2018). As discussed in Study 1, it may be that 
egocentric harm-based moral judgments are less influenced by gastric sensations associated 
with disgust, that have been associated observations of ‘bad’ moral character (Giner-Sorolla 
& Chapman, 2017) and moral violations of others (Tracy et al., 2019). This could be due to 
the fundamental function of disgust as a defensive ‘rejection’ mechanism to protect the 
organism from a range of contaminating and violating external threats to the body and soul 
(Rozin, 2015). Disgust sensations may therefore be less useful to egocentric judgments of 
harm, as disgust towards immoral action would need to be self-directed. Self-directed 
emotions of shame and guilt are intuitively more influential for egocentric judgments of harm 
where you consider the self-relevant consequences of immoral action. The differentiation 
between the heart and stomach is interesting as it suggests sensations within the cardiac and 
gastrointestinal visceral systems may be discretely associated with different types of moral 
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 Study 4 was conceived at the onset of the coronavirus pandemic. These exceptional 
circumstances provided a unique context to explore morally relevant behaviours during 
national lockdowns during April-May 2020. In the early days of the crisis in Europe there 
was an overwhelming amount of media content depicting traumatic stories and images of 
people who were suffering with and dying from coronavirus. These were often shocking and 
highly emotional stories, that evoked a strong imagery regarding the unknowable and 
indiscriminate threat of this new deadly disease. Some articles were clearly more ‘harm-
salient’ in their descriptions of the pandemic, highlighting the threat of death and illness as a 
central concern that was likely to have a strong emotional impact on readers. People were 
also being told to make significant changes to their behaviour on a massive scale. Public 
health messages were emphasising the need to make personal sacrifices such as social 
distancing, in order to control the spread of the virus, ultimately to save lives and reduce the 
strain on health services. However, an early research study during coronavirus, found 
emotionally arousing media frames and content during this time was increasing emotional 
distress of readers (e.g. Tabri et al., 2020). Anxiety in particular has the potential to 
encourage preoccupation with selfish needs during the pandemic, as our sense of threat-
perception is heightened (Barlow, 1988). We hypothesised that self-oriented distress may 
make people less inclined to consider the wider social implications of their behaviour, 
potentially reducing the likelihood that they would behave in a way that benefits a ‘greater 
good’ at a societal level. Although, interestingly, anxiety has also shown to be useful in 
facilitating some preventative behaviours during previous pandemics (e.g. Bults et al., 2011). 
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In addition, as this was a health-centric crisis, we were particularly interested in whether 
people’s tendency to focus on or worry about interoceptive or bodily sensations influenced 
their interpretation and emotional and behavioural responses to news media about 
coronavirus. 
We tested the effects of frame-type and harm-salience of coronavirus media on 
people’s behavioural intentions and moral judgments during the pandemic and investigated 
whether individual differences in interoceptive sensibility and anxiety influenced these 
effects. We manipulated the amount of harm-content (high versus low) and also the frame-
type (individual focus i.e. episodic, versus wider societal focus i.e. thematic) of fictitious 
coronavirus media articles. This time, we used the ‘noticing’, ‘not worrying’ and ‘not 
distracting’ subscales from the Multidimensional Interoceptive Awareness scale (Mehling et 
al., 2018) as opposed to the Body Consciousness scale (Miller, Murphy, & Buss, 1981) used 
in study 1-3. These subscales were more comprehensive and appropriate to assess tendencies 
to worry or catastrophise about bodily sensations, that would be most relevant to their 
responses to threatening health-related media.  We limited the measure to these three 
subscales to reduce experimental load and to focus our hypotheses.  
We developed novel moral dilemmas that were specifically related to the coronavirus 
pandemic, to explore whether moral judgments directly related to real-world moral dilemmas 
showed similar patterns to other generic moral dilemmas. Moral dilemmas have not 
previously been curated to reflect immediate real-world issues that participants may be 
personally affected by, which could increase emotional engagement with these tasks.  The 
dilemmas were either personal (in the role of self) or impersonal (in the role of a healthcare 
worker) to ascertain whether adopting these roles facilitated different responses, and whether 
these responses predicted real-world behavioural intentions during the pandemic.  
The role of media effects on moral judgment and behaviour has not been explored 
before in a pandemic context. Furthermore, the role of individual differences in interoception 
has not previously been investigated as a factor that could influence people’s behavioural 
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Media coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic is vital for providing information to the 
public to encourage informed and united action that can reduce the spread of the virus. Media 
frames can affect people’s emotions and exert influence by accentuating certain issues over 
others, increasing the accessibility or saliency of these issues. Episodic frames are more 
individualistic, surround specific events and are more likely to use evocative engagement 
strategies. Thematic frames lie in the public realm, integrate events and stories into one 
fundamental issue and provide audiences with useful background knowledge. This online 
experiment (n=151) investigated whether frame-type (episodic versus thematic) and the 
harm-salient content of coronavirus media stories influenced feelings of anxiety, health-
relevant behavioural intentions and moral judgments. The harm-content and the frame-type 
indirectly influenced people’s intention to carry out preventative and anti-social behaviours 
by shaping subjective appraisals of harm-salience. Anxiety moderated whether people’s 
appraisals of harm-salience translated into preventative or antisocial behaviours. Moral 
judgments were less affected by the news coverage and in the main did not correlate with 
behavioural intentions, suggesting moral judgments regarding the treatment of coronavirus 
patients are not informative for predicting real-world behaviours during the pandemic. 


















The importance of media coverage during a pandemic 
COVID-19 is a novel form of the coronavirus disease primarily affecting the lungs 
and airways which continues to be a threat to public health worldwide while we await a 
vaccine. Although less deadly than other epidemic diseases such as SARS and Ebola, 
coronavirus is extremely contagious. From its origins in Wuhan, China, in 2019, coronavirus 
had spread globally within two months and at the time of writing this article has cost the lives 
of over 1.4 million people worldwide. Media coverage during previous pandemics has shown 
to be vital for providing information to the public to encourage informed and united action 
that can reduce viral spread (Bults et al., 2011; Yan, Tang, Gabriele, & Wu, 2016). Equally, 
coverage regarding ‘threats’ is likely to be regarded as more newsworthy during a pandemic 
(Chang, 2012; Klemm, Das, & Hartmann, 2016) and the media has been criticised for 
dramatising or sensationalising the deadliness and threat of previous pandemics (Klemm et 
al., 2016) which has the potential to stir up public anxieties (Bodas, Siman-Tov, Peleg, & 
Solomon, 2015; Chang, 2012; Tabri, Hollingshead, & Wohl, 2020).  
Media framing effects 
Media frames are a category of rhetorical devices used by media outlets that can 
influence people’s perceptions of risk during health crises (Chang, 2012), by shaping how 
people interpret (e.g. Hart, 2011; Iyengar & Simon, 1993) and respond to public issues (Price, 
Tewksbury, & Powers, 1997; Maddux & Rogers, 1983). Gamson and Modigliani describe 
media framing as “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an 
unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them.” (1987, p.143). This study is 
situated in the literature of emphasis framing effects, whereby the media influences opinions 
by accentuating certain issues or themes over others, thus increasing the accessibility of these 
issues in the minds of audiences (Druckman, 2001). Agenda-setting theory is also relevant 
and proposes a strong relationship between the emphasis the media places on certain issues 
and how important audiences evaluate these issues to be (see Scheufele & Iyengar, 2012 for a 
review). In particular, we were interested in the effects of episodic and thematic frames of 
coronavirus news coverage. Episodic frames are more individualistic in nature, surround 
specific cases or events and are more likely to use evocative engagement strategies such as 
shocking images or headlines. In contrast, thematic frames lie in the public realm, integrate 
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events and stories into one fundamental issue and seek to provide audiences with background 
knowledge (Iyengar, 1994; Nitz & West, 2004).  
The use of episodic versus thematic frames can shape perceptions of who is 
responsible for dealing with societal issues and influence how likely we are to take personal 
action to resolve social problems. For example, when issues of poverty are framed in a 
thematic format (general statistics and outcomes) people attribute more responsibility for 
poverty to the government and wider society, whereas episodic frames (a case of one 
impoverished individual) encourage people to assign responsibility to that individual 
(Iyengar, 1994). Frames can be persuasive because people’s attitudes or judgments are often 
influenced by how easily we can access certain types of information (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). For example, narratives describing an experience of one individual victim (episodic) 
are more effective at encouraging charitable donations than a story involving numerous 
victims (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b). Helping the one person identified appeals to the 
helper as we typically get greater satisfaction from helping a greater proportion of identified 
victims, in this case, helping 1 identified victim equates to helping 100% of identified victims 
(Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b). 
Media frames are also purposefully used to emotionally affect audiences as a means 
to seduce, shock or influence them (Klemm et al., 2016). Our emotional reactions can then 
produce different behavioural responses as we try to gain congruency between what we feel 
and what we think (Nerb & Spada, 2001). Episodic frames are characteristically more 
emotionally arousing than thematic frames, as people typically have stronger emotional 
responses towards identified people compared to unidentified people in a story (Small & 
Loewenstein, 2003). Hart (2011) suggests that individuals represent discrete and coherent 
psychological entities which provide a more understandable narrative for interpretation. 
Consistent with this, Aarøe (2011) and Gross (2008) found episodic frames were more 
effective at inducing emotional responses towards the story’s subject, than thematic frames. 
However, thematic frames were found to be more persuasive when no emotional response 
was present (Aarøe, 2011) or when accounting for emotional effects of the frames (Gross, 
2008). People reported feeling more distress when reading stories about one identified victim, 
compared to multiple unidentified victims (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a), and gave more monetary 
contributions (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b). In contrast, Hart (2011) found feelings of 
anxiety and worry triggered by media coverage stimulated behaviour change and policy 
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support, but a concern for victims did not. Hart proposed that frames which evoked feelings 
of self-focused anxiety or worry inspired self-serving ‘prosocial’ behaviour as an attempt to 
reduce negative feelings e.g. by donating to an associated cause.  
Harm salience of news coverage  
Although episodic frames are typically more affecting than thematic frames, some 
thematically framed narratives are inherently more passionate or shocking through their use 
of dramatic statistics or emotional language, which can make messages more memorable 
(Bolls, Lang, & Potter, 2001; Uribe & Gunter, 2007). Therefore, in addition to the effects of 
episodic and thematic frames, we sought to explore the effects of harm-salience, as an 
authored characteristic of news stories that could be particularly emotionally arousing during 
this pandemic. We conceptualised harm salience as the prominence of harm and suffering of 
people depicted within an article, which could be a property of both episodic and thematic 
stories about people who have been profoundly affected by the pandemic. In virtual reality 
research, Patil and colleagues (2014) found that graphically representing the number of 
people who could be harmed in hypothetical moral dilemmas increased people’s 
physiological arousal and the likelihood they would carry out an action in the interests of 
saving the most victims. The authors proposed, the contextual saliency of the potential 
victims led people to place more value on the potential harmful outcomes of their decisions. 
The saliency of harm to others can also be exaggerated in written media, as both issue 
saliency and evaluative tone of media coverage are key factors dictating the direction and 
emotional strength of a media message (Sheafer, 2007). We suggest that articles using 
descriptive language that evokes stronger visual representations of harm or suffering of others 
affected by the pandemic, would be more emotionally arousing and accentuate the harmful 
consequences of the virus as a central issue, compared to less harm-salient articles.  
Media coverage, anxiety and behaviour during a pandemic 
As well as emphasising the harmful consequences of coronavirus, harm-salient 
narratives may also generate emotional distress if readers consider the risks and consequences 
of the coronavirus in their own lives. The social amplification of risk model (Kasperson et al., 
2016) proposes communication of risk via news media, can selectively report some 
information in a way to increase or reduce people’s perceptions of risk, irrespective of the 
accuracy of the coverage. Media coverage is classified as dramatizing, sensationalist, or 
‘hype’ if it disproportionately draws attention to a threat, exaggerates risk (Vasterman, 
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Yzermans, & Dirkzwager, 2005) or predominantly discusses a threat using emotional or 
arousing content, as opposed to factual content (see Klemm et al., 2016 for review). 
Consistent with this, media frames that emphasise coronavirus as an existential threat have 
shown to increase anxiety in readers (Tabri et al., 2020). Anxiety has shown an inverse 
relationship with empathy, which is likely due to the fact that while empathy requires a 
consideration of other’s needs, anxiety facilitates a preoccupation with selfish needs 
(Deardorff et al., 1977). Moreover, threatening or shocking stories of others have been shown 
to simultaneously increase anxiety and reduce empathy-related distress (Negd, Mallan, & 
Lipp, 2011). Anxiety increases threat-perception, makes us think in more simplistic ways 
(Barlow, 1988) and has been associated with unethical behaviours (e.g. Kouchaki & Desai, 
2015). Reminding people of their own mortality can also increase people’s self-oriented 
defences to avoid feelings of anxiety (Greenberg et al., 2003) which can impair moral 
decision-making (Trémolière, Neys, & Bonnefon, 2012) and influence health-related 
behaviours (Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008; Grover & Miller, 2014). 
Conversely, epidemiological evidence suggests that anxiety may actually be useful for 
public health during a pandemic, as higher levels of anxiety were associated with more 
preventative measures to keep well during the Influenza pandemic in the Netherlands (Bults 
et al., 2011), during the swine-flu epidemic (Jones & Salathé, 2009) and during outbreaks of 
SARS in Hong Kong (Lau, Yang, Tsui, & Kim, 2003; Leung et al., 2005). Together, these 
findings suggest that media frames generating anxiety in readers may encourage egoistically 
driven preventative behaviours to keep oneself safe from coronavirus but may concurrently 
reduce motivations to carry out behaviours that serve the interests of other people. We 
explored whether anxiety after reading a coronavirus news article increased preventative 
behaviours but weakened people’s capacity to carry out prosocial behaviours and/or avoid 
carrying out antisocial behaviours.  
In addition, some people are more prone to noticing, paying attention to and/or worry 
about internal bodily sensations which can predispose them to catastrophising, anxiety and 
health-related concerns (Clark et al., 1997; Domschke et al., 2018). These dispositional 
tendencies represent subconstructs of interoceptive sensibility (Mehling et al., 2018) which 
could influence how people react to a global health crisis but to our knowledge has not been 
explored in this context before. Interoception refers to our perception of sensations 
originating in the body that accompany regulatory processes associated with homeostasis, 
such as cardiac or gastrointestinal feelings originating in the body (Craig, 2015). Some 
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people are more sensitive to changes in bodily sensations than others (Garfinkel & Critchley, 
2013). Therefore, understanding individual differences in how people typically respond to 
somatic sensations potentially resembling symptoms of illness, discomfort or pain during this 
time could provide insight into how media communications about the harmful outcomes of 
coronavirus, may influence emotional and behavioural reactions to this media.   
Do moral judgments predict behavioural responses to news coverage? 
Finally, whether or not people choose to carry out behaviours that could prevent the 
spread of the virus or help others during the pandemic has moral implications. Collectively, 
we make sacrifices to our social lives, our time spent outdoors, and how often we visit friends 
and family, to ultimately contain the virus and prevent a rising death toll. As feelings of 
anxiety can make us more prone to focus on selfish needs (Deardorff et al., 1977) which can 
influence moral decision-making (Sarlo, Lotto, Rumiati, & Palomba, 2014; Zhao, Harris, & 
Vigo, 2016), we explored whether people’s moral judgments regarding coronavirus moral 
dilemmas predicted their intentions to conduct themselves in ways that benefit public health 
in general (e.g. social distancing), specifically benefit others (e.g. volunteering) or 
specifically benefit themselves (e.g. bulk buying). There is growing research to suggest that 
people’s hypothetical moral judgments often diverge from their moral behaviours when faced 
with the same scenarios in more realistic environments (e.g. Francis et al., 2016), but this 
judgment-behaviour discrepancy has not been explored in a pandemic context. 
Present study  
A primary aim of this study was to investigate the influence of frame-type and harm-
salience of coronavirus news coverage on readers’ anxiety, moral judgments and behavioural 




H1. Episodic frames and high harm-content articles will increase anxiety levels. 
 
H2. People higher in interoceptive sensibility will demonstrate greater anxiety after reading 
the articles, independent of the effect of frame-type and harm-content. 
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H3. Episodic frames and a greater amount of harm-content in the news articles will induce 
stronger subjective representations of harm and suffering of their subjects.  
 
H4. Frame-type and harm content will influence behavioural intentions by enhancing 
appraisals of harm-salience which may be moderated by anxiety.  
 
H5. Frame-type and harm content will influence hypothetical moral judgments about the 
treatment of coronavirus patients. 
 






The sample was 39.7% male, 1 MtF Female participant, and 1 person preferred not to 
disclose. The age of participants ranged between 18 and 74 years (Median=23, SD= 12.42). 
Five people did not disclose their age. A large proportion of the sample resided in Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland (47.7%). Minimum sample size was based on a-priori power 
calculations using G*Power (α = 0.05, β = 0.8), estimating medium effect sizes (d=0.5, df=1) 
resulting in 128 participants, 32 per group. We exceeded this slightly (n=151) and group sizes 
were nearly identical. Participants were required to be aged 18+ but no other specific 
inclusion criteria needed to be met. During the time of the study, from mid-March through to 
early April 2020, 92% of the participants were in countries that were beginning or had 
already begun national lockdown. The remaining sample were either following localised or 
national recommendations, or in localised lockdown (Dunford et al., 2020).  
Design 
A 2x2 between participant’s design investigated the impact of harm-content (high vs 
low) and frame-type (episodic vs thematic) of COVID-19 media narratives. Group sizes for 
each of the four conditions were roughly equal: high harm-content episodic group (n=36), 
low harm-content episodic group (n=38), high harm-content thematic group (n=39) and low 
 ccxxx 
harm-content thematic group (n=38). There was no significant difference in the distribution 
of healthcare workers (F (3, 147) =.358, p=.783) or keyworkers (F (3, 147) =.608, p=.611), 
between group conditions. Each participant viewed one news article. Dependent variables 
included: anxiety, subjective harm-salience (SHS), moral judgments and behavioural 
intentions related to coronavirus. Interoceptive sensibility was a within-participants 
independent variable. Age, sex and baseline individual differences in people’s experiences 




All articles were equal in word count; did not refer to any geographical location; and 
provided the same message at the end: The message from government health officials remains 
the same: Stay home. Protect our health service. Save lives. All articles were based on real-
news stories, but fictitious in nature (see supplementary material). Fictitious names used 
within the episodic articles were the same, and also for the thematic articles. No images were 
used. The articles were pre-validated by a group of five people who read the articles and rated 
whether the harm-salience of each article and whether the articles were more thematic or 
episodic in nature, which was followed up with a brief telephone discussion. The episodic 
articles focused on the individual stories of several people. The high harm-content episodic 
article depicted a distressing story about a family who had lost their son/sibling very quickly 
to the virus, whereas the low harm-content episodic article depicted several shopkeepers and 
pharmacists who were discussing their fears of catching the virus while at work. Quotes and 
personal experiences of individuals were the focus of these articles. The high harm-content 
thematic article discussed the wider impact and suffering of people within the health service 
dealing with an overwhelming amount of very ill patients. The low harm-content thematic 
article discussed the wider impact of government failings to roll out mass testing for 
coronavirus. Thematic articles did not focus on individual stories, although used quotes from 
‘experts’ in the field providing comment on the wider story. The fundamental differences 
between high and low harm-content articles were the amount of harm-related language and 
descriptions used. More direct associations of harm and suffering of individuals/families 
(episodic) and larger bodies of people (thematic) were made in the high harm-content articles. 
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Moral dilemma stimuli 
The moral dilemma task involved six situations directly related to treatment for 
coronavirus patients in hospital (see supplementary materials). Three of the dilemmas 
required participants to adopt the role of self, asking people to consider a situation involving 
a friend or relative (Personal). The other three dilemmas required participants to adopt the 
role of a healthcare worker involving patients with coronavirus (Impersonal). Presentation 
order was as follows: impersonal-personal-impersonal-personal-impersonal-personal. The 
moral dilemmas were based on a recent paper (Emanuel et al., 2020) outlining moral 
guidelines for healthcare workers in America during the coronavirus pandemic which 
instructed ethical treatment principles including: maximising outcomes offered by limited 
resources, equal treatment of people, prioritising people who were more ill or more at risk, 
and endorsing and prioritising instrumental value (e.g. supporting people such as healthcare 
workers who could be of help during the crisis), which were incorporated into the moral 
dilemmas. These principles are largely ‘utilitarian’ in nature in that they promote utility and 
maximising outcomes/advantage for the most people.  
After reading each dilemma, participants were asked to judge whether a given action 
was morally appropriate or inappropriate e.g. ‘Do you take the ventilator away from the one 
patient to share between the other two patients?’. Response options included: ‘Yes, this is 
appropriate’ or ‘No, this is not appropriate’ (coded as Yes=1, No=0). Participants were then 
asked to rate how morally acceptable they judged the action that was propositioned in the 
question to be (1=Completely unacceptable, 7=Completely acceptable). For two of the 
personal moral dilemmas, participants were asked to judge whether an anti-utilitarian was 
morally appropriate e.g. ‘Do you insist the ventilator remains with your friend?’. These 
questions were reverse coded (Yes, this is appropriate =0, and No, this is inappropriate=1). 
Moral acceptability scores for these items were also reverse coded (i.e. Completely 
acceptable=1, Completely unacceptable =7) to inversely reflect judgments about the 
inappropriateness of anti-utilitarian actions. Mean moral appropriateness and moral 






After reading the article, participants were asked to rate how likely it was that they 
would carry out certain behaviours over the coming weeks (1=Unlikely, 7=Very likely). 
Behaviours included: 1) cutting out inessential shopping trips, 2) being more cautious around 
social distancing protocols 3) avoid going outdoors for walks/runs/cycles at ‘busier’ times 4) 
contact a friend/relative who might need support 5) offer to volunteer COVID-19 effort 
(where possible) 6) keep up to date with news surrounding coronavirus 7) purchase more 
food/cleaning supplies/medical supplies than needed 8) Go against government protocol to 
meet a friend/relative 
Subjective harm-salience 
At the end of the experiment participants were asked: ‘In the article you read, how 
striking (or salient) was the physical/mental harm and suffering of individuals or groups of 
people dealing with Covid-19?’. Likert scale responses included 1=Not very striking/salient 
and 7=Very striking/salient.   
Anxiety  
State anxiety was calculated using the State Anxiety Scale (STAI, Spielberger & 
Gorsuch, 1983). The scale includes positively and negatively coded items. Participants were 
asked to indicate their agreement (Not at all/Somewhat/Moderately so/Very much so), with 
twenty different statements e.g. ‘I feel calm’, ‘I feel tense’, ‘I feel at ease’.  
Interoceptive sensibility 
People’s awareness and response to both pleasant and unpleasant bodily sensations 
was measured using the ‘noticing’, ‘not distracting’ and ‘not worrying’ subscales of the 
Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness scale version 2 (Mehling et al., 
2018). Participants were asked to indicate how often each item statement applied to them 
generally in daily life (0=Never, 5=Always). The noticing subscale consists of 4 items e.g. 
‘When I am tense, I notice where the tension is located in my body’; the not-distracting 
subscale consists of 6 items which were reverse coded e.g. ‘I distract myself from sensations 
of discomfort’; and the not-worrying subscale consists of 5 items, 3 of which were reverse 
coded e.g. ‘I can notice an unpleasant body sensation without worrying about it’.   
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Individual differences 
We used items from a recent pre-print investigating individual differences in people’s 
responses to COVID-19 (Everett et al., 2020) that capture a number of baseline factors that 
could contribute to people’s perceptions and reactions to news coverage about COVID-19. 
Items included: 1) How much of a threat do you think COVID-19 (coronavirus) is? (1 = not a 
threat at all; 7= extremely threatening) 2) How likely do you think it is that you yourself will 
die as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic? (1 = extremely unlikely, 7 = extremely likely); 3) 
How likely do you think it is that someone you know will die as a result of the COVID-19 
pandemic? (1 = extremely unlikely, 7 = extremely likely); 4) How unpleasant would it be for 
you personally to stay at home and avoid social contact for the next 2 weeks? (1 = not at all 
unpleasant; 7 = extremely pleasant); 5) Over the past week, how often have you sought out 
information about the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g. news articles, video, social media posts, 
etc.)? (1 = rarely, 4 = occasionally, 7 = frequently); 6) Are there currently a lot of cases of 
COVID-19 in the city where you live? (yes, no, not sure); 7) Has anyone you know personally 
tested positive for coronavirus? (yes, no, not sure). Items 6 and 7 were coded as Yes=2, 
Unsure=1, and No=0. 
Procedure 
Following approval from University of Bath Psychology Ethics Committee, 151 
participants were recruited online via the research platform Prolific, University of Bath 
research participation pool and departmental email lists. Participants recruited via Prolific 
were awarded monetary compensation for their time in accordance with platform guidelines. 
Students accessing the experiment via the University participation pool were awarded credits 
as part of the experimental hours scheme. All other participants were able to enter into a prize 
draw to win 1 of 4 £20 Amazon vouchers. The experiment was developed in Qualtrics online 
experimental software and accessed via an anonymous link. Prospective participants were 
explicitly warned in research advertisements and information sheets about the potential 
upsetting nature of the experiment.  Participants viewed an information sheet and consent 
form and encouraged to contact the experimenter with any questions or concerns about taking 
part. The whole experiment took 20-25 minutes. Demographic information, baseline 
individual differences measures and the interoceptive sensibility measures were completed 
first. Participants were then presented with 1 of 4 news articles and reminded throughout that 
they could close their browser window at any time to end the experiment. Presentation of 
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news articles was randomised, to ensure equal group sizes. There was no time limit for 
participants to read the news article. Participants then completed the state anxiety scale. 
Instructions for the moral dilemma task were then presented. There were six moral dilemma 
stories, viewed in the same order. The two moral judgment questions were presented after 
each dilemma. There was a timing function set for the moral dilemmas, so that 7-10 seconds 
had to pass before participants could advance to the questions depending on the amount of 
text. After 50 seconds participants were automatically advanced to the moral judgment 
questions. The final section required participants to rate their intentions to carry out certain 
behaviours over the next few weeks. Participants were then asked to judge how salient they 
perceived the physical or mental harm of people in the news article to be. A debrief sheet 
followed providing further details about the research and information and links for people to 
seek further support if needed. Other links to the World Health Organisation regarding 
coronavirus were also provided, as well as YouTube videos which aimed to provide a 
positive or restorative experience for participants. 
 
Results 
Individual differences in experiences and perceptions of coronavirus 
Around 40% of the sample were living in a place with many cases of coronavirus and 
also knew someone who had tested positive for coronavirus (Table 1), indicating a 
considerable amount of people had been personally impacted by the pandemic. A principal 
component analysis (PCA) was carried out on the remaining five individual differences 
questions to see whether they could be reduced to a single dimension. Four factors were 
retained which cumulatively explained 91.1% of the total variance with eigenvalues of 1.934, 
0.854, 0.692, and 1.076. The two component items combined (item 2 and 3) both represented 
a sense of threat regarding the deadliness of COVID-19 to the self and others. A mean score 
of these items was relabelled ‘Perceived deadliness of virus’. The remaining items were 









Table 1  
 
Percentage of sample who were aware of lots of cases of coronavirus in the place that they lived, and percentage of sample 
who knew someone who had tested positively for coronavirus 
 
 Yes Unsure No 
Many cases nearby 39.7 14.6 45.7 
Tested positive for virus 39.7 6.6 53.6 
 
Behavioural intentions 
A principal component analysis (PCA) was also carried out to investigate whether the 
behavioural items could be grouped within distinct dimensions. Three factors were retained 
(Table 2). These factors cumulatively explained, 30.15%, 46.57% and 61.19% of the total 
variance with Eigenvalues of 2.248, 1.477 and 1.171 respectively. Items for each factor were 
combined into a composite mean score. Factor 1 was labelled ‘Preventative behaviours’, as 
all items reflected intentions to reduce acts that could increase the catching or spread of the 
virus. Factor 2 was labelled ‘Prosocial behaviours’ as these items represented a sense of 
carrying out acts which had positive outcomes for others, including taking responsibility for 
keeping informed via the news. Factor 3 was labelled ‘Antisocial behaviours’, as these final 
two items corresponded with actively selfish behaviours that could have negative outcomes 
for others. 
Table 2  
 
Varimax Rotated component Matrix for Principal Component analysis. Values refer to factor loadings. Items in bold face 
retained for that factor. 
 
Behaviour Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
 Preventative Prosocial  Anti-social 
1. Reduce shopping trips .876 .085 -.077 
2. Caution social distancing .783 .312 -.017 
3. Avoid outdoors  .759 -.043 .267 
4. Contact friend/relative .133 .825 -.067 
5. Volunteer -.033 .619 .344 
6. News updates .086 .546 -.154 
7. Bulk-buying .196 -.079 .836 
8. Break protocol -.477 .034 .498 
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H1. Frame-type, harm-content and anxiety 
A two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to test the effects of frame-
type (episodic versus thematic) and harm- content (high harm- content versus low harm- 
content) on anxiety (see Table 3). Contrary to H1, there was no significant interaction 
between harm- content and frame-type for anxiety scores, F (1, 147) =.586, p=.445, partial 
η2=.04. Simple main effects for harm- content F (1, 147) =.509, p=.477, partial η2=.003, and 
frame-type, F (1, 147) =1.711, p=.193, partial η2=.012, were also non-significant. This 
suggests that frame-type and harm-content of articles people read were not responsible for the 
differences in anxiety people reported after reading the articles. 
Table 3 
 
Mean and standard deviation anxiety scores for each group condition (Harm content=HC) 
 
 Article group 
 Episodic Thematic 








14.37 10.42 13.71 14.53 
 
H2. Interoceptive sensibility and anxiety  
A three-step hierarchical regression was performed to test whether a tendency to 
notice, focus on, or worry about internal sensations predicted feelings of anxiety when 
controlling for group condition and key individual differences. Subjective harm-salience 
(SHS) was also included as a predictor, to test its association with anxiety. Predictors entered 
at step-one were age, sex, threat of COVID-19, subjective deadlines of COVID-19, 
unpleasantness of staying at home, many cases of COVID-19 in area, known someone who 
tested positive with coronavirus, and seeking information about coronavirus. Frame-type and 
harm-content condition were entered at step-two. SHS scores and interoception subscales 
‘noticing’, ‘not distracting’ and ‘not worrying’ were inputted at step-three.   
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Model 1 significantly predicted anxiety, R² chng=.216, F (8, 137) =4.179, p<.0005. 
Specifically, age (b=-.247, p=.004), sex (b=.178, p=.026), and finding it unpleasant to be at 
home during lockdown (b=.172, p=.029) all significantly predicted anxiety in Model 1-3, 
with younger people and women reporting higher levels of anxiety. The addition of frame-
type and harm-content in Model 2 did not significantly improve the model. In Model 3, we 
found that including SHS (b=.205, p=.020) and the interoception ‘not worrying’ subscale 
(b=-.169, p=.039) led to a statistically significant increase (F change= 3.144, p=.017) of 
variance explained, R² chng=.067, F (14, 131) =3.979, p<.0005. Therefore, in support of H2 
people’s appraisals of harm-salience and a tendency to worry about bodily sensations 
significantly increased feelings of anxiety when controlling for group condition and key 
individual differences.  
H3. Frame-type, harm-content and subjective harm salience 
A two-way Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted to assess the impact 
of frame-type and harm-content on subjective appraisals of harm-salience (SHS). SHS was 
the dependent variable (Table 4), with two between subjects’ factors: frame-type (episodic 
versus thematic) and harm-content (high versus low). The three interoception subscales were 
included as covariates to explore the influence of frame-type and harm-content when 
controlling for interoceptive tendencies. The ANCOVA revealed a main effect of harm-
content, F (1, 144) =26.32, p<.001, partial η2=.155, a main effect of frame-type, F (1, 144) 
=7.457, p=.007, partial η2=.049, and a significant interaction between frame type and harm-
content on SHS ratings, F (1, 144) =5.457, p=.021, partial η2=.037. An analysis of simple 
main effects of frame-type and harm-content was performed with statistical significance 
receiving a Bonferroni adjustment. Bootstrapping (x1000) was applied to confidence 
intervals and tests of significance of post hoc tests. We found SHS was significantly higher 
for the episodic low harm-content article compared to thematic low harm-content article, F 
(1, 144) =12.821, p=.001, partial η2=.082, 95% CI [-1.701 to -.450]. Although SHS was 
marginally higher for the episodic high harm content article than the thematic high harm 
content article, this was not statistically significant, F (1, 144) =0.95, p=.740, partial η2=.001. 
Therefore, in partial support of H3, episodic frames strengthened appraisals of harm-salience, 
but only for stories not containing very harm-salient content. For both thematic and episodic 
stories that have more harm-salient content, people perceived the harm and suffering of 
individuals versus larger groups/organisations in society as similarly striking.   
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For the interoception covariates, the ‘noticing’, F (1, 144) =2.772, p=.098, partial 
η2=.019, and ‘not distracting’ subscales, F (1, 144) =1.443, p=.232, partial η2=.010, did not 
significantly explain variance in SHS ratings. However, the ‘not worrying’ subscale was 
significantly related (r= -.133) to SHS, F (1, 144) =4.360, p=.039, partial η2=.029. This 
suggests people who were more prone to worrying about painful/unpleasant bodily sensations 
gave higher subjective-harm salience ratings when controlling for frame-type and harm-
content.  
 
Table 4  
 
Means, Standard Deviations and Standard errors for Subjective harm-salience ratings (SHS) for the Four Article Groups 
(HC = Harm-content) 
 
 Article group 
 Episodic Thematic 
SHS Low HC High HC Low HC High HC 
M 
 
4.842 5.361 3.763 5.230 
(SD) 
 
1.424 1.198 1.459 1.111 
(SE) 
 
.241 .194 .235 .179 
 
 
H4. Frame type, harm-content, subjective harm salience and behavioural intentions 
We investigated whether harm-content and frame-type indirectly influenced 
participants preventative, prosocial and antisocial behaviours by shaping their appraisals of 
harm salience. Furthermore, because subjective harm salience (SHS) predicted feelings of 
anxiety in H2, and anxiety has been shown to be an important factor determining preventative 
behaviours in previous pandemics, we tested whether the relationship between subjective 
harm-salience (SHS) and behaviour was modulated by anxiety. We used PROCESS Model 
21 (Hayes, 2018a; see figure 1) to explore the influence of harm-content and frame-type for 
each of the behaviour measures, resulting in two regression analyses for the three dependent 
variables a) Preventative b) Prosocial and c) Antisocial behaviours. For each dependent 
variable, harm-content was inputted as the independent variable and frame-type as the 
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moderator between harm-content and SHS. Anxiety was inputted as a moderator between 
SHS and behaviour. For all models, we found a greater amount of harm-content (b=1.468, 
p=<.0001) and the use of episodic frames (b=1.079, p=.0004) strengthened subjective harm-
salience (SHS), R²= .1915, F (3, 147) =11.606, p<.0001.  
Preventative behaviours 
We found frame-type moderated the effect of harm-content on SHS, with harm-
content only increasing SHS in the thematic style articles, R² chng= .028, F (1, 147) =4.966, 
p=.027, 95% CI [.8788 to 2.056]. The interaction between SHS and anxiety significantly 
predicted preventative behaviours, b=.0114, p=.045, R² = .025, F (1, 146) =4.068, p=.045, 
95% CI [.0002 to .0225], indicating a moderation effect of anxiety (Figure 1). The Johnson-
Neyman (JN) technique was used to explore this moderation effect by identifying regions of 
significance. We found SHS increased preventative behaviours but only for people scoring 
above 39.08 points on the anxiety scale, 69.5% of the sample. We also found that the effect 
of harm-content of thematic articles through the mediating factor of SHS indirectly increased 
preventative behaviours, but only for people scoring at the mean and 1 standard deviation 
above the mean on the anxiety scale. Anxiety did not moderate the overall indirect effect of 
harm content on preventative behaviours, 95% CI [-.0279 to .0003], suggesting the 
modulating influence of anxiety was isolated to the pathway between SHS and preventative 
behaviours (Hayes, 2015, 2018b). In sum, a greater amount of harm content in the thematic 
articles strengthened appraisals of harm-salience, which, given a sufficient level of anxiety, 











 Statistical diagram of PROCESS Model 21 (Hayes, 2018) for effect of harm-content on subjective harm salience (SHS) and 






Note. Harm-content (high= 1, low=0) and frame-type (episodic=1, thematic=0). Effect of subjective harm-salience on 
preventative behaviour is moderated by anxiety. Values represent beta coefficients for each pathway of the model, from left 
to right: interaction frame-type*harm-content on SHS; effect harm-content on SHS; direct effect of harm-content; effect of 
SHS on preventative behaviour; interaction SHS*anxiety on preventative behaviour (*p<.05, **p<.00001). 
 
Prosocial behaviours 
Again, we used PROCESS Model 21 (Hayes, 2018a) to investigate whether frame-
type and harm-content indirectly influenced prosocial behaviour through the mediating factor 
of subjective harm-salience (SHS). We found a direct effect of harm-content on prosocial 
behaviours, t=.5253, p=.0226, 95% CI [-.8139 to -.0625]. Specifically, people who read the 
high harm-content articles were less likely to commit to prosocial behaviours, such as calling 
a relative or keeping up to date with the news and this was independent from their appraisals 
of harm-salience and anxiety. Confidence intervals for the indirect effects of harm-content on 
prosocial behaviours through SHS included zero, indicating no indirect effect of harm-































Figure 2.  
 




Note. Harm-content (high=1, low=0) and frame-type (episodic =1, thematic =0).Values represent beta coefficients for each 
pathway of the model from left to right: interaction frame-type*harm-content on SHS; effect harm-content on SHS; direct 




Using PROCESS Model 21 (Hayes, 2018a) we investigated whether frame-type and 
harm-content indirectly influenced antisocial behaviour. We found subjective harm salience 
(SHS) significantly predicted antisocial behaviours, b=.608, p=.025, R²= .056, F (4, 146) 
=2.173, p=.075, but again, this was moderated by anxiety, R² chng= .027, F (1, 146) =4.214, 
p=.042, 95% CI [-.0228 to -.0004]. Using the JN technique, we found SHS only predicted 
antisocial behaviour for people scoring below 36.29 on the anxiety measure, 28.48% of the 
sample. The overall indirect effect of harm-content on antisocial behaviour was also 
moderated by anxiety 95% CI [.0000 to .0286]. Therefore, thematic articles higher in harm-
content increased the likelihood that people would carry out antisocial behaviours by 
enhancing appraisals of harm-salience, but only for people experiencing relatively low levels 
of anxiety after reading the article (Figure 3). This suggests a moderate level of emotional 
distress may be important to deter people from carrying out more selfish or antisocial 





Figure 3.  
 





Note. Harm-content (high=1, low=0) and frame-type (episodic =1, thematic =0). Indirect effect of harm-content moderated 
by anxiety. Values represent beta coefficients for each pathway of the model from left to right: interaction frame-type*harm-
content on SHS; effect harm-content on SHS; direct effect of frame-type; effect of SHS on antisocial behaviour; interaction 
SHS*anxiety on antisocial behaviour (*p<.05, **p<.0005). 
 
H5. Frame-type, harm-content and moral judgments 
We investigated whether the harm-content and frame-type of articles influenced 
people’s hypothetical moral judgments regarding the treatment of coronavirus patients. Moral 
appropriateness judgments included both impersonal (adopting role of healthcare worker) and 
personal (adopting role of self) dilemmas. Participants subsequently rated how morally 
acceptable they found the proposed actions within the moral dilemma to be. We conducted a 
repeated-measures ANOVA to test the effect of dilemma type; ‘Personal’ versus 
‘Impersonal’, on people’s moral appropriateness and moral acceptability judgments. Harm-
content and frame-type were included as between-participant factors. A Pearson’s bivariate 
correlation showed none of the demographic, individual differences or key independent 
variables correlated with moral judgments so were not included in the model.  
The ANOVA revealed the average moral appropriateness scores for the ‘Personal’ 
dilemmas were statistically lower than for the ‘Impersonal’ dilemmas, F (1,147) = 19.644, 



























when in the role of a healthcare worker, compared to dilemmas where participants made 
decisions that could impact their friends or relatives. There was no interaction between 
dilemma type and harm-content, F (1,147) = .258, p=.612, partial η2=.002,  or frame-type, F 
(1,147) = <.001, p=.998, partial η2<.001, or between all three factors, F (1,147) = .097, 
p=.756, partial η2=.001. Therefore, across all groups people typically judged utilitarian action 
in the impersonal dilemmas to be more morally appropriate compared to the personal 
dilemmas. A further repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for moral acceptability 
judgments. This time, no effect of dilemma type was found, F (1,147) = .019, p=.890, partial 
η2<.001. Therefore, people rated the moral acceptability of utilitarian action similarly in both 
personal and impersonal dilemmas. There was no interaction between dilemma type and 
harm-content, F (1,147) = 1.503, p=.222, partial η2=.010 or frame-type, F (1,147) = 1.322, 
p=.252, partial η2=.009 , or between all three factors, F (1,147) = .140, p=.709, partial 
η2=.001. Therefore, people typically judged the acceptability of utilitarian actions as more 
similar, regardless of the personal connection to the people in the story. All findings were 
sustained when excluding all health workers from the analyses. Overall, the harm-content and 
frame-type of coronavirus news coverage did not affect people’s moral judgments directly 
related to COVID-19 patients.  
H6. Moral judgments and behavioural intentions 
We used a multivariate regression approach to investigate whether hypothetical moral 
judgments related to the coronavirus crisis predicted people’s behavioural intentions 
associated with COVID-19. Prosocial, antisocial, and preventative behaviours were inputted 
as the dependent variables. ‘Personal’ moral appropriateness scores, ‘Impersonal’ moral 
appropriateness scores, ‘Personal’ moral acceptability ratings and ‘Impersonal’ moral 
acceptability ratings were entered as predictors. We found a main effect of Personal moral 
acceptability scores, F (3, 144) =3.326, p=.021, partial η2=.065. There were no main effects 
of any other predictors. Parameter estimates providing the unstandardized regression 
coefficients, indicated that higher moral acceptability ratings in personal moral dilemmas was 
positively associated with prosocial behaviour during the pandemic, B=.311, p=.006, 95% CI 
[.091 to .531]. Therefore, people who saw it as more acceptable to support utilitarian action 
in their moral judgments, even if that means sacrificing the care of a loved one, may be more 




The media is a powerful source of both information and influence during the 
coronavirus pandemic as we look to news coverage to communicate guidance, alarm and 
reassurance about the evolving health crisis. Here, we explored the influence of a fictitious 
news article on people’s feelings of anxiety, behavioural intentions associated with the 
pandemic and moral judgments associated with the treatment of coronavirus patients. 
Contrary to H1, we did not find that episodic frames or articles higher in harm content 
increased readers anxiety. Instead, in support of H2 we found a tendency to worry about 
painful or unpleasant bodily sensations, as well as people’s subjective appraisals of harm-
salience predicted feelings of anxiety. In H3 we found an interaction between harm-content 
and frame-type influenced subjective appraisals of harm salience; specifically, a greater 
amount of harm-content in the thematic articles, and the use of an episodic frame in low 
harm-content articles strengthened appraisals of harm-salience. Interoceptive sensibility (not 
worrying) also independently predicted stronger harm-salience appraisals. In H4, we 
discovered that higher harm-content in thematic articles, indirectly increased the likelihood 
people would carry out preventative (e.g. social-distancing) and antisocial (e.g. bulk-buying) 
behaviours, by enhancing appraisals of harm salience. These effects, however, were 
conditional upon a certain level of anxiety experienced after reading the articles.  A higher 
level of harm-content also directly decreased the likelihood people would carry out prosocial 
behaviours. We did not find any effects of frame-type or harm content on people’s moral 
judgments (H5), and people’s moral judgments about the treatment of coronavirus patients 
did not predict their real-world behavioural intentions during the pandemic (H6).   
Effects of harm-content and frame-type on harm salience appraisals 
Previous work has shown that episodic frames, explicitly identifying victims are more 
effective at evoking an emotional response from readers (e.g. Aarøe, 2011; Kogut & Ritov, 
2005b; Small & Loewenstein, 2003). Our findings suggest this ‘singularity effect’ did not 
apply to appraisals of harm-salience, as a thematic narrative that was high in harm-content 
was shown to be as powerful for enhancing readers’ appraisals of harm-salience as an 
episodic narrative describing a family’s loss of a son to coronavirus. It is possible that the 
language and metaphors used to describe harm in this article had anthropomorphic qualities, 
which may have generated a more humanised representation of the health service, in a similar 
way to narratives focusing on the emotional experiences of an individual person. 
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Alternatively, the high harm-content articles may have been more effective at amplifying risk 
or threat (Kasperson et al., 2016) associated with coronavirus, due to the balance of 
information regarding the harmful consequences of COVID-19 (Chang, 2012; Klemm et al., 
2016). If participants considered the self-relevant consequences of the harm and suffering of 
others when forming their appraisals, these evaluations may represent some form of self-
oriented harm-salience which was projected onto those within the article. Further work is 
needed to understand whether appraisals regarding the harm and suffering of others depicted 
in media coverage, correlates with self-oriented evaluations of harm, threat or risk discussed 
in the wider health communication literature (e.g. Klemm et al., 2016).  
Interoceptive sensibility, anxiety and harm-salience 
Media coverage has the potential to exacerbate public anxieties of external threats 
(e.g. Bodas et al., 2015; Tabri et al., 2020). Here we have found that individual differences in 
interoception may also provide a vulnerability to experience negative emotional responses to 
distressing media coverage. People with a tendency to worry more about painful or 
unpleasant interoceptive sensations gave stronger appraisals of harm-salience overall and 
were more likely to report feeling anxious after reading the articles. Previous research has 
shown that the interoception ‘not worrying’ dimension is associated with trait anxiety and 
susceptibility to emotionally laden stimuli (Calì et al., 2015; Mehling et al., 2018). This may 
explain why people high in interoceptive sensibility found the harm and suffering of people 
in the news articles to be more salient. Importantly, the average level of anxiety across all 
groups (scores between 44.33-48.86) was considerably higher than healthy population norms 
(e.g. Julian, 2011; Knight, Waal Manning, & Spears, 1983), which is perhaps not surprising 
in the context of a global pandemic. Future research incorporating pre and post-treatment 
anxiety measures could determine whether people with higher levels of interoceptive 
sensibility experience greater increases in anxiety than others, after exposure to pandemic 
news coverage.  
The indirect effect of frame-type and harm-content on behavioural intentions 
A greater amount of harm-content in the thematic articles, and the use of an episodic 
frame in low harm-content articles indirectly boosted intentions to carry out preventative 
behaviours by enhancing perceptions of harm-salience. This may be because episodic frames 
have been shown to encourage individual action by enhancing the saliency of individual 
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responsibility compared to thematic frames (Hart, 2011; Iyengar, 1994). Yet, the fact that 
episodic frames also indirectly increased antisocial behavioural intentions challenges the 
notion that episodic frames were more effective at inducing a sense of social responsibility. 
Anxiety and behavioural intentions 
A sufficiently high level of anxiety after reading coronavirus news coverage was a 
key moderating factor determining whether appraisals of harm-salience translated into 
preventative behaviours, and is consistent with epidemiological research (Bults et al., 2011; 
Jones & Salathé, 2009; Lau et al., 2003; Leung et al., 2005). Interestingly, the indirect effects 
of harm-content and frame-type for predicting antisocial behaviours was only present for 
people experiencing low levels of anxiety. This novel finding indicates a dampened 
emotional response after reading emotive coronavirus articles may lead to more selfish 
behaviours that could have consequences for viral spread. Anxiety did not modulate the 
influence of subjective harm salience on prosocial behaviours, suggesting anxiety did not 
facilitate behaviours benefitting the interests of others. Therefore, as in Hart (2011) we 
suggest that coronavirus articles that evoked a sufficient level of emotional distress, promoted 
egoistically motivated preventative behaviours in an attempt to reduce emotional distress. 
Finally, news articles higher in harm-content directly reduced people’s intention to carry out 
prosocial behaviours including, contacting a friend or relative who might need support and 
keeping informed about the pandemic via the news, which is problematic as keeping alert to 
media information appears to play an important role in encouraging preventative behaviours 
(Bults et al., 2011). Striking the correct balance of emotional arousal has been shown to be 
important for engagement with evocative news coverage (Vettehen, Nuijten, & Peeters, 2008) 
which may explain this finding.  
Influence of coronavirus news coverage on moral judgments 
Readers’ hypothetical moral judgments about the treatment of coronavirus patients 
were less impacted by coronavirus media coverage. Although people typically judged anti-
utilitarian acts in the personal moral dilemmas (adopting the role of self) to be more morally 
appropriate than in the impersonal moral dilemmas (adopting role of healthcare worker), 
these effects were not influenced by either the frame-type or harm-content of the articles. It is 
not surprising that people judged anti-utilitarian or more ‘self-serving’ actions to be more 
morally appropriate for the dilemmas involving friends and family, as self-interested 
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motivations are likely to bias our moral judgments to be less utilitarian (Thomas, Croft, & 
Tranel, 2012). The finding that moral acceptability judgments did not show the same pattern 
of responses between personal and impersonal moral dilemmas is consistent with 
psychological (Tassy et al., 2013) and neuropsychological studies (Berthoz et al., 2006) that 
have found inconsistencies between appropriateness judgments (egocentric) and acceptability 
(allocentric) judgments. 
Dissociation between moral judgments and behaviour  
People’s moral preferences associated with the treatment of coronavirus patients 
provided little indication of their behaviours during the pandemic. This is consistent with 
virtual reality research that has found the hypothetical moral judgments people make, and the 
moral behaviours they carry out in more realistic environments, are often contradictory (e.g. 
Francis et al., 2016; Francis et al., 2017). We did find people who judged it to be more 
morally acceptable to carry out utilitarian action in the personal moral dilemmas, were more 
likely to self-report the intention to carry out prosocial behaviours in the coming weeks, such 
as contacting a loved one or volunteering. Therefore, people who were more willing to 
hypothetically reject superior treatment for a friend or relative [if superior treatment would 
result in poorer outcomes for other people] were more likely to carry out behaviours that 
could have positive outcomes for others during the pandemic. It is possible that these people 
had an underlying altruistic motivation to increase welfare to others (Batson, Fultz, & 
Schoenrade, 1987). Interestingly, people’s moral judgments did not correlate with their 
appraisals of harm-salience or anxiety, unlike the behavioural measures. This suggests that 
the harm-salience of coronavirus news coverage was impactful for shaping individual 
behavioural action but did not sway their underlying moral perspectives.  
Limitations 
We acknowledge several limitations of this research. This study was carried out 
during a unique period of time, when coronavirus was beginning to spread rapidly around the 
world and many countries began to go into lockdown for the first time. The fictitious articles 
created were based on real UK news media, potentially providing a UK-biased perspective on 
issues relating to coronavirus. The findings should be considered within this specific context 
of public discourse in the media, as the public health challenges associated with coronavirus 
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have been unprecedented and continue to develop. Further work in other epidemics or 
pandemics is needed to assess the transferability of findings in other media contexts.  
Secondly, our measure of harm-salience is novel and based on a single item question. 
How harm-salience correlates with other variables such as self-oriented emotional distress 
associated with empathy (Hart, 2011; Sarlo et al., 2014), and risk perception (Klemm et al., 
2016), warrants further exploration. In addition, although each article was evaluated as 
representing categories of high and low harm-content and episodic versus thematic frame-
types, each article discussed different coronavirus ‘topics’ which potentially influenced 
participants in ways we did not capture. Stricter standardisation of media coverage in future 
between-subjects designs would control for content-based confounding variables. Further 
studies would also benefit from including an attention check to be confident that participants 
were engaged with the online tasks. Finally, the behavioural measures we used reflected 
participants ‘intention’ to carry out preventative, prosocial and antisocial behaviours, and do 
not necessarily guarantee real-world behaviours. Longitudinal designs collecting health-
relevant behavioural data during a pandemic would provide invaluable insights into the 
ecological validity of these findings.  
Media framing as a public health strategy  
Media frames that were more effective at increasing the saliency of harm and 
suffering of people impacted by coronavirus influenced how anxious people felt and the 
socially relevant behaviours they intended to carry out during the pandemic. Highly harm-
salient media narratives may represent a double-edged sword which could simultaneously 
encourage people to minimise behaviours that increase the spread of the virus, whilst also 
motivate them to acquire more essential resources than they need or breach public health 
protocols. Deliberately using framing devices as a strategy to influence public health raises 
fundamental ethical questions. Increasing the salience of certain issues in the minds of 
audiences makes readers vulnerable to elite manipulation and may undermine citizen 
competence (Druckman, 2001). However, some evidence suggests that people interpret and 
respond to media frames through the lens of their existing predispositions and perspectives 
(Gross & D’Ambrosio, 2004). Our findings somewhat support this perspective, as it was 
people’s personal appraisals of harm-salience, as opposed to the news coverage 
manipulations per se, that were influential for emotional and behavioural responses to 
coronavirus media coverage. Secondly, an important job of public health communications 
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during a pandemic is to effectively support the public to manage difficult emotions (Lee & 
Basnyat, 2013), which could be hampered by sensationalist news pieces that amplify fear 
(Klemm et al., 2016). However, others have suggested that more sensational news coverage 
can be socially functional for drawing people’s attention towards what acts, or events are 
deemed to be morally acceptable in society (Stevens, 1985). Quantifying the balance of 
‘emotional’ versus factual coronavirus media coverage demands a retrospective analysis of 
the interactions between content, tone, and frame-types (Klemm et al., 2016), as well as the 
perspectives of the receiver (Gross & D’Ambrosio, 2004). Considering the emerging nature 
and scale of the coronavirus pandemic, judging whether dramatising media coverage about 
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Episodic: High harm-content 
 
‘A brutal, evil virus’. Family heartbroken as Covid-19 claims life of teenager 24 hours after 
hospital admittance 
 
On Wednesday afternoon, the family of Joseph Selis said their final goodbyes to him over the phone 
as the teenager tragically became another victim of Covid-19. Hospitals expect more and more 
patients suffering with this deadly disease to come through their doors in the next few weeks. 
 
In a statement his father said, ‘he had so much ahead of him’, ‘it was unbearable to not be able to see 
him when he died. I just couldn’t believe what was happening’ 
 
Jo was admitted to hospital on Tuesday, after a persistent cough worsened. His family said that by 
midnight, he was ‘unable to breathe and in a lot of pain’. He had no underlying health conditions.  
 
‘unable to breathe and in a lot of pain’ 
 
His brother Stephan warns, ‘this is a brutal, evil virus. It doesn’t matter who you are, everyone is at 
risk’.  
 
His family said they are ‘devastated’ and ‘still trying to process’ their tragic loss.  
 
Joseph condition worsened dramatically, after only suffering with a mild temperature on Monday he 
was struggling to breathe the following day and ventilated within 4 hours. The disease was extremely 
aggressive, and Joseph’s lungs eventually stopped working. 
 
‘It was horrible to watch. We weren’t able to do anything’, Stephan said.  
 
In the early hours of Wednesday morning, Joseph got moved to an isolated ward and the hospital staff 
told his family they would be unable to stay due to further risks of contracting and spreading the 
disease. Distraught, Joseph’s family returned home unable to do anything further. 
 
The following day, they received the terrible news that Joseph would not make it after suffering 
respiratory distress for several hours he was not able to fight the virus.  
 
It is becoming clear, that the speed and intensity of this infection is unpredictable, as people of all 
ages with no underlying health conditions continue to die from the disease. 
 
Sadly, health officials predict that many more lives will be lost as they expect the influx of patients 
with the disease to rise considerably over the coming weeks.  
 
The message from government health officials remains the same: 
Stay home. Protect our health service. Save lives. 
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Thematic high harm-content 
 
Healthcare staff redistributed to high-risk areas to deal with ‘overwhelming surge’ of Covid-19 
patients  
 
In an unprecedented move from the government, healthcare workers around the country are being re-
deployed to population-dense regions, as hospitals struggle to respond to the dramatic influx of 
coronavirus patients. 
 
Some rural hospitals, however, are also struggling to manage patients that come through their doors, 
as PPE equipment, ventilators and intensive care specialists are typically much scarcer in these areas.  
 
Dr Penn, a chief medical officer, said hospital capacity has been “pushed to its limits”.  
 
In some cases, “up to 45% of healthcare staff have been unable to attend work” due to personal 
vulnerability or coronavirus symptoms. Healthcare staff face high risks of catching the virus every 
day, often bringing that risk home to their families. 
 
A central hospital yesterday was forced to announce a ‘critical incident’ as they struggled to manage 
new coronavirus patients. A lack of intensive care staff and ventilators meant patients could not 
receive care soon enough, with many transferred to a nearby hospital. 
 
As the death toll rises, government health officials predict this is only the beginning of the emergency, 
as an ‘overwhelming surge’ of patients currently incubating the virus are expected to be admitted in 
the coming weeks. Heads of emergency response and national Ambulance services have expressed 
fears they will be unable to respond to the crushing number of patients requiring transport, as 
emergency callouts are expected to increase by 120 a day. 
 
“Healthcare staff are already exhausted and struggling under the weight of this disease” 
 
The move to spread out healthcare resources, is part of a comprehensive set of measures proposed by 
senior healthcare officials announced yesterday. The military are expected to continue their efforts in 
building new hospitals for those suffering with the disease, but also for patients needing life-saving 
treatment away from the risks of Covid-19. 
 
Jo Selva, a spokesperson for one of the major central hospitals, has said “Healthcare staff are already 
exhausted and struggling under the weight of this disease. Sadly, the influx of very ill patients coming 
through their doors in the next few weeks is likely to greatly exceed previous predictions.” 
 
The message from government health officials remains the same: 
 








Episodic low harm-content 
 
Facing coronavirus everyday: Growing anxiety of shopkeepers and pharmacists told to go to 
work  
 
Keyworkers around the country in our supermarkets, pharmacies and drugstores continue to go to 
work, putting themselves and often their families at risk of catching the virus every day.  
 
Joseph Selis works in a large grocery store and has said he fears for his health constantly. 
“It’s hard not to worry, when we see the news everyday telling people to stay at home and stay safe. I 
can’t do that.” 
 
Although strict social-distancing protocols are in place, Joseph says “it is very difficult to avoid 
people completely” in supermarkets, as the option of home deliveries is still not available for the 
majority of people.  
 
Joseph also expressed concern for those around him; “I live with my parents and have a younger 
brother and sister. I’m scared I’ll accidentally spread the virus to them”. 
 
This is just the beginning, as many key workers could be asked to continue working for several 
months while the majority of the country is advised to stay home.  
 
“I can’t help but think it is more and more likely I will catch the virus” 
 
Pharmacists and drugstores are also under increasing pressure to remain open. Stephan works in a 
busy central pharmacy and is concerned about exposure to people who may have the virus over time. 
 
“We need to stay open to ensure people are able to get the medication they need... I know it’s very 
important but as time goes on, I can’t help but think it is more and more likely I will catch the virus”. 
 
Stephan says he suffered from a bad bout of the flu a few years ago, which meant he was ill for some 
time. Unfortunately, he is not considered ‘high risk’ so “has to keep coming to work”. He is worried 
his poor health in the past may mean he is less equipped to fight the virus if he becomes unwell.  
 
These are no doubt worrying times for those working in public-facing roles every day, as growing 
numbers of bus drivers, taxi drivers and shopkeepers are being admitted to hospital each week with 
coronavirus.  
 
The message from government health officials remains the same: 
 









Thematic low harm-content 
 
‘Too little, too late’. Testing strategy failed to gather vital data in early days of Covid-19 
 
Following predictions from virology experts warning of the severity of Covid-19, the country has seen 
its largest spike in coronavirus cases over the past week, and the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
has condemned the government’s slow approach to testing people for the virus. 
 
A senior spokesperson in the Department for Health made a formal statement this week, 
acknowledging “more should have been done in the beginning to understand the spread of the virus. 
We are directing all of our efforts towards getting large numbers of healthcare workers and civilians 
tested in the coming weeks.” 
 
“We are now playing ‘catch up’ to understand exactly how many people are infected” 
 
Test-building sites around the country have been frantically developing and packaging test kits in 
preparation for mass-testing, which has been more delayed than they expected. It is likely that demand 
for tests may exceed the availability of kits, and large amounts of tests will need to be imported from 
other countries. 
 
Dr Penn, a researcher in one of the leading virology units in the country said “it is a great relief that 
this is beginning to happen now, but some will say it is too little, too late. We are now playing ‘catch 
up’ to understand exactly how many people are infected, and how we can effectively manage this 
virus”. 
 
The WHO has consistently pushed governments to test people very early on, especially in the case of 
novel diseases like Covid-19, as emerging data provides vital information to inform swift and 
effective policy change and ensure the most vulnerable people are protected.  
 
Many countries have been slow to test people for Covid-19, in part due to mathematical modelling 
research using early projection data that was unable to account for the sheer number of people who 
would develop severe cases of the disease.  
 
Jo Selva, a senior public health official, stated earlier today “we have been making very difficult 
decisions in unknown territory which we must learn from. Policy is now rapidly shifting towards a 
testing focus, to better understand the scale and spread of infection”.  
 
The message from government health officials remains the same: 
 









1.You are a physician in a busy hospital where staff and resources are scarce and need to be 
rationed. On your ward, there is a patient using a ventilator who is unable to breathe properly 
without it. Two other patients have recently joined the ward, and are also struggling to 
breathe, but there are no more ventilators available. Without a ventilator soon, the condition 
of these two new patients will worsen and they could both be left unable to breathe while 
waiting. These two patients could manage their coughing and breathlessness by sharing the 
one ventilator of the first patient.  
 
Do you take the ventilator away from the one patient to share between the other two patients?  
 
2.You have escorted an elderly relative to Accident and Emergency at your local hospital at 6 
am in the morning with breathing difficulties and a high temperature and are asked to sit in 
the waiting room as there are no staff available. At 7:30 am two further elderly patients arrive 
to A and E who are experiencing identical symptoms of the same severity. A doctor arrives 
and says the fairest way to choose who is seen next is by random selection.  
 
Do you insist to be seen first?  
 
3.There are 5 very ill coronavirus patients in a waiting room, all requiring urgent attention. 
One of the patients however has further underlying health difficulties which increases their 
health risks without treatment. You are the only doctor available in the emergency room. 
 
Do you treat the patient with underlying health difficulties first?  
 
4.You take one of your family members to hospital to receive treatment for a prolonged fever 
and persistent coughing that is getting worse. A lead nurse in the hospital is also suffering 
with a fever and persistent coughing and is currently unable to do her job until she receives 
treatment. There are long wait times and limited staff available.  
 
Do you insist the nurse receives treatment first?  
 
5.There is an elderly patient and a small child who have both come into hospital with a fever 
and complications from contracting coronavirus that means they require immediate care from 
doctors and nurses. The small child requires care from their parents and is unable to self-
isolate completely during their stay in hospital which could mean the virus is spread to others. 
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Staff numbers are low in the department, and as the lead medical professional you need to 
decide who receives care first which could mean that the other patients condition worsens 
while they wait.  
 
Do you treat the child first and risk the condition of the elderly patient worsening?  
 
6. You have escorted a close friend who lives in a very rural area to a city hospital to receive 
treatment for severe flu symptoms and cough. They have no other relatives/friends nearby 
and no other means of transport, and you suspect they may have coronavirus. Your friend is 
ventilated within a few hours to support their breathing. After a few hours, the doctor asks 
whether they could remove the ventilator from your friend for a short time, so that another 
patient may share this resource.  
 





















Data reduction and additional analyses 
 
Data reduction  
Partially completed questionnaires were removed from the analysis. Statistical 
analysis was carried out with SPSS v.26. A Pearson’s bivariate correlation analysis including 
all of the key independent and dependent variables was conducted. The SPSS scripts for 
moderation, mediation and conditional process analyses (PROCESS) were adopted from 
Hayes (2018). For all moderation analyses carried out in PROCESS, interactions are probed 
at the 16th, 50th and 84th percentiles by default. The Johnson-Neyman technique 
implemented in PROCESS was used to identify regions of significance for moderation effects 
as recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2013). A bootstrapping method was adopted for 
all PROCESS regression analyses (5000 x samples, 95% confidence interval) (Hayes, 2018a). 
Leverage points and influential data points with standardised residuals ± 3 standard 
deviations were investigated. No outliers were removed from the analysis. Homogeneity of 
variances was determined by Levene’s test for equality of variances. Homoscedasticity was 
assessed by visual inspection of standardised residuals plotted against the predicted values. In 
H2, the assumption of normality for an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) as assessed by a 
Shapiro-Wilk test was violated for the dependent variable ‘anxiety’ in the high harm-content 
thematic group and for the dependent variable ‘subjective harm salience’ in the episodic low 
harm-content group. Moral appropriateness judgments in R2 also demonstrated non-normal 
distribution and Levene’s test of equality of variances was violated. As groups were close in 
size and ANOVA’s considered relatively robust to deviations of normality the dependent 
variables were not transformed.  
Scale reliabilities 
Internal reliabilities for interoception subscale ‘noticing’ (Cronbach’s α = .792), ‘not 
distracting’ (α = .831), and ‘not worrying’ (α = .753) all indicated good internal consistency. 







Sex (r=.223, p=.006) and age (r=-.268, p=.001) showed significant correlation with 
anxiety ratings, with older people typically reporting lower levels of anxiety and women 
reporting higher levels of anxiety than men. Greater anxiety after reading the articles was 
associated with higher ratings of harm-salience for the news articles (r=.258, p=.001). 
Therefore, people who found the harm and suffering of others in the news stories to be more 
striking or salient, also experienced greater levels of anxiety.  
Subjective harm-salience 
SHS did not show any correlation with age (r=-.016, p=.851) or sex (r=-.021, 
p=.802), but was positively associated with subjective deadliness of COVID-19 (r=.161, 
p=.048). As this measure correlated with the interoception (not worrying) subscale, it was not 
included in the ANCOVA. 
Interoception 
The interoception subscales (‘noticing’, ‘not distracting’ and ‘not worrying’) did not 
show any correlation with each other, confirming the independence of these constructs. 
People scoring lower on the ‘not worrying’ subscale were more likely to report high levels of 
anxiety (r=-.291, p<.005); perceive coronavirus to be more threatening (r=-.224, p=.006); and 
believed it to be more likely that they or someone they knew would die from the disease (r=-
.195, p=.016). This is in line with previous findings (Mehling et al., 2018) and suggests that 
people who typically worried about unpleasant or painful bodily sensations had more extreme 
health concerns surrounding the virus and experienced greater anxiety after reading the 
COVID-19 news articles. The ‘noticing’ and ‘not distracting’ subscales were not correlated 
with anxiety. People scoring lower on the ‘not distracting’ subscale were more likely to 
report that they would find it unpleasant staying at home during lockdown (r=.268, p=.001), 
suggesting people who were less able to be present with bodily sensations expected it to be 




Individual and demographic factors associated with behavioural intentions 
We explored individual and demographic factors associated with preventative, 
prosocial and antisocial behaviours with a Pearson’s bivariate correlation. Women were 
significantly more likely to carry out preventative (r=.322, p<.0005) and prosocial behaviours 
(r=.173, p=.033), with men more likely to carry out antisocial behaviours (r=-.164, p=.045). 
People who perceived a greater threat from COVID-19 were more likely to carry out 
preventative behaviours (r=.347, p<.0005). People finding it more unpleasant to stay at home 
were less likely to carry out preventative behaviours (r=-.207, p=.011) and more likely to 
carry out antisocial behaviours such as breaking protocol or bulk buying (r=.221, p=.007). 
People who knew someone who had tested positive with the virus were less likely to carry 
out antisocial behaviours (r=-161, p=.049). Age, number of cases nearby, and subjective 
deadliness of COVID-19 did not predict any of the behavioural measures. Overall, these 
findings suggest that women were more likely to carry out behaviours to keep themselves and 
others safe during the pandemic. Unpleasant experiences of staying at home are also likely to 
contribute to behaviours that could heighten people’s risk of catching and spreading the virus. 
Principal Component analyses  
For both of the Principal Component analyses, Bartletts test of sphericity was 
significant (p<.0005), suggesting the data was appropriate for factor analysis. The Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure was .639, a mediocre level of sampling adequacy (Kaiser & 
Rice, 1974). 
Mediating role of SHS in relationship between interoception and anxiety 
A mediation analysis using PROCESS (Model 4, Hayes, 2018) was implemented to 
investigate whether interoception indirectly affected anxiety by influencing appraisals of 
harm salience. We found interoception directly influenced anxiety ratings (t=-3.380, 
p=<.0005, 95% CI: -6.064 to -1.589) and was not mediated by SHS, as confidence intervals 
for the indirect effect included zero (-1.0319 to .0448). Moreover, a simple moderation 
analysis (Model 1: Hayes, 2018), showed the effect of SHS on anxiety ratings was not 
moderated by interoception (not worrying) (R² chng =.0001, F (1, 147) =.0141, p=.9058). 
This suggests that a tendency to worry about bodily sensations and subjective appraisals of 
harm-salience independently increased anxiety ratings. 
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Study 4 Postface 
 
Paper:  
Brown, H., Fraser, D. S., Farmer, H., & Proulx, M. J. (2020). The salience of harm: the 
framing and harm-content of coronavirus media articles indirectly influences preventative 
and antisocial behaviours during the pandemic [Unpublished thesis]. University of Bath. 
 
The key finding from this study was that subjective appraisals of harm salience 
influenced behavioural intentions associated with the pandemic. Harm salience has not been 
captured in previous studies exploring media-effects and suggests a promising avenue for 
future public health research during pandemics. This measure conceptualised how salient or 
striking people found the harm and suffering of those in the article to be and indicates that 
our emotional response to the suffering of others during this pandemic could be strong 
enough to change behaviours that impact public health. In particular, we found that highly 
harm-salient thematic narratives were just as impactful for appraisals of harm-salience as 
episodic narratives. This suggests that narratives need not pull at the heart strings of readers 
with narrowly focused, evocative stories of individuals to generate powerful emotional 
responses from readers. Thematic narratives that aim to provide useful contextual information 
regarding the coronavirus crisis in wider society, may be as effective for emphasising harm 
on a larger scale whilst also providing audiences with the ‘bigger picture’.  
The finding that the ‘not worrying’ subscale of interoception influenced subjective 
appraisals of harm salience, highlighted a potentially important individual differences factor 
in how people respond to health-crisis information in the media. People who typically worry 
about unpleasant or painful bodily sensations, reported greater anxiety after reading the 
article and found the harm associated with coronavirus to be more salient when controlling 
for the frame-type and harm-content of the articles. This suggests that how much people 
worry about their own bodily sensations has implications for how they interpret the harm and 
suffering of others, but it is unclear whether this is an empathic response to the suffering of 
others or a self-oriented distress that is triggered by highly salient illness-related media. As 
subjective harm salience and anxiety emerged as key factors influencing preventative and 
antisocial behavioural intentions during the pandemic, the role of interoceptive sensibility in 
health behaviours warrants much further investigation. Anxiety appears to provide a useful 
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self-oriented emotional response encouraging people to protect themselves, and indirectly 
protecting others from viral spread during the pandemic. However, anxiety did not appear to 
provide any benefit for prosocial behaviours, or for the moral dilemma task. This is consistent 
with Studies 1-3, that did not find anxiety to be associated with moral judgments or behaviour 
that directly concern the wellbeing of others. It is possible that there are more complex 
interactions between anxiety, interoception and moral judgment that may come to light in 
study designs using clinical populations or those involving direct manipulations of anxiety.   
The findings from this study suggest the saliency of harm can be enhanced in text-
based media and may have implications for real-world behaviours during the pandemic. 
However, harm salience was not associated with moral judgments about the treatment of 
coronavirus patients, suggesting that appraisals of harm and suffering of others may not 
influence moral judgments that are hypothetical and thus inconsequential in regard to the 
pandemic.  Further work is needed to establish the mechanism of appraisals of harm-salience 
in more real-world health contexts, and in moral dilemma research to understand whether 
people’s subjective appraisals of harm are associated with traits such as action aversion and 
outcome aversion (Miller et al., 2014) and response tendencies of harm-aversion and 













Damasio (1996) proposed that somatic signals and homeostatic states in the body are 
intrinsically linked to social decision-making because personal and social issues are strongly 
tied to outcomes of punishment and reward. ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ are felt physically and 
emotionally as pleasure and pain which are represented, alongside homeostatic states within 
the somatosensory system (Damasio, 1996). We have found that individual differences in 
interoception can interact with emotional and physiological processes to influence moral 
judgments and behaviour in numerous ways. In particular interoceptive accuracy, moderated 
the relationship between physiological arousal and moral judgments of harm. Interoceptive 
accuracy also predicted a lengthening of pre-ejection period in VR moral dilemmas, which 
was also associated with differences in response time to carry out harmful action. 
Interoceptive sensibility indirectly influenced harm-aversion responses to a moral dilemma 
task, and a tendency to worry about bodily sensations increased appraisals of harm salience 
of coronavirus media articles, which predicted preventative and antisocial behavioural 
intentions during the pandemic. These findings provide further support for the Somatic 
Marker Hypothesis (Damasio, 1996) and are consistent with evidence from studies with 
patients with VMPfC damage, that show how the physiological representation of emotional 
states may influence harm-based moral decision-making (Damasio et al.,1990; Koenigs et al., 
2007; Moretto et al., 2010; Young et al., 2010). The lack of association found between 
distinct measures of interoception in study 2 and 3, also provide further support for the 
dimensional model of interoception developed by Garfinkel and Critchley (2013). 
This thesis builds on previous work, by establishing how individual differences in 
interoceptive capacities in healthy populations can influence harm-based moral decision-
making, indicating that the relationship between bodily signals and moral decision-making 
may be stronger for some people than others. Perhaps most significantly, our findings suggest 
that an ability to consciously direct attention to heartbeats can modulate the relationship 
between changes in physiological arousal and moral judgments and behaviour.  Furthermore, 
this work adds to previous research using traditional moral dilemma paradigms (Greene et al., 
2001, 2004; Sarlo et al., 2014), by using moral dilemma stimuli that can establish harm-
aversion and outcome-maximisation response tendencies or inclinations (Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013) as well as contrasting an allocentric measure of moral judgment. This 
allowed a more nuanced investigation of how emotional and interoceptive processes may be 
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linked with distinct socio-emotional motivations driving choice judgments (i.e. Would 
you…?), and acceptability judgments of harmful acts (i.e. How acceptable do you find…?) 
(Tassy et al., 2013). We have also shown for the first time, how a sub-construct of 
interoceptive sensibility may present a dispositional vulnerability to harm-salient news media 
about coronavirus, which may influence social behaviour during the pandemic with 
consequences for viral spread. Study 3 and 4 compliment findings from study 1 and 2 using 
text-based moral dilemma paradigms, to show how interoceptive processes may be associated 
with moral behaviour in more ecologically valid contexts. Although the cross-sectional and 
behavioural study designs used, prevent us from drawing conclusions about the neural bases 
of the effects found, this work can complement neuropsychological research linking the 
processing of somatic markers in the brain to observable phenomena using moral dilemma 
paradigms, such as those measuring event-related potentials while carrying out moral 
dilemma tasks (Sarlo et al., 2014; Yoder & Decety, 2014).  
Summary of findings 
In Study 1, we found that a tendency to notice internal sensations (interoceptive 
sensibility) indirectly increased harm-aversion response tendencies on a moral dilemma task, 
which was mediated by a greater tendency to provide ‘intuitive’ answers when faced with 
cognitively demanding problems. The complexity and length of the moral dilemma stimuli 
used potentially combined with the low task-engagement of people completing online 
research, may be partly responsible for this effect. People with a greater tendency to rely on 
intuitive heuristics, may be more likely to support harmful action on congruent (i.e. non-
moral conflict dilemmas) if they have not fully considered the context and outcomes of the 
problem. In addition, the interoceptive state of hunger appeared to be uniquely influential for 
allocentric judgments of non-utilitarian harmful acts, suggesting that self-reports of hunger-
type sensations may predict greater acceptance of harmful acts when in the role of observer, 
potentially due to an absence of disgust sensations that may be triggered by the release of 
satiety hormones (Halawi et al., 2017; Vicario et al., 2018).  
In Study 2, we found several moderation effects of interoceptive accuracy on the 
relationship between physiological arousal and moral judgments. Notably, on incongruent 
trials, a greater increase in cardiovascular indices of sympathetic arousal (threat reactivity) 
predicted reduced harm-aversion tendencies, whereas, increased heart rate predicted greater 
harm-aversion tendencies and decreased heart rate predicted outcome-maximisation 
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tendencies, but only for people who were relatively better at perceiving heartbeats. Although 
we are not able to establish the causal mechanisms discussed in predictive coding models of 
interoception (Apps & Tsakiris, 2014; Ainley et al., 2016; Farb et al., 2015; Seth & Friston, 
2016) that may underlie these effects, we speculate that heartbeat detection ability may 
selectively modulate the influence of changes in physiological arousal on moral decision-
making. Possibly due to a greater ability to enhance the precision of cardiovascular signals 
with attention (Ainley et al., 2016), better heartbeat perceivers may demonstrate greater non-
reactivity to surprising interoceptive sensations afforded by perceptual forms of inference that 
prioritise precision of bodily information (Farb et al., 2015). A greater sensitivity to 
interoceptive sensations may facilitate adaptive regulation strategies (Füstös et al., 2013; 
Kever et al., 2015) that temper overt behavioural responses to changes in physiological 
arousal; selectively attenuating or strengthening the relationship between physiological 
arousal and moral judgments.  
In Study 3, a virtual-reality moral dilemma study, we found interoceptive accuracy 
was associated with relatively reduced sympathetic cardiovascular arousal (pre-ejection 
period; PEP) prior to taking harmful action on incongruent trials. PEP reactivity was 
associated with different response time patterns, depending on the nature of the harmful 
action taken in a semi-autonomic vehicle (button-press versus foot-pedal). This suggests that 
a superior ability to detect heartbeats could influence response time to carry out harmful 
action in moral dilemma driving tasks. Further work is needed to understand whether reduced 
PEP reactivity demonstrated by better heartbeat detectors is due to a relatively greater 
motivational challenge state (Tomaka et al., 1993), or reduced physical and cardiovascular 
effort to carry out the harmful actions (Herbert et al., 2007). If the latter is true, capturing 
individual differences in interoception would be pertinent for future psychophysiological 
studies exploring moral behaviour in VR environments. Study 2 and 3 contribute to literature 
exploring the role of embodiment and personal harm in VR moral dilemmas (Francis et al., 
2016; Francis et al., 2017) and psychophysiological studies exploring the role of sympathetic 
cardiovascular arousal in action-based aversion to harm (Cushman et al., 2012; Parton & 
McGinley, 2019), by showing that changes in physiological arousal generated by the prospect 
of harming others, may be moderated by an ability to perceive cardiac sensations.  
Although we found some interesting significant relationships between interoception 
and moral decision-making in studies 1-3, we did not find evidence that any of interoception 
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measures directly influenced moral decision-making or behaviour. The effects found were 
either moderated or mediated, suggesting that individual differences in interoception alone 
are unlikely to be useful to predict moral decision-making in moral dilemmas of harm. In 
addition, our measures of interoceptive sensibility and interoceptive meta-cognitive 
awareness did not influence moral decision-making or moderate the influence of emotional 
arousal on decision-making in studies 1-3. Gastric sensitivity using the water load task, also 
did not show any relation to the moral behaviour outcomes in study 3 and did not interact 
with any of the primary dependent variables in study 2.  The absence of relationships found 
between these interoception parameters indicates that the relationship between physiological 
arousal and moral decision-making is uniquely influenced by individual differences in 
interoceptive accuracy. We can take from this that a tendency to notice bodily sensations and 
an awareness of one’s ability to detect heartbeat sensations may be less relevant to moral 
decision-making processes when considering moral judgments of harm. However, further 
work is needed to understand whether dimensions of interoception, potentially exploring and 
comparing other measures of interoception, could interact with each other to directly 
influence moral decision-making alone or modulate the link between emotional arousal and 
moral decision-making.  
Finally, in study 4, we found that subjective appraisals of harm salience of 
coronavirus media content and feelings of anxiety predicted preventative, prosocial and 
antisocial behavioural intentions during the pandemic. Greater anxiety and harm-salience 
were associated with a tendency to worry about painful or unpleasant bodily sensations - a 
sub-construct of interoceptive sensibility (Mehling et al., 2012). This suggests that when 
exposed to harm-salient media coverage, a negative attentional focus on bodily sensations 
could shape how people feel and behave, which could have implications for viral spread in 
useful ways (preventative behaviours) and in less useful ways (antisocial behaviours). Media-
coverage of the coronavirus pandemic is inherently political, and these findings are pertinent 
to consider in the context of ‘visceral politics’ (Tsakiris, 2020). How harm is made salient in 
the media, potentially as a tool to emphasise normative guidance around how we ‘should’ be 
conducting ourselves during the pandemic, has implications on a societal scale for how safe 
people feel and the behaviours they are likely to engage in (Tsakiris, 2020).  
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Implications and future research 
There is much scope to explore the role of interoception across other types of moral 
decision-making and behaviour in different contexts. The role of disgust sensations and 
disgust sensitivity has already been highlighted as a factor influencing judgments of others 
ethical violations of harm which may be triggered by homeostatic changes associated with 
satiety (Vicario et al., 2018), which may also be modulated by interoceptive sensibility 
(Schnall et al., 2008). Feelings of disgust have shown to be associated with activation of the 
insula cortex (Wright et al., 2004), which is a key area implicated in interoceptive and 
emotional experiences (Zaki et al., 2012). Future research using other measures of 
interoception, potentially alongside measures of gastric myoelectrical activity could provide 
insight into the mechanisms underlying these effects.  It may also shed light on why cardiac 
and gastric forms of interoception were associated with moral judgments in different ways, 
and not associated with each other in the current study and also in a recent study that did not 
find support for a generalised interoceptive ability across channels (Ferentzi et al., 2018a). In 
addition, other research has found different effects of emotional regulation difficulties, 
arousal and valence on moral judgments across the domains of Harm, Fairness, Authority, 
Loyalty and Sanctity (Zhang et al., 2017). Therefore, individual differences in emotional 
regulation and perhaps interoception, may influence moral judgments in other moral 
domains, depending on the nature and strength of the emotion experienced.  
Secondly, although interoceptive accuracy has shown to be a relatively stable trait 
(Ferentzi et al., 2018b), there is evidence to suggest that interoceptive accuracy may be 
momentarily enhanced, for example using direct gaze to heighten self-awareness (Isomura & 
Watanabe, 2020) or use of biofeedback (Meyerholz et al., 2019). Therefore, interoceptive 
accuracy could present a promising ‘leverage point’ to alter the relationship between somatic 
states and moral decision-making in real-world contexts. In particular, heartbeat detection 
ability using a heartbeat counting task has been associated with antisocial behaviour in 
forensic populations (Nentjes et al., 2013). Although individual, genetic and environmental 
factors contributing to criminal behaviour are undoubtedly complex and interrelated, it is 
possible that enhancing people’s ability to perceive somatic sensations associated with 
punishment and reward (Damasio, 1996), if sustained in the longer term, could have positive 
behavioural outcomes among forensic populations.  Importantly, Nentjes et al (2013) 
highlight that the cross-sectional nature of the study means it is not possible to determine 
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causality in the relationship between expressions of antisocial behaviour and heartbeat 
detection ability. Developmental studies exploring interoception and moral decision-making 
and behaviour in children may shed light on how interoceptive processes are related to 
psychopathology and anti-social behaviour over time. A recent study found overweight 
adolescents showed atypical insular activation prior to risky decision making, specifically, 
decreased activation of brain regions associated with risk, and increased activation of brain 
regions associated with reward during a Risky-Gains task (Delgado-Rico et al., 2013). This 
shows how the processing of visceral signals may influence complex decision-making at a 
young age. Heartbeat detection ability in adults has also been associated with enhanced 
decision-making ability in the Iowa Gambling task (Werner et al., 2009). Further work is 
needed to understand how interoceptive processes in childhood may be associated with moral 
decision-making, and whether interoceptive capacities of children such as heartbeat detection 
ability, may be more malleable or receptive to interventions that improve sensitivity to 
somatic sensations.  
Thirdly, investigating the role of interoceptive processes and experiences of presence 
in conjunction with emotional and physiological processes in moral dilemma tasks, may 
further shed light on the distinct emotional and psychological processes governing moral 
judgment and action that were discussed by Francis et al (2016, 2017) in their comparisons of 
text-based and virtual reality moral choices. Understanding the difference in homeostatic 
drivers and interoceptive processes recruited during text-based versus immersive moral 
dilemma scenarios, may also be useful to illuminate the regulatory mechanisms that underlie 
physiological and behavioural responses to harm-based moral dilemmas. Further 
investigations could also clarify whether performance on heartbeat discrimination tasks  
(Whitehead et al., 1977) show the same relationships as heartbeat detection ability with moral 
judgments and arousal found in Study 2 and 3. In particular, using this task may provide more 
understanding of whether a person’s ability to integrate cardiac sensory information with 
external sensory information (Forkmann et al., 2016) is important in the relationship between 
physiological arousal and moral decision-making. 
Furthermore, VR moral dilemma studies investigating individual differences in 
physiological responses preceding emergency situations, offers a promising methodology for 
testing artificial intelligence technology currently being trialled in autonomous vehicles, that 
incorporate driver data into crash prediction algorithms. Ethically, it is not possible to 
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comprehensively explore the behaviour of drivers in real collision events on the road. VR 
simulations and advanced car simulators may be the best we can do to better understand 
factors that predict harm-avoidance or ‘anti-utilitarian’ behaviours of drivers in automated 
vehicles. It also allows the opportunity to investigate the impact of novel automated functions 
and driving actions (such as swopping an accelerator pedal with a button) in automated 
vehicles, in more ecologically valid and sensorially rich environments that offer a greater 
level of experimental control than field experiments. Future research measuring real-time 
physiological data and moral behaviour of drivers in VR driving-dilemmas, could provide 
useful sample data to inform supervised-learning models of AI (Ba et al., 2017) and 
physiological classifier systems in SA vehicles (Veeraraghavan et al., 2007) that are designed 
to calculate crash probabilities in real-time.  
Finally, future research could explore interactions between interoception, presence 
and agency in VR moral dilemmas. Agency is defined as the experience of being in control of 
one’s body and the external world. Predictive coding models have linked experiences of 
agency, interoceptive processing and conscious experiences of presence (Seth, 2013; Seth et 
al., 2012; Farb et al, 2015), which could be informative for understanding individual 
differences in moral behaviours carried out in VR moral dilemmas. Issues of agency are also 
particularly relevant to consider in the context of human-computer interactions as the design 
of these interactions can influence both explicit and implicit forms of agency (see Limerick et 
al., 2014). When considering the design of human-computer interactions, such as the 
interfaces used in autonomous vehicles, it would be worthwhile to investigate whether the 
nature of an interaction that could have consequences for the wellbeing of others (such as 
novel driving actions), interferes with experiences of agency and also a sense of moral 
responsibility of human supervisors who ultimately bare legal accountability for these 
vehicles (Limerick et al., 2014).  
In conclusion, this thesis has demonstrated that individual differences in interoception 
can influence responses to harm-based moral decision-making, suggesting that the emotional 
processes believed to precipitate moral judgments of harm (e.g. Cushman et al., 2012; Greene 
et al., 2001; Reynolds & Conway, 2018) may depend on how we perceive and interpret 
somatic signals in our body (Damasio, 1996). People who are better at perceiving their 
heartbeats may generate heightened physiological responses to aversive moral dilemma 
stimuli. Interoceptive accuracy also appears to moderate the relationship between 
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cardiovascular indices of arousal and harm-aversion, outcome-maximisation in text-based 
paradigms and response time for harmful action in VR dilemmas. In addition, individual 
differences in how much people worry about painful or unpleasant sensations within their 
body may influence how they respond to harm-salient media about coronavirus, and the 
socially relevant behaviours they intend to carry out during the pandemic and suggests this 
may be a worthwhile construct to explore in the context of socially-relevant health 
behaviours. Further work is needed to establish how interoceptive processes may interact 
with emotional and physiological processes to influence moral judgment and behaviour 
across a range of domains and contexts. Future VR moral dilemma studies incorporating 
measures of interoception have a lot to offer in terms of understanding how interoceptive 
processes may interact with arousal, and reports of conscious presence and agency (Seth et 
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